wpa-supplicant: upgrade to 2.5

wpa-supplicant: upgrade to 2.5

1. upgrade to 2.5
2. remove eight patches since they have been applied in 2.5
3. update SRC_URI, HOMEPAGE and BUGTRACKER to use w1.fi instead

(From OE-Core rev: 80af821d1240a1fc2b32379b75801571db562657)

Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

9 files changed, 6 insertions, 452 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 882674fe5b..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
-
-The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
-length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
-negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
-buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
-so, resulting in segmentation fault.
-
-This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
-attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
-hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
-drivers).
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
-index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
---- a/src/ap/wmm.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
-                return;
-        }
- 
-+       if (left < 0)
-+               return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
-+
-        /* extract the tspec info element */
-        if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
-                hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a2bafc8c46..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b0926..a629437 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-        BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-        u16 offset;
-        u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+       size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+       if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+               ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-+       prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+       order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+       if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                          (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+                          (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
- 
-        if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-            ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-        u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
-        int offset;
- 
-+       if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+               ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-+       if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                          (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-        /*
-         * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
-         *      prf
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e108a931c0..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
- (CVE-2015-1863)
-
-This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
-p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
-was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
-arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
-dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
-heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
-peer discovery purposes.
-
-This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
-behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
-due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
-and potentially arbitrary code execution.
-
-Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
-hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <yue.tao@windriver.com>
-
----
- src/p2p/p2p.c |    1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
-+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
-        if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
-                os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-        if (msg.ssid &&
-+           msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
-            (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
-             os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
-             != 0)) {
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2568ea1124..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
-                                        if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
-                                                goto bad;
-                                        h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+                                       if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+                                           h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+                                               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                                                          "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+                                                          h->chunk_size);
-+                                               goto bad;
-+                                       }
-                                        /* throw away chunk header
-                                         * so we have only real data
-                                         */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c477c2f93c..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-        BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-        EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
-        int res = 0;
-+       size_t prime_len, order_len;
- 
-        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
- 
-+       prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+       order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+       if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                          (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+                          (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-        if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-            ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-            ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-        u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
-        int offset;
- 
-+       if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                          (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-        /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
-        grp = htons(data->group_num);
-        ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e46ce436e1..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index a629437..1d2079b 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
-         * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
-         */
-        if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+               if (len < 2) {
-+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                                  "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+                       ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+                       return NULL;
-+               }
-                tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
-                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
-                           "total length = %d", tot_len);
-                if (tot_len > 15000)
-                        return NULL;
-+               if (data->inbuf) {
-+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                                  "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+                       ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+                       return NULL;
-+               }
-                data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
-                if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
-                        wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a4c02b4745..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
-         * the first fragment has a total length
-         */
-        if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+               if (len < 2) {
-+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                                  "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+                       return;
-+               }
-                tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
-                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
-                           "length = %d", tot_len);
-                if (tot_len > 15000)
-                        return;
-+               if (data->inbuf) {
-+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                                  "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+                       return;
-+               }
-                data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
-                if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
-                        wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4073600732..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
-
-The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
-whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
-fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
-for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
-triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
-due to invalid buffer allocation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
-        /*
-         * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
-         */
-+       lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
-        len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
-        if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
-                resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb
index a124cf21d9..21263771ed 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.5.bb
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 SUMMARY = "Client for Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)"
-HOMEPAGE = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
-BUGTRACKER = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/bugz/"
+HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
+BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/"
 SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "BSD"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=36b27801447e0662ee0138d17fe93880 \
                     file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=7f393579f8b109fe91f3b9765d26c7d3 \
-                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=3430fda79f2ba1dd545f0b3c4d6e4d24 "
+                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=3430fda79f2ba1dd545f0b3c4d6e4d24"
 DEPENDS = "dbus libnl libgcrypt"
 RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"
 
@@ -18,23 +18,15 @@ inherit systemd
 SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "wpa_supplicant.service wpa_supplicant-nl80211@.service wpa_supplicant-wired@.service"
 SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE = "disable"
 
-SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
+SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz  \
            file://defconfig \
            file://wpa-supplicant.sh \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
-           file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \
-           file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \
-           file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \
-           file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \
-           file://0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch \
-           file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch \
-           file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \
-           file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \
           "
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "96ff75c3a514f1f324560a2376f13110"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}"