1 files changed, 0 insertions, 77 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a2bafc8c46..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
-
-From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b0926..a629437 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-        BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-        u16 offset;
-        u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+       size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+       if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+               ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-+       prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+       order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+       if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                          (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+                          (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
- 
-        if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-            ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-        u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
-        int offset;
- 
-+       if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+               ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-+       if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                          (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+               goto fin;
-+       }
-+
-        /*
-         * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
-         *      prf
--- 
-1.9.1
-