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From 0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 21:29:52 +0100
Subject: mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Stratulat <adrian.stratulat@enea.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1]
CVE: CVE-2019-9213
---
mm/mmap.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f901065c4c64..fc1809b1bed6 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2426,12 +2426,11 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
- int error;
+ int error = 0;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
- error = security_mmap_addr(address);
- if (error)
- return error;
+ if (address < mmap_min_addr)
+ return -EPERM;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
--
cgit 1.2-0.3.lf.el7
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