2 files changed, 109 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3adb981fb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 05:23:03 +0000
+Subject: upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to
+
+prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the
+best-preference default algorithm.
+
+feedback and ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f
+
+Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com>
+---
+ sshconnect2.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+CVE: CVE-2020-14145
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d]
+Comment: Refreshed first hunk
+
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 347e348c..f64aae66 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+@@ -102,12 +102,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+        return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
++static char *
++first_alg(const char *algs)
++{
++       char *ret, *cp;
++
++       ret = xstrdup(algs);
++       if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
++               *cp = '\0';
++       return ret;
++}
++
+ static char *
+ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ {
+-       char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
++       char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
++       char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
+        size_t maxlen;
+-       struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
++       struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
+        int ktype;
+        u_int i;
+ 
+@@ -119,6 +132,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+        for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+                load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+ 
++       /*
++        * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
++        * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
++        * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
++        * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
++        * plain keys if necessary.
++        */
++       best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++       if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
++           sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
++               debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
++                   "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
++               ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++               goto out;
++       }
++
++       /*
++        * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
++        * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
++        */
+        oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+        maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+        first = xmalloc(maxlen);
+@@ -159,6 +192,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+        if (*first != '\0')
+                debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
+ 
++ out:
++       free(best);
+        free(first);
+        free(last);
+        free(hostname);
+-- 
+cgit v1.2.3
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb
index 6ed54a8139..64a0a72a8f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://fix-potential-signed-overflow-in-pointer-arithmatic.patch \
            file://sshd_check_keys \
            file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671"
@@ -35,7 +36,17 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-2768"
 # and when running in a Kerberos environment. As such it is not relevant to OpenEmbedded
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-9278"
 
-# CVE only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries
+# As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp
+# which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion
+# problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used
+# by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of
+# scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15778"
+
+# CVE-2008-3844 was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and
+# certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable
+# as our source is OpenBSD. https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730
+# https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844"
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"