openssl: upgrade 3.0.15 -> 3.0.16

Release information:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.0/NEWS.md#major-changes-between-openssl-3015-and-openssl-3016-11-feb-2025

All CVEs were already patched, so this upgrade fixes only minor bugs.

Remove CVE patches included in the new version.

(From OE-Core rev: 68c01710e3522af317f8fe09465b56e6aca01615)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>

3 files changed, 1 insertions, 330 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-13176.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-13176.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0076003db1..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-13176.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-From 07272b05b04836a762b4baa874958af51d513844 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:27:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation
-
-There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of
-the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant
-probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular
-the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the
-attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or
-must have a very fast network connection with low latency.
-
-Attacks on ECDSA nonce are also known as Minerva attack.
-
-Fixes CVE-2024-13176
-
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26429)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 63c40a66c5dc287485705d06122d3a6e74a6a203)
-
-CVE: CVE-2024-13176
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/07272b05b04836a762b4baa874958af51d513844]
-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
----
- crypto/bn/bn_exp.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++------
- crypto/ec/ec_lib.c  |  7 ++++---
- include/crypto/bn.h |  3 +++
- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
-index 598a592ca1397..d84c7de18a6b6 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
-@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
-  * out by Colin Percival,
-  * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
-  */
--int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-+int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-                               BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
- {
-@@ -623,10 +623,6 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-     unsigned int t4 = 0;
- #endif
- 
--    bn_check_top(a);
--    bn_check_top(p);
--    bn_check_top(m);
--
-     if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
-         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
-         return 0;
-@@ -1146,7 +1142,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-             goto err;
-     } else
- #endif
--    if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
-+    if (!bn_from_mont_fixed_top(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
-         goto err;
-     ret = 1;
-  err:
-@@ -1160,6 +1156,19 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-+int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-+                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+                              BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
-+{
-+    bn_check_top(a);
-+    bn_check_top(p);
-+    bn_check_top(m);
-+    if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont))
-+        return 0;
-+    bn_correct_top(rr);
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
- int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                          const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
- {
-diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
-index b1696d93bd6dd..1f0bf1ec795fa 100644
---- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
-+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
- #include "crypto/ec.h"
-+#include "crypto/bn.h"
- #include "internal/nelem.h"
- #include "ec_local.h"
- 
-@@ -1262,10 +1263,10 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
-     if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e))
-         goto err;
-     /*-
--     * Exponent e is public.
--     * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-+     * Although the exponent is public we want the result to be
-+     * fixed top.
-      */
--    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
-+    if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
-         goto err;
- 
-     ret = 1;
-diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
-index c5f328156d3a9..59a629b9f6288 100644
---- a/include/crypto/bn.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
-@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words);
-  */
- int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
-                           BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
-+int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-+                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+                              BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
- int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
-                          BN_CTX *ctx);
- int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-9143.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-9143.patch
deleted file mode 100755
index c72a4193c6..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-9143.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-From 72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.
-
-The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
-(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
-to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
-
-These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
-reduction.  A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
-polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
-its final element).
-
-Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
-precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
-could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
-
-The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
-standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
-See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
-
-    https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
-
-The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
-basis X9.62 forms.
-
-This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
-the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
-
-Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
-enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
-The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
-final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
-large.  Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
-just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
-for non-sentinel values.
-
-Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
-degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
-CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
-
-The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates.  These
-generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
-disallows explicit EC parameters.  The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
-constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
-parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
-problem values as noted above.
-
-Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
-
-A closely related issue was earlier reported in
-<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
-
-Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2)
-
-CVE: CVE-2024-9143
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712]
-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
----
- crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c     | 28 +++++++++++++++-------
- test/ec_internal_test.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
-index c811ae82d6b15..bcc66613cc14d 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
-@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
- #include "bn_local.h"
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+# include <openssl/ec.h>
- 
- /*
-  * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
-@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- /*
-  * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
-  * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
-- * coefficient.  Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
-- * will be filled.  Return value is total number of array elements that would
-- * be filled if array was large enough.
-+ * coefficient.  The array is intended to be suitable for use with
-+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
-+ * zero.  This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
-+ *
-+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1.  Up to max elements
-+ * of the array will be filled.
-+ *
-+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
-+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`.  It is `0` when `a`
-+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
-+ *
-+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
-+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
-  */
- int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
- {
-     int i, j, k = 0;
-     BN_ULONG mask;
- 
--    if (BN_is_zero(a))
-+    if (!BN_is_odd(a))
-         return 0;
- 
-     for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    if (k < max) {
-+    if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    if (k < max)
-         p[k] = -1;
--        k++;
--    }
- 
--    return k;
-+    return k + 1;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c
-index 8c2cd05631696..02cfd4e9d8858 100644
---- a/test/ec_internal_test.c
-+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
-@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
- }
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
-+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
-+{
-+    int ret = 0;
-+    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
-+    EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
-+
-+    TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
-+
-+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+    p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
-+        || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
-+        || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
-+        goto out;
-+
-+    /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
-+    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
-+        goto out;
-+    if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
-+        TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
-+
-+    /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
-+    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
-+        goto out;
-+    if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
-+        TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
-+
-+    /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
-+    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
-+        || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
-+        goto out;
-+    if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
-+        TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
-+                   OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
-+
-+    ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
-+
-+ out:
-+    EC_GROUP_free(group1);
-+    EC_GROUP_free(group2);
-+    EC_GROUP_free(group3);
-+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
- static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
- {
-@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
-     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
-     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+    ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
-     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
- #endif
-     ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.15.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.16.bb
index 295f05729f..a9fffd18ba 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.15.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.16.bb
@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
            file://afalg.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
-           file://CVE-2024-9143.patch \
-           file://CVE-2024-13176.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23c666d0edf20f14249b3d8f0368acaee9ab585b09e1de82107c66e1f3ec9533"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "57e03c50feab5d31b152af2b764f10379aecd8ee92f16c985983ce4a99f7ef86"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"