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authorVijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>2023-03-03 16:13:01 +0530
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2023-03-14 14:59:10 +0000
commit7b9f7437edcc3de1c52345deefcc507452ee95fc (patch)
treecf51dcd19d05051d658aae6a30932f7348762830
parentc35692c6ebd704e7f4c13b34ac66eda35e8e251e (diff)
downloadpoky-7b9f7437edcc3de1c52345deefcc507452ee95fc.tar.gz
git: Security fix for CVE-2022-41903
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/git/git/commit/a244dc5b & https://github.com/git/git/commit/81dc898d & https://github.com/git/git/commit/b49f309a & https://github.com/git/git/commit/f6e0b9f3 & https://github.com/git/git/commit/1de69c0c & https://github.com/git/git/commit/48050c42 & https://github.com/git/git/commit/522cc87f & https://github.com/git/git/commit/17d23e8a & https://github.com/git/git/commit/937b71cc & https://github.com/git/git/commit/81c2d4c3 & https://github.com/git/git/commit/f930a239 & https://github.com/git/git/commit/304a50ad (From OE-Core rev: d591ac4dfeff7b69086a47c7e88a8127f1d31299) Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-01.patch39
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-02.patch187
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-03.patch146
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-04.patch150
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-05.patch98
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-06.patch90
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-07.patch123
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-08.patch67
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-09.patch162
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-10.patch99
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-11.patch90
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-12.patch124
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc12
13 files changed, 1387 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-01.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-01.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87091abd47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-01.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From a244dc5b0a629290881641467c7a545de7508ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
3Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 15:46:06 +0000
4Subject: [PATCH 01/12] test-lib: add prerequisite for 64-bit platforms
5
6Allow tests that assume a 64-bit `size_t` to be skipped in 32-bit
7platforms and regardless of the size of `long`.
8
9This imitates the `LONG_IS_64BIT` prerequisite.
10
11Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
12Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
13Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
14
15Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/a244dc5b0a629290881641467c7a545de7508ab2]
16CVE: CVE-2022-41903
17Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
18---
19 t/test-lib.sh | 4 ++++
20 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
21
22diff --git a/t/test-lib.sh b/t/test-lib.sh
23index e06fa02..db5ec2f 100644
24--- a/t/test-lib.sh
25+++ b/t/test-lib.sh
26@@ -1613,6 +1613,10 @@ build_option () {
27 sed -ne "s/^$1: //p"
28 }
29
30+test_lazy_prereq SIZE_T_IS_64BIT '
31+ test 8 -eq "$(build_option sizeof-size_t)"
32+'
33+
34 test_lazy_prereq LONG_IS_64BIT '
35 test 8 -le "$(build_option sizeof-long)"
36 '
37--
382.25.1
39
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-02.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-02.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f35e55b585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
1From 81dc898df9b4b4035534a927f3234a3839b698bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:25 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 02/12] pretty: fix out-of-bounds write caused by integer overflow
5
6When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1)
7we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string
8lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily
9overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to
10an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P):
11
12 ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588
13 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0
14 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
15 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762
16 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
17 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
18 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
19 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
20 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
21 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
22 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
23 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
24 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
25 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
26 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
27 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
28 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
29 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
30 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
31 #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
32 #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
33
34 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839)
35 allocated by thread T0 here:
36 #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
37 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
38 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
39 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327
40 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761
41 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
42 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
43 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
44 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
45 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
46 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
47 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
48 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
49 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
50 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
51 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
52 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
53 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
54 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
55 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
56 #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
57 #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
58
59 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
60 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
61 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
62 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
63 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
64 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
65 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
66 =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]
67 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
68 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
69 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
70 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
71 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
72 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
73 Addressable: 00
74 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
75 Heap left redzone: fa
76 Freed heap region: fd
77 Stack left redzone: f1
78 Stack mid redzone: f2
79 Stack right redzone: f3
80 Stack after return: f5
81 Stack use after scope: f8
82 Global redzone: f9
83 Global init order: f6
84 Poisoned by user: f7
85 Container overflow: fc
86 Array cookie: ac
87 Intra object redzone: bb
88 ASan internal: fe
89 Left alloca redzone: ca
90 Right alloca redzone: cb
91 ==8340==ABORTING
92
93The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the
94`export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a
95critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an
96archive of user supplied Git repositories.
97
98Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the
99string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is
100compiled with the address sanitizer.
101
102Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
103Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
104Modified-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttalorr.com>
105Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
106Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
107
108Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/81dc898df9b4b4035534a927f3234a3839b698bf]
109CVE: CVE-2022-41903
110Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
111---
112 pretty.c | 11 ++++++-----
113 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 17 +++++++++++++++++
114 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
115
116diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
117index b32f036..637e344 100644
118--- a/pretty.c
119+++ b/pretty.c
120@@ -1427,7 +1427,9 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
121 struct format_commit_context *c)
122 {
123 struct strbuf local_sb = STRBUF_INIT;
124- int total_consumed = 0, len, padding = c->padding;
125+ size_t total_consumed = 0;
126+ int len, padding = c->padding;
127+
128 if (padding < 0) {
129 const char *start = strrchr(sb->buf, '\n');
130 int occupied;
131@@ -1439,7 +1441,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
132 }
133 while (1) {
134 int modifier = *placeholder == 'C';
135- int consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
136+ size_t consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
137 total_consumed += consumed;
138
139 if (!modifier)
140@@ -1505,7 +1507,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
141 }
142 strbuf_addbuf(sb, &local_sb);
143 } else {
144- int sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
145+ size_t sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
146 if (c->flush_type == flush_left)
147 offset = padding - len;
148 else if (c->flush_type == flush_both)
149@@ -1528,8 +1530,7 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
150 const char *placeholder,
151 void *context)
152 {
153- int consumed;
154- size_t orig_len;
155+ size_t consumed, orig_len;
156 enum {
157 NO_MAGIC,
158 ADD_LF_BEFORE_NON_EMPTY,
159diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
160index f42a69f..a2acee1 100755
161--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
162+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
163@@ -788,4 +788,21 @@ test_expect_success '%S in git log --format works with other placeholders (part
164 test_cmp expect actual
165 '
166
167+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
168+ # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
169+ # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
170+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%>(2147483646)%x41%41%>(2147483646)%x41" >/dev/null
171+'
172+
173+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'set up huge commit' '
174+ test-tool genzeros 2147483649 | tr "\000" "1" >expect &&
175+ huge_commit=$(git commit-tree -F expect HEAD^{tree})
176+'
177+
178+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
179+ git log -1 --format="%B%<(1)%x30" $huge_commit >actual &&
180+ echo 0 >>expect &&
181+ test_cmp expect actual
182+'
183+
184 test_done
185--
1862.25.1
187
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-03.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-03.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d83d77eaf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-03.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
1From b49f309aa16febeddb65e82526640a91bbba3be3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:30 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 03/12] pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when left-flushing with stealing
5
6With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to
7steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see
8whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI
9sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them
10until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into
11account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds
12read.
13
14Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to
15verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with
16`SANITIZE=address`:
17
18 ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10
19 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0
20 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712
21 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
22 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
23 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
24 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
25 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
26 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
27 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
28 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
29 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
30 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
31 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
32 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
33 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
34 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
35 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
36 #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
37 #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
38
39 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8)
40 allocated by thread T0 here:
41 #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
42 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
43 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
44 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
45 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
46 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
47 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
48 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
49 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
50 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
51 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
52 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
53 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
54 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
55 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
56 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
57 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
58 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
59 #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
60 #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
61
62 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit
63 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
64 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
65 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
66 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
67 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd
68 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
69 =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa
70 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
71 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
72 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
73 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
74 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
75 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
76 Addressable: 00
77 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
78 Heap left redzone: fa
79 Freed heap region: fd
80 Stack left redzone: f1
81 Stack mid redzone: f2
82 Stack right redzone: f3
83 Stack after return: f5
84 Stack use after scope: f8
85 Global redzone: f9
86 Global init order: f6
87 Poisoned by user: f7
88 Container overflow: fc
89 Array cookie: ac
90 Intra object redzone: bb
91 ASan internal: fe
92 Left alloca redzone: ca
93 Right alloca redzone: cb
94
95Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data
96into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence
97preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences.
98
99Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start.
100
101Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
102Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
103Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
104Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
105
106Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/b49f309aa16febeddb65e82526640a91bbba3be3]
107CVE: CVE-2022-41903
108Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
109---
110 pretty.c | 2 +-
111 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 6 ++++++
112 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
113
114diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
115index 637e344..4348a82 100644
116--- a/pretty.c
117+++ b/pretty.c
118@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
119 if (*ch != 'm')
120 break;
121 p = ch - 1;
122- while (ch - p < 10 && *p != '\033')
123+ while (p > sb->buf && ch - p < 10 && *p != '\033')
124 p--;
125 if (*p != '\033' ||
126 ch + 1 - p != display_mode_esc_sequence_len(p))
127diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
128index a2acee1..e69caba 100755
129--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
130+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
131@@ -788,6 +788,12 @@ test_expect_success '%S in git log --format works with other placeholders (part
132 test_cmp expect actual
133 '
134
135+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with space stealing' '
136+ printf mm0 >expect &&
137+ git log -1 --pretty="format:mm%>>|(1)%x30" >actual &&
138+ test_cmp expect actual
139+'
140+
141 test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
142 # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
143 # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
144--
1452.25.1
146
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-04.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-04.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e3c74ff67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-04.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
1From f6e0b9f38987ad5e47bab551f8760b70689a5905 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:34 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 04/12] pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid padding format
5
6An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete
7padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives
8when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.
9
10This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output
11via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %<
12and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the
13formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL`
14pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent
15check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned
16pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only
17returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL
18byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the
19start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check
20doesn't do anything anymore.
21
22The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the
23formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory
24contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of
25the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.
26
27 ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78
28 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0
29 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725
30 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417
31 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
32 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
33 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
34 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
35 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
36 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
37 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
38 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
39 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
40 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
41 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
42 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
43 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
44 #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
45 #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
46
47 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398)
48 allocated by thread T0 here:
49 #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
50 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39
51 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40
52 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173
53 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456
54 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850
55 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269
56 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348
57 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882
58 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
59 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
60 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
61 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
62 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
63 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
64 #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
65 #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
66
67 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul
68 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
69 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
70 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
71 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
72 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01
73 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa
74 =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd
75 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa
76 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
77 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
78 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
79 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
80 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
81 Addressable: 00
82 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
83 Heap left redzone: fa
84 Freed heap region: fd
85 Stack left redzone: f1
86 Stack mid redzone: f2
87 Stack right redzone: f3
88 Stack after return: f5
89 Stack use after scope: f8
90 Global redzone: f9
91 Global init order: f6
92 Poisoned by user: f7
93 Container overflow: fc
94 Array cookie: ac
95 Intra object redzone: bb
96 ASan internal: fe
97 Left alloca redzone: ca
98 Right alloca redzone: cb
99 ==10888==ABORTING
100
101Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte.
102Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates
103that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message.
104
105Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
106Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
107Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
108Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
109
110Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/f6e0b9f38987ad5e47bab551f8760b70689a5905]
111CVE: CVE-2022-41903
112Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
113---
114 pretty.c | 2 +-
115 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 6 ++++++
116 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
117
118diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
119index 4348a82..c49e818 100644
120--- a/pretty.c
121+++ b/pretty.c
122@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static size_t parse_padding_placeholder(const char *placeholder,
123 const char *end = start + strcspn(start, ",)");
124 char *next;
125 int width;
126- if (!end || end == start)
127+ if (!*end || end == start)
128 return 0;
129 width = strtol(start, &next, 10);
130 if (next == start || width == 0)
131diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
132index e69caba..8a349df 100755
133--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
134+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
135@@ -794,6 +794,12 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with space stealing' '
136 test_cmp expect actual
137 '
138
139+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with invalid padding format' '
140+ printf "%s%%<(20" "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" >expect &&
141+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%H%<(20" >actual &&
142+ test_cmp expect actual
143+'
144+
145 test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
146 # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
147 # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
148--
1492.25.1
150
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-05.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-05.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..994f7a55b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-05.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
1From 1de69c0cdd388b0a5b7bdde0bfa0bda514a354b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:39 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 05/12] pretty: fix adding linefeed when placeholder is not expanded
5
6When a formatting directive has a `+` or ` ` after the `%`, then we add
7either a line feed or space if the placeholder expands to a non-empty
8string. In specific cases though this logic doesn't work as expected,
9and we try to add the character even in the case where the formatting
10directive is empty.
11
12One such pattern is `%w(1)%+d%+w(2)`. `%+d` expands to reference names
13pointing to a certain commit, like in `git log --decorate`. For a tagged
14commit this would for example expand to `\n (tag: v1.0.0)`, which has a
15leading newline due to the `+` modifier and a space added by `%d`. Now
16the second wrapping directive will cause us to rewrap the text to
17`\n(tag:\nv1.0.0)`, which is one byte shorter due to the missing leading
18space. The code that handles the `+` magic now notices that the length
19has changed and will thus try to insert a leading line feed at the
20original posititon. But as the string was shortened, the original
21position is past the buffer's boundary and thus we die with an error.
22
23Now there are two issues here:
24
25 1. We check whether the buffer length has changed, not whether it
26 has been extended. This causes us to try and add the character
27 past the string boundary.
28
29 2. The current logic does not make any sense whatsoever. When the
30 string got expanded due to the rewrap, putting the separator into
31 the original position is likely to put it somewhere into the
32 middle of the rewrapped contents.
33
34It is debatable whether `%+w()` makes any sense in the first place.
35Strictly speaking, the placeholder never expands to a non-empty string,
36and consequentially we shouldn't ever accept this combination. We thus
37fix the bug by simply refusing `%+w()`.
38
39Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
40Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
41
42Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/1de69c0cdd388b0a5b7bdde0bfa0bda514a354b0]
43CVE: CVE-2022-41903
44Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
45---
46 pretty.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
47 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 8 ++++++++
48 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
49
50diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
51index c49e818..195d005 100644
52--- a/pretty.c
53+++ b/pretty.c
54@@ -1551,9 +1551,21 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
55 default:
56 break;
57 }
58- if (magic != NO_MAGIC)
59+ if (magic != NO_MAGIC) {
60 placeholder++;
61
62+ switch (placeholder[0]) {
63+ case 'w':
64+ /*
65+ * `%+w()` cannot ever expand to a non-empty string,
66+ * and it potentially changes the layout of preceding
67+ * contents. We're thus not able to handle the magic in
68+ * this combination and refuse the pattern.
69+ */
70+ return 0;
71+ };
72+ }
73+
74 orig_len = sb->len;
75 if (((struct format_commit_context *)context)->flush_type != no_flush)
76 consumed = format_and_pad_commit(sb, placeholder, context);
77diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
78index 8a349df..fa1bc2b 100755
79--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
80+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
81@@ -800,6 +800,14 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with invalid padding format' '
82 test_cmp expect actual
83 '
84
85+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
86+ commit_id=$(git commit-tree HEAD^{tree} -m "describe me") &&
87+ git tag describe-me $commit_id &&
88+ printf "\n(tag:\ndescribe-me)%%+w(2)" >expect &&
89+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1)%+d%+w(2)" $commit_id >actual &&
90+ test_cmp expect actual
91+'
92+
93 test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
94 # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
95 # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
96--
972.25.1
98
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-06.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-06.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93fbe5c7fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-06.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
1From 48050c42c73c28b0c001d63d11dffac7e116847b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:49 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 06/12] pretty: fix integer overflow in wrapping format
5
6The `%w(width,indent1,indent2)` formatting directive can be used to
7rewrap text to a specific width and is designed after git-shortlog(1)'s
8`-w` parameter. While the three parameters are all stored as `size_t`
9internally, `strbuf_add_wrapped_text()` accepts integers as input. As a
10result, the casted integers may overflow. As these now-negative integers
11are later on passed to `strbuf_addchars()`, we will ultimately run into
12implementation-defined behaviour due to casting a negative number back
13to `size_t` again. On my platform, this results in trying to allocate
149000 petabyte of memory.
15
16Fix this overflow by using `cast_size_t_to_int()` so that we reject
17inputs that cannot be represented as an integer.
18
19Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
20Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
21
22Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/48050c42c73c28b0c001d63d11dffac7e116847b]
23CVE: CVE-2022-41903
24Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
25---
26 git-compat-util.h | 8 ++++++++
27 pretty.c | 4 +++-
28 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 12 ++++++++++++
29 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
30
31diff --git a/git-compat-util.h b/git-compat-util.h
32index a1ecfd3..b0f3890 100644
33--- a/git-compat-util.h
34+++ b/git-compat-util.h
35@@ -854,6 +854,14 @@ static inline size_t st_sub(size_t a, size_t b)
36 return a - b;
37 }
38
39+static inline int cast_size_t_to_int(size_t a)
40+{
41+ if (a > INT_MAX)
42+ die("number too large to represent as int on this platform: %"PRIuMAX,
43+ (uintmax_t)a);
44+ return (int)a;
45+}
46+
47 #ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
48 # include <alloca.h>
49 # define xalloca(size) (alloca(size))
50diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
51index 195d005..ff9fc97 100644
52--- a/pretty.c
53+++ b/pretty.c
54@@ -898,7 +898,9 @@ static void strbuf_wrap(struct strbuf *sb, size_t pos,
55 if (pos)
56 strbuf_add(&tmp, sb->buf, pos);
57 strbuf_add_wrapped_text(&tmp, sb->buf + pos,
58- (int) indent1, (int) indent2, (int) width);
59+ cast_size_t_to_int(indent1),
60+ cast_size_t_to_int(indent2),
61+ cast_size_t_to_int(width));
62 strbuf_swap(&tmp, sb);
63 strbuf_release(&tmp);
64 }
65diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
66index fa1bc2b..23ac508 100755
67--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
68+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
69@@ -808,6 +808,18 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
70 test_cmp expect actual
71 '
72
73+test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping directive' '
74+ cat >expect <<-EOF &&
75+ fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
76+ EOF
77+ test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%d" 2>error &&
78+ test_cmp expect error &&
79+ test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%d" 2>error &&
80+ test_cmp expect error &&
81+ test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%d" 2>error &&
82+ test_cmp expect error
83+'
84+
85 test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
86 # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
87 # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
88--
892.25.1
90
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-07.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-07.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec248ad6c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-07.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
1From 522cc87fdc25449222a5894a428eebf4b8d5eaa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:53 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 07/12] utf8: fix truncated string lengths in utf8_strnwidth()
5
6The `utf8_strnwidth()` function accepts an optional string length as
7input parameter. This parameter can either be set to `-1`, in which case
8we call `strlen()` on the input. Or it can be set to a positive integer
9that indicates a precomputed length, which callers typically compute by
10calling `strlen()` at some point themselves.
11
12The input parameter is an `int` though, whereas `strlen()` returns a
13`size_t`. This can lead to implementation-defined behaviour though when
14the `size_t` cannot be represented by the `int`. In the general case
15though this leads to wrap-around and thus to negative string sizes,
16which is sure enough to not lead to well-defined behaviour.
17
18Fix this by accepting a `size_t` instead of an `int` as string length.
19While this takes away the ability of callers to simply pass in `-1` as
20string length, it really is trivial enough to convert them to instead
21pass in `strlen()` instead.
22
23Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
24Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
25
26Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/522cc87fdc25449222a5894a428eebf4b8d5eaa9]
27CVE: CVE-2022-41903
28Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
29---
30 column.c | 2 +-
31 pretty.c | 4 ++--
32 utf8.c | 8 +++-----
33 utf8.h | 2 +-
34 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
35
36diff --git a/column.c b/column.c
37index 4a38eed..0c79850 100644
38--- a/column.c
39+++ b/column.c
40@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ struct column_data {
41 /* return length of 's' in letters, ANSI escapes stripped */
42 static int item_length(const char *s)
43 {
44- return utf8_strnwidth(s, -1, 1);
45+ return utf8_strnwidth(s, strlen(s), 1);
46 }
47
48 /*
49diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
50index ff9fc97..c3c1443 100644
51--- a/pretty.c
52+++ b/pretty.c
53@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
54 int occupied;
55 if (!start)
56 start = sb->buf;
57- occupied = utf8_strnwidth(start, -1, 1);
58+ occupied = utf8_strnwidth(start, strlen(start), 1);
59 occupied += c->pretty_ctx->graph_width;
60 padding = (-padding) - occupied;
61 }
62@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
63 placeholder++;
64 total_consumed++;
65 }
66- len = utf8_strnwidth(local_sb.buf, -1, 1);
67+ len = utf8_strnwidth(local_sb.buf, local_sb.len, 1);
68
69 if (c->flush_type == flush_left_and_steal) {
70 const char *ch = sb->buf + sb->len - 1;
71diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
72index 5c8f151..a66984b 100644
73--- a/utf8.c
74+++ b/utf8.c
75@@ -206,13 +206,11 @@ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p)
76 * string, assuming that the string is utf8. Returns strlen() instead
77 * if the string does not look like a valid utf8 string.
78 */
79-int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi)
80+int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
81 {
82 int width = 0;
83 const char *orig = string;
84
85- if (len == -1)
86- len = strlen(string);
87 while (string && string < orig + len) {
88 int skip;
89 while (skip_ansi &&
90@@ -225,7 +223,7 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi)
91
92 int utf8_strwidth(const char *string)
93 {
94- return utf8_strnwidth(string, -1, 0);
95+ return utf8_strnwidth(string, strlen(string), 0);
96 }
97
98 int is_utf8(const char *text)
99@@ -792,7 +790,7 @@ int skip_utf8_bom(char **text, size_t len)
100 void strbuf_utf8_align(struct strbuf *buf, align_type position, unsigned int width,
101 const char *s)
102 {
103- int slen = strlen(s);
104+ size_t slen = strlen(s);
105 int display_len = utf8_strnwidth(s, slen, 0);
106 int utf8_compensation = slen - display_len;
107
108diff --git a/utf8.h b/utf8.h
109index fcd5167..6da1b6d 100644
110--- a/utf8.h
111+++ b/utf8.h
112@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ typedef unsigned int ucs_char_t; /* assuming 32bit int */
113
114 size_t display_mode_esc_sequence_len(const char *s);
115 int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p);
116-int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi);
117+int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi);
118 int utf8_strwidth(const char *string);
119 int is_utf8(const char *text);
120 int is_encoding_utf8(const char *name);
121--
1222.25.1
123
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-08.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-08.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3de6a5ba6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-08.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
1From 17d23e8a3812a5ca3dd6564e74d5250f22e5d76d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:00 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 08/12] utf8: fix returning negative string width
5
6The `utf8_strnwidth()` function calls `utf8_width()` in a loop and adds
7its returned width to the end result. `utf8_width()` can return `-1`
8though in case it reads a control character, which means that the
9computed string width is going to be wrong. In the worst case where
10there are more control characters than non-control characters, we may
11even return a negative string width.
12
13Fix this bug by treating control characters as having zero width.
14
15Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
16Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
17
18Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/17d23e8a3812a5ca3dd6564e74d5250f22e5d76d]
19CVE: CVE-2022-41903
20Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
21---
22 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 6 ++++++
23 utf8.c | 8 ++++++--
24 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
25
26diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
27index 23ac508..261a6f0 100755
28--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
29+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
30@@ -820,6 +820,12 @@ test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping dire
31 test_cmp expect error
32 '
33
34+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
35+ printf "\20\20 0" >expect &&
36+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%x10%x10%>|(4)%x30" >actual &&
37+ test_cmp expect actual
38+'
39+
40 test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
41 # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
42 # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
43diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
44index a66984b..6632bd2 100644
45--- a/utf8.c
46+++ b/utf8.c
47@@ -212,11 +212,15 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
48 const char *orig = string;
49
50 while (string && string < orig + len) {
51- int skip;
52+ int glyph_width, skip;
53+
54 while (skip_ansi &&
55 (skip = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(string)) != 0)
56 string += skip;
57- width += utf8_width(&string, NULL);
58+
59+ glyph_width = utf8_width(&string, NULL);
60+ if (glyph_width > 0)
61+ width += glyph_width;
62 }
63 return string ? width : len;
64 }
65--
662.25.1
67
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-09.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-09.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..761d4c6a9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-09.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
1From 937b71cc8b5b998963a7f9a33312ba3549d55510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:04 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 09/12] utf8: fix overflow when returning string width
5
6The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is
7`int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type
8`size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we
9will overflow and thus return a negative result.
10
11This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B`
12and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long:
13
14 =================================================================
15 ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8
16 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0
17 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
18 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763
19 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
20 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
21 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
22 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
23 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
24 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
25 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
26 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
27 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
28 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
29 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
30 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
31 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
32 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
33 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
34 #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
35 #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
36
37 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168)
38 allocated by thread T0 here:
39 #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
40 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
41 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
42 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
43 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
44 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
45 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
46 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
47 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
48 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
49 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
50 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
51 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
52 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
53 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
54 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
55 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
56 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
57
58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
59 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
60 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
61 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd
62 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
63 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa
64 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
65 =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa
66 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
67 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
68 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
69 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
70 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
71 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
72 Addressable: 00
73 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
74 Heap left redzone: fa
75 Freed heap region: fd
76 Stack left redzone: f1
77 Stack mid redzone: f2
78 Stack right redzone: f3
79 Stack after return: f5
80 Stack use after scope: f8
81 Global redzone: f9
82 Global init order: f6
83 Poisoned by user: f7
84 Container overflow: fc
85 Array cookie: ac
86 Intra object redzone: bb
87 ASan internal: fe
88 Left alloca redzone: ca
89 Right alloca redzone: cb
90 ==26009==ABORTING
91
92Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return
93an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part
94of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die
95in case we see an overflow.
96
97Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash.
98
99Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
100Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
101
102Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/937b71cc8b5b998963a7f9a33312ba3549d55510]
103CVE: CVE-2022-41903
104Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
105---
106 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 8 ++++++++
107 utf8.c | 12 +++++++++---
108 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
109
110diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
111index 261a6f0..de15007 100755
112--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
113+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
114@@ -843,4 +843,12 @@ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit mes
115 test_cmp expect actual
116 '
117
118+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message does not cause allocation failure' '
119+ test_must_fail git log -1 --format="%<(1)%B" $huge_commit 2>error &&
120+ cat >expect <<-EOF &&
121+ fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
122+ EOF
123+ test_cmp expect error
124+'
125+
126 test_done
127diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
128index 6632bd2..03be475 100644
129--- a/utf8.c
130+++ b/utf8.c
131@@ -208,11 +208,12 @@ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p)
132 */
133 int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
134 {
135- int width = 0;
136 const char *orig = string;
137+ size_t width = 0;
138
139 while (string && string < orig + len) {
140- int glyph_width, skip;
141+ int glyph_width;
142+ size_t skip;
143
144 while (skip_ansi &&
145 (skip = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(string)) != 0)
146@@ -222,7 +223,12 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
147 if (glyph_width > 0)
148 width += glyph_width;
149 }
150- return string ? width : len;
151+
152+ /*
153+ * TODO: fix the interface of this function and `utf8_strwidth()` to
154+ * return `size_t` instead of `int`.
155+ */
156+ return cast_size_t_to_int(string ? width : len);
157 }
158
159 int utf8_strwidth(const char *string)
160--
1612.25.1
162
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-10.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-10.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bbfc6e758f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-10.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
1From 81c2d4c3a5ba0e6ab8c348708441fed170e63a82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:10 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 10/12] utf8: fix checking for glyph width in strbuf_utf8_replace()
5
6In `strbuf_utf8_replace()`, we call `utf8_width()` to compute the width
7of the current glyph. If the glyph is a control character though it can
8be that `utf8_width()` returns `-1`, but because we assign this value to
9a `size_t` the conversion will cause us to underflow. This bug can
10easily be triggered with the following command:
11
12 $ git log --pretty='format:xxx%<|(1,trunc)%x10'
13
14>From all I can see though this seems to be a benign underflow that has
15no security-related consequences.
16
17Fix the bug by using an `int` instead. When we see a control character,
18we now copy it into the target buffer but don't advance the current
19width of the string.
20
21Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
22Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
23
24Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/81c2d4c3a5ba0e6ab8c348708441fed170e63a82]
25CVE: CVE-2022-41903
26Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
27---
28 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 7 +++++++
29 utf8.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
30 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
31
32diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
33index de15007..52c8bc8 100755
34--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
35+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
36@@ -826,6 +826,13 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
37 test_cmp expect actual
38 '
39
40+test_expect_success 'log --pretty truncation with control chars' '
41+ test_commit "$(printf "\20\20\20\20xxxx")" file contents commit-with-control-chars &&
42+ printf "\20\20\20\20x.." >expect &&
43+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(3,trunc)%s" commit-with-control-chars >actual &&
44+ test_cmp expect actual
45+'
46+
47 test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
48 # We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
49 # executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
50diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
51index 03be475..ec03e69 100644
52--- a/utf8.c
53+++ b/utf8.c
54@@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
55 dst = sb_dst.buf;
56
57 while (src < end) {
58+ int glyph_width;
59 char *old;
60 size_t n;
61
62@@ -390,21 +391,29 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
63 break;
64
65 old = src;
66- n = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
67- if (!src) /* broken utf-8, do nothing */
68+ glyph_width = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
69+ if (!src) /* broken utf-8, do nothing */
70 goto out;
71- if (n && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
72+
73+ /*
74+ * In case we see a control character we copy it into the
75+ * buffer, but don't add it to the width.
76+ */
77+ if (glyph_width < 0)
78+ glyph_width = 0;
79+
80+ if (glyph_width && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
81 if (subst) {
82 memcpy(dst, subst, subst_len);
83 dst += subst_len;
84 subst = NULL;
85 }
86- w += n;
87+ w += glyph_width;
88 continue;
89 }
90 memcpy(dst, old, src - old);
91 dst += src - old;
92- w += n;
93+ w += glyph_width;
94 }
95 strbuf_setlen(&sb_dst, dst - sb_dst.buf);
96 strbuf_swap(sb_src, &sb_dst);
97--
982.25.1
99
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-11.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-11.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f339edfc8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-11.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
1From f930a2394303b902e2973f4308f96529f736b8bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:15 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 11/12] utf8: refactor strbuf_utf8_replace to not rely on preallocated buffer
5
6In `strbuf_utf8_replace`, we preallocate the destination buffer and then
7use `memcpy` to copy bytes into it at computed offsets. This feels
8rather fragile and is hard to understand at times. Refactor the code to
9instead use `strbuf_add` and `strbuf_addstr` so that we can be sure that
10there is no possibility to perform an out-of-bounds write.
11
12Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
13Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
14
15Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/f930a2394303b902e2973f4308f96529f736b8bc]
16CVE: CVE-2022-41903
17Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
18---
19 utf8.c | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
20 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
21
22diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
23index ec03e69..a13f5e3 100644
24--- a/utf8.c
25+++ b/utf8.c
26@@ -365,26 +365,20 @@ void strbuf_add_wrapped_bytes(struct strbuf *buf, const char *data, int len,
27 void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
28 const char *subst)
29 {
30- struct strbuf sb_dst = STRBUF_INIT;
31- char *src = sb_src->buf;
32- char *end = src + sb_src->len;
33- char *dst;
34- int w = 0, subst_len = 0;
35+ const char *src = sb_src->buf, *end = sb_src->buf + sb_src->len;
36+ struct strbuf dst;
37+ int w = 0;
38
39- if (subst)
40- subst_len = strlen(subst);
41- strbuf_grow(&sb_dst, sb_src->len + subst_len);
42- dst = sb_dst.buf;
43+ strbuf_init(&dst, sb_src->len);
44
45 while (src < end) {
46+ const char *old;
47 int glyph_width;
48- char *old;
49 size_t n;
50
51 while ((n = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(src))) {
52- memcpy(dst, src, n);
53+ strbuf_add(&dst, src, n);
54 src += n;
55- dst += n;
56 }
57
58 if (src >= end)
59@@ -404,21 +398,19 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
60
61 if (glyph_width && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
62 if (subst) {
63- memcpy(dst, subst, subst_len);
64- dst += subst_len;
65+ strbuf_addstr(&dst, subst);
66 subst = NULL;
67 }
68- w += glyph_width;
69- continue;
70+ } else {
71+ strbuf_add(&dst, old, src - old);
72 }
73- memcpy(dst, old, src - old);
74- dst += src - old;
75+
76 w += glyph_width;
77 }
78- strbuf_setlen(&sb_dst, dst - sb_dst.buf);
79- strbuf_swap(sb_src, &sb_dst);
80+
81+ strbuf_swap(sb_src, &dst);
82 out:
83- strbuf_release(&sb_dst);
84+ strbuf_release(&dst);
85 }
86
87 /*
88--
892.25.1
90
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-12.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-12.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..978865978d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-12.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
1From 304a50adff6480ede46b68f7545baab542cbfb46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:23 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH 12/12] pretty: restrict input lengths for padding and wrapping formats
5
6Both the padding and wrapping formatting directives allow the caller to
7specify an integer that ultimately leads to us adding this many chars to
8the result buffer. As a consequence, it is trivial to e.g. allocate 2GB
9of RAM via a single formatting directive and cause resource exhaustion
10on the machine executing this logic. Furthermore, it is debatable
11whether there are any sane usecases that require the user to pad data to
122GB boundaries or to indent wrapped data by 2GB.
13
14Restrict the input sizes to 16 kilobytes at a maximum to limit the
15amount of bytes that can be requested by the user. This is not meant
16as a fix because there are ways to trivially amplify the amount of
17data we generate via formatting directives; the real protection is
18achieved by the changes in previous steps to catch and avoid integer
19wraparound that causes us to under-allocate and access beyond the
20end of allocated memory reagions. But having such a limit
21significantly helps fuzzing the pretty format, because the fuzzer is
22otherwise quite fast to run out-of-memory as it discovers these
23formatters.
24
25Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
26Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
27
28Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/304a50adff6480ede46b68f7545baab542cbfb46]
29CVE: CVE-2022-41903
30Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
31---
32 pretty.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
33 t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
34 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
35
36diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
37index c3c1443..e9687f0 100644
38--- a/pretty.c
39+++ b/pretty.c
40@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@
41 #include "gpg-interface.h"
42 #include "trailer.h"
43
44+/*
45+ * The limit for formatting directives, which enable the caller to append
46+ * arbitrarily many bytes to the formatted buffer. This includes padding
47+ * and wrapping formatters.
48+ */
49+#define FORMATTING_LIMIT (16 * 1024)
50+
51 static char *user_format;
52 static struct cmt_fmt_map {
53 const char *name;
54@@ -1029,6 +1036,15 @@ static size_t parse_padding_placeholder(const char *placeholder,
55 if (!*end || end == start)
56 return 0;
57 width = strtol(start, &next, 10);
58+
59+ /*
60+ * We need to limit the amount of padding, or otherwise this
61+ * would allow the user to pad the buffer by arbitrarily many
62+ * bytes and thus cause resource exhaustion.
63+ */
64+ if (width < -FORMATTING_LIMIT || width > FORMATTING_LIMIT)
65+ return 0;
66+
67 if (next == start || width == 0)
68 return 0;
69 if (width < 0) {
70@@ -1188,6 +1204,16 @@ static size_t format_commit_one(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
71 if (*next != ')')
72 return 0;
73 }
74+
75+ /*
76+ * We need to limit the format here as it allows the
77+ * user to prepend arbitrarily many bytes to the buffer
78+ * when rewrapping.
79+ */
80+ if (width > FORMATTING_LIMIT ||
81+ indent1 > FORMATTING_LIMIT ||
82+ indent2 > FORMATTING_LIMIT)
83+ return 0;
84 rewrap_message_tail(sb, c, width, indent1, indent2);
85 return end - placeholder + 1;
86 } else
87diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
88index 52c8bc8..572d02f 100755
89--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
90+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
91@@ -809,15 +809,21 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
92 '
93
94 test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping directive' '
95- cat >expect <<-EOF &&
96- fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
97- EOF
98- test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%d" 2>error &&
99- test_cmp expect error &&
100- test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%d" 2>error &&
101- test_cmp expect error &&
102- test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%d" 2>error &&
103- test_cmp expect error
104+ printf "%%w(2147483649,1,1)0" >expect &&
105+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%x30" >actual &&
106+ test_cmp expect actual &&
107+ printf "%%w(1,2147483649,1)0" >expect &&
108+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%x30" >actual &&
109+ test_cmp expect actual &&
110+ printf "%%w(1,1,2147483649)0" >expect &&
111+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%x30" >actual &&
112+ test_cmp expect actual
113+'
114+
115+test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing padding directive' '
116+ printf "%%<(2147483649)0" >expect &&
117+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(2147483649)%x30" >actual &&
118+ test_cmp expect actual
119 '
120
121 test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
122--
1232.25.1
124
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
index ed6308ea2d..3c4c0fd37b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
@@ -12,6 +12,18 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \
12 file://fixsort.patch \ 12 file://fixsort.patch \
13 file://CVE-2021-40330.patch \ 13 file://CVE-2021-40330.patch \
14 file://CVE-2022-23521.patch \ 14 file://CVE-2022-23521.patch \
15 file://CVE-2022-41903-01.patch \
16 file://CVE-2022-41903-02.patch \
17 file://CVE-2022-41903-03.patch \
18 file://CVE-2022-41903-04.patch \
19 file://CVE-2022-41903-05.patch \
20 file://CVE-2022-41903-06.patch \
21 file://CVE-2022-41903-07.patch \
22 file://CVE-2022-41903-08.patch \
23 file://CVE-2022-41903-09.patch \
24 file://CVE-2022-41903-10.patch \
25 file://CVE-2022-41903-11.patch \
26 file://CVE-2022-41903-12.patch \
15 " 27 "
16S = "${WORKDIR}/git-${PV}" 28S = "${WORKDIR}/git-${PV}"
17 29
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2026-07-17 16:07:07 +0000