wpa-supplicant: fix CVE-2019-16275

(From OE-Core rev: d7b5a2ebdb6e74a21059ac2496b5dbea4597eb87)

(From OE-Core rev: 1c1c70ee26078357c4fe3647581f4adec1a8a97d)

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 83 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b0713cf6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+hostapd before 2.10 and wpa_supplicant before 2.10 allow an incorrect indication
+of disconnection in certain situations because source address validation is
+mishandled. This is a denial of service that should have been prevented by PMF
+(aka management frame protection). The attacker must send a crafted 802.11 frame
+from a location that is within the 802.11 communications range.
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-16275
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
+ address
+
+Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
+so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
+sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
+sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
+out a response to another device and that other device processing the
+unexpected response.
+
+In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
+where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
+connected station dropping its association.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
++++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
+                           "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
+                return -1;
+        }
++
++       if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
++           is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
++           os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++               /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++                * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++                * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++                          " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
++                          __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
++               return 0;
++       }
++
+        random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ 
+        hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
+        fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
+        stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ 
++       if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++           is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++           os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++               /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++                * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++                * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++                          " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
++                          MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
++               return 0;
++       }
++
+        if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
+                handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
+                return 1;
+-- 
+2.20.1
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb
index c16978cfe8..2db09ad2c6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz  \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
            file://0001-replace-systemd-install-Alias-with-WantedBy.patch \
+                   file://0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2d2958c782576dc9901092fbfecb4190"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fcbdee7b4a64bea8177973299c8c824419c413ec2e3a95db63dd6a5dc3541f17"