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| author | Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com> | 2026-06-08 18:33:19 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com> | 2026-06-12 02:58:55 +0000 |
| commit | 5bd3f928dad9f423a74793cad6a6bda212a12bde (patch) | |
| tree | d34391bc19a6b951d1129a1d0919014ab0b3dd4e /recipes-containers/go-errors/go-errors_git.bb | |
| parent | f989375e12f60b2e9627dddb01ecfa1f11ff7fa3 (diff) | |
| download | meta-virtualization-5bd3f928dad9f423a74793cad6a6bda212a12bde.tar.gz | |
vrunner: warn on shutdown-escalation that state disk may be corrupted
When the guest doesn't exit within the daemon_stop() poll window, the
graceful_shutdown() didn't complete and the state disk's ext4 journal
may have unflushed writes from this session. Any subsequent escalation
(QMP quit, SIGTERM, SIGKILL) leaves the disk image at risk of corruption:
layer files end up with correct inode metadata but partially-unwritten
data extents, surfacing on the next session as
Error: reading blob sha256:<hash>: EOF
Error: reading blob sha256:<hash>: file integrity checksum failed
for "<file>"
These errors are silent today — the operator hits them later in another
session with no way to correlate back to the original cause. Emit a
WARN as soon as the poll window expires, naming the symptom and pointing
at the remediation (`memres restart --clean`) so the next session starts
from a known-good state instead of inheriting a corrupted image.
This is purely diagnostic — no behavior change to the shutdown sequence
itself. The escalation paths (QMP quit, SIGTERM, SIGKILL) still run
unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'recipes-containers/go-errors/go-errors_git.bb')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
