open-vm-tools: Security fix CVE-2023-20867

CVE-2023-20867:
A fully compromised ESXi host can force VMware Tools to fail to
authenticate host-to-guest operations, impacting the confidentiality and
integrity of the guest virtual machine.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20867

Patch from:
https://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools/blob/CVE-2023-20867.patch/2023-20867-Remove-some-dead-code.patch

Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>

2 files changed, 164 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/CVE-2023-20867.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/CVE-2023-20867.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..170dddf688
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/CVE-2023-20867.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+From 3028cdd4c0b2461b904cbe5a5868c8e591aa0941 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Wolfe <jwolfe@vmware.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 May 2023 19:04:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Remove some dead code.
+
+Address CVE-2023-20867.
+Remove some authentication types which were deprecated long
+ago and are no longer in use. These are dead code.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-20867
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools/blob/CVE-2023-20867.patch/2023-20867-Remove-some-dead-code.patch]
+
+Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
+---
+ open-vm-tools/services/plugins/vix/vixTools.c | 102 --------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 102 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/open-vm-tools/services/plugins/vix/vixTools.c b/open-vm-tools/services/plugins/vix/vixTools.c
+index 9f376a7..85c5ba7 100644
+--- a/open-vm-tools/services/plugins/vix/vixTools.c
++++ b/open-vm-tools/services/plugins/vix/vixTools.c
+@@ -254,8 +254,6 @@ char *gImpersonatedUsername = NULL;
+ #define  VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_API_AUTHENTICATION          "Authentication"
+ #define  VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_AUTHTYPE_AGENTS             "InfrastructureAgents"
+ 
+-#define VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_INFRA_AGENT_DISABLED_DEFAULT  TRUE
+-
+ /*
+  * The switch that controls all APIs
+  */
+@@ -730,9 +728,6 @@ VixError GuestAuthSAMLAuthenticateAndImpersonate(
+ 
+ void GuestAuthUnimpersonate();
+ 
+-static Bool VixToolsCheckIfAuthenticationTypeEnabled(GKeyFile *confDictRef,
+-                                                     const char *typeName);
+-
+ #if SUPPORT_VGAUTH
+ 
+ VGAuthError TheVGAuthContext(VGAuthContext **ctx);
+@@ -8013,29 +8008,6 @@ VixToolsImpersonateUser(VixCommandRequestHeader *requestMsg,   // IN
+                                           userToken);
+       break;
+    }
+-   case VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_ROOT:
+-   {
+-      if ((requestMsg->requestFlags & VIX_REQUESTMSG_HAS_HASHED_SHARED_SECRET) &&
+-          !VixToolsCheckIfAuthenticationTypeEnabled(gConfDictRef,
+-                                            VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_AUTHTYPE_AGENTS)) {
+-          /*
+-           * Don't accept hashed shared secret if disabled.
+-           */
+-          g_message("%s: Requested authentication type has been disabled.\n",
+-                    __FUNCTION__);
+-          err = VIX_E_GUEST_AUTHTYPE_DISABLED;
+-          goto done;
+-      }
+-   }
+-   // fall through
+-
+-   case VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_CONSOLE_USER:
+-      err = VixToolsImpersonateUserImplEx(NULL,
+-                                          credentialType,
+-                                          NULL,
+-                                          loadUserProfile,
+-                                          userToken);
+-      break;
+    case VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PASSWORD:
+    case VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PASSWORD_OBFUSCATED:
+    case VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_NAMED_INTERACTIVE_USER:
+@@ -8205,36 +8177,6 @@ VixToolsImpersonateUserImplEx(char const *credentialTypeStr,         // IN
+       }
+ 
+       /*
+-       * If the VMX asks to be root, then we allow them.
+-       * The VMX will make sure that only it will pass this value in,
+-       * and only when the VM and host are configured to allow this.
+-       */
+-      if ((VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_ROOT == credentialType)
+-            && (thisProcessRunsAsRoot)) {
+-         *userToken = PROCESS_CREATOR_USER_TOKEN;
+-
+-         gImpersonatedUsername = Util_SafeStrdup("_ROOT_");
+-         err = VIX_OK;
+-         goto quit;
+-      }
+-
+-      /*
+-       * If the VMX asks to be root, then we allow them.
+-       * The VMX will make sure that only it will pass this value in,
+-       * and only when the VM and host are configured to allow this.
+-       *
+-       * XXX This has been deprecated XXX
+-       */
+-      if ((VIX_USER_CREDENTIAL_CONSOLE_USER == credentialType)
+-            && ((allowConsoleUserOps) || !(thisProcessRunsAsRoot))) {
+-         *userToken = PROCESS_CREATOR_USER_TOKEN;
+-
+-         gImpersonatedUsername = Util_SafeStrdup("_CONSOLE_USER_NAME_");
+-         err = VIX_OK;
+-         goto quit;
+-      }
+-
+-      /*
+        * If the VMX asks us to run commands in the context of the current
+        * user, make sure that the user who requested the command is the
+        * same as the current user.
+@@ -10917,50 +10859,6 @@ VixToolsCheckIfVixCommandEnabled(int opcode,                          // IN
+ /*
+  *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  *
+- * VixToolsCheckIfAuthenticationTypeEnabled --
+- *
+- *    Checks to see if a given authentication type has been
+- *    disabled via the tools configuration.
+- *
+- * Return value:
+- *    TRUE if enabled, FALSE otherwise.
+- *
+- * Side effects:
+- *    None
+- *
+- *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+- */
+-
+-static Bool
+-VixToolsCheckIfAuthenticationTypeEnabled(GKeyFile *confDictRef,     // IN
+-                                         const char *typeName)      // IN
+-{
+-   char authnDisabledName[64]; // Authentication.<AuthenticationType>.disabled
+-   gboolean disabled;
+-
+-   Str_Snprintf(authnDisabledName, sizeof(authnDisabledName),
+-                VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_API_AUTHENTICATION ".%s.disabled",
+-                typeName);
+-
+-   ASSERT(confDictRef != NULL);
+-
+-   /*
+-    * XXX Skip doing the strcmp() to verify the auth type since we only
+-    * have the one typeName (VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_AUTHTYPE_AGENTS), and default
+-    * it to VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_INFRA_AGENT_DISABLED_DEFAULT.
+-    */
+-   disabled = VMTools_ConfigGetBoolean(confDictRef,
+-                                       VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_API_GROUPNAME,
+-                                       authnDisabledName,
+-                                       VIX_TOOLS_CONFIG_INFRA_AGENT_DISABLED_DEFAULT);
+-
+-   return !disabled;
+-}
+-
+-
+-/*
+- *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+- *
+  * VixTools_ProcessVixCommand --
+  *
+  *
+-- 
+2.6.2
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_12.1.5.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_12.1.5.bb
index d389d2450c..e12e4be7f8 100644
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_12.1.5.bb
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_12.1.5.bb
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools.git;protocol=https;branch=stabl
            file://0012-hgfsServerLinux-Consider-64bit-time_t-possibility.patch;patchdir=.. \
            file://0013-open-vm-tools-Correct-include-path-for-poll.h.patch;patchdir=.. \
            file://0001-timeSync-Portable-way-to-print-64bit-time_t.patch;patchdir=.. \
+           file://CVE-2023-20867.patch;patchdir=.. \
            "
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "stable-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"