nginx: fix CVE-2026-27654

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix.
Backport the commit[3] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160382
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27654
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a1d18284e0a173c4ef2b28425535d0f640ae0a82

Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>

2 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27654.patch b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27654.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b85c6621e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27654.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From be39034fa93a4d44b52de9b7a463754eda56e712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <arut@nginx.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 20:13:03 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Dav: destination length validation for COPY and MOVE.
+
+Previously, when alias was used in a location with Dav COPY or MOVE
+enabled, and the destination URI was shorter than the alias, integer
+underflow could happen in ngx_http_map_uri_to_path(), which could
+result in heap buffer overwrite, followed by a possible segfault.
+With some implementations of memcpy(), the segfault could be avoided
+and the overwrite could result in a change of the source or destination
+file names to be outside of the location root.
+
+Reported by Calif.io in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a1d18284e0a173c4ef2b28425535d0f640ae0a82)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-27654
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a1d18284e0a173c4ef2b28425535d0f640ae0a82]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c
+index cfb98929e..4619b139a 100644
+--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c
++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c
+@@ -535,19 +535,20 @@ ngx_http_dav_mkcol_handler(ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t *dlcf)
+ static ngx_int_t
+ ngx_http_dav_copy_move_handler(ngx_http_request_t *r)
+ {
+-    u_char                   *p, *host, *last, ch;
+-    size_t                    len, root;
+-    ngx_err_t                 err;
+-    ngx_int_t                 rc, depth;
+-    ngx_uint_t                overwrite, slash, dir, flags;
+-    ngx_str_t                 path, uri, duri, args;
+-    ngx_tree_ctx_t            tree;
+-    ngx_copy_file_t           cf;
+-    ngx_file_info_t           fi;
+-    ngx_table_elt_t          *dest, *over;
+-    ngx_ext_rename_file_t     ext;
+-    ngx_http_dav_copy_ctx_t   copy;
+-    ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t  *dlcf;
++    u_char                    *p, *host, *last, ch;
++    size_t                     len, root;
++    ngx_err_t                  err;
++    ngx_int_t                  rc, depth;
++    ngx_uint_t                 overwrite, slash, dir, flags;
++    ngx_str_t                  path, uri, duri, args;
++    ngx_tree_ctx_t             tree;
++    ngx_copy_file_t            cf;
++    ngx_file_info_t            fi;
++    ngx_table_elt_t           *dest, *over;
++    ngx_ext_rename_file_t      ext;
++    ngx_http_dav_copy_ctx_t    copy;
++    ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t   *dlcf;
++    ngx_http_core_loc_conf_t  *clcf;
+ 
+     if (r->headers_in.content_length_n > 0 || r->headers_in.chunked) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0,
+@@ -644,6 +645,18 @@ destination_done:
+         return NGX_HTTP_CONFLICT;
+     }
+ 
++    clcf = ngx_http_get_module_loc_conf(r, ngx_http_core_module);
++
++    if (clcf->alias
++        && clcf->alias != NGX_MAX_SIZE_T_VALUE
++        && duri.len < clcf->alias)
++    {
++        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0,
++                      "client sent invalid \"Destination\" header: \"%V\"",
++                      &dest->value);
++        return NGX_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
+     depth = ngx_http_dav_depth(r, NGX_HTTP_DAV_INFINITY_DEPTH);
+ 
+     if (depth != NGX_HTTP_DAV_INFINITY_DEPTH) {
diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb
index b57ee49813..cdd351fb12 100644
--- a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb
+++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ SRC_URI:append = " \
                   file://CVE-2023-44487.patch \
                   file://CVE-2026-28755.patch \
                   file://CVE-2026-27651.patch \
+                  file://CVE-2026-27654.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77a2541637b92a621e3ee76776c8b7b40cf6d707e69ba53a940283e30ff2f55d"