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From 065e6298a75164b4347682b63381dbe752c2b156 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:40:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] device_tree: Fix integer overflowing in load_device_tree()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
If the value of get_image_size() exceeds INT_MAX / 2 - 10000, the
computation of @dt_size overflows to a negative number, which then
gets converted to a very large size_t for g_malloc0() and
load_image_size(). In the (fortunately improbable) case g_malloc0()
succeeds and load_image_size() survives, we'd assign the negative
number to *sizep. What that would do to the callers I can't say, but
it's unlikely to be good.
Fix by rejecting images whose size would overflow.
Reported-by: Kurtis Miller <kurtis.miller@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-Id: <20190409174018.25798-1-armbru@redhat.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2018-20815
affects <= 3.0.1
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
device_tree.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/device_tree.c b/device_tree.c
index 296278e..f8b46b3 100644
--- a/device_tree.c
+++ b/device_tree.c
@@ -84,6 +84,10 @@ void *load_device_tree(const char *filename_path, int *sizep)
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
+ if (dt_size > INT_MAX / 2 - 10000) {
+ error_report("Device tree file '%s' is too large", filename_path);
+ goto fail;
+ }
/* Expand to 2x size to give enough room for manipulation. */
dt_size += 10000;
--
2.7.4
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