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CVE-2015-0245: prevent forged ActivationFailure from non-root processes
Upstream has fixed this in code but suggests using this as a easily
backportable fix: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88811
Upstream-Status: Inappropriate
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kukkonen <jussi.kukkonen@intel.com>
From 91eb2ea3362630190e08c1c777c47bae065ac828 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2015 20:09:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2015-0245: prevent forged ActivationFailure from
non-root processes
Without either this rule or better checking in dbus-daemon, non-systemd
processes can make dbus-daemon think systemd failed to activate a system
service, resulting in an error reply back to the requester.
This is redundant with the fix in the C code (which I consider to be
the real solution), but is likely to be easier to backport.
---
bus/system.conf.in | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/bus/system.conf.in b/bus/system.conf.in
index 92f4cc4..851b9e6 100644
--- a/bus/system.conf.in
+++ b/bus/system.conf.in
@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@
<deny send_destination="org.freedesktop.DBus"
send_interface="org.freedesktop.DBus"
send_member="UpdateActivationEnvironment"/>
+ <deny send_destination="org.freedesktop.DBus"
+ send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Activator"/>
+ </policy>
+
+ <!-- Only systemd, which runs as root, may report activation failures. -->
+ <policy user="root">
+ <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.DBus"
+ send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Activator"/>
</policy>
<!-- Config files are placed here that among other things, punch
--
2.1.4
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