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From 524a1da3c45683cec77480acc6cab1d33ae8d5cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2009 12:36:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86: Use __builtin_object_size to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user

gcc (4.x) supports the __builtin_object_size() builtin, which reports the
size of an object that a pointer point to, when known at compile time.
If the buffer size is not known at compile time, a constant -1 is returned.

This patch uses this feature to add a sanity check to copy_from_user();
if the target buffer is known to be smaller than the copy size, the copy
is aborted and a WARNing is emitted in memory debug mode.

These extra checks compile away when the object size is not known,
or if both the buffer size and the copy length are constants.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c  |    2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S       |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c        |    4 ++--
 include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h     |    2 ++
 include/linux/compiler.h          |    4 ++++
 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 632fb44..582d6ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -187,9 +187,26 @@ __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *to, const void __user *from,
 
 unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to,
 					const void *from, unsigned long n);
-unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to,
+unsigned long __must_check _copy_from_user(void *to,
 					  const void __user *from,
 					  unsigned long n);
+
+static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to,
+					  const void __user *from,
+					  unsigned long n)
+{
+	int sz = __compiletime_object_size(to);
+	int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (likely(sz == -1 || sz >= n))
+		ret = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
+	else
+		WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+
 long __must_check strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
 				    long count);
 long __must_check __strncpy_from_user(char *dst,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index db24b21..ce6fec7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -21,10 +21,27 @@ copy_user_generic(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
 __must_check unsigned long
 copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
 __must_check unsigned long
-copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned len);
+_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned len);
 __must_check unsigned long
 copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned len);
 
+static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to,
+					  const void __user *from,
+					  unsigned long n)
+{
+	int sz = __compiletime_object_size(to);
+	int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (likely(sz == -1 || sz >= n))
+		ret = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
+	else
+		WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
 static __always_inline __must_check
 int __copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
index 3909e3b..a0cdd8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_8);
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_user_generic);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_nocache);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_to_user);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_inatomic);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S
index 6ba0f7b..4be3c41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ ENTRY(copy_to_user)
 ENDPROC(copy_to_user)
 
 /* Standard copy_from_user with segment limit checking */
-ENTRY(copy_from_user)
+ENTRY(_copy_from_user)
 	CFI_STARTPROC
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%rax)
 	movq %rsi,%rcx
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ ENTRY(copy_from_user)
 	jae bad_from_user
 	ALTERNATIVE_JUMP X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD,copy_user_generic_unrolled,copy_user_generic_string
 	CFI_ENDPROC
-ENDPROC(copy_from_user)
+ENDPROC(_copy_from_user)
 
 ENTRY(copy_user_generic)
 	CFI_STARTPROC
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
index 1f118d4..8498684 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_to_user);
  * data to the requested size using zero bytes.
  */
 unsigned long
-copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
+_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
 		n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
@@ -882,4 +882,4 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 		memset(to, 0, n);
 	return n;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h
index 450fa59..a3aef5d 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h
@@ -37,3 +37,5 @@
 #define __cold			__attribute__((__cold__))
 
 #endif
+
+#define __compiletime_object_size(obj) __builtin_object_size(obj, 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 9d4c4b0..9c42853 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -185,6 +185,10 @@ extern void __chk_io_ptr(const volatile void __iomem *);
 # define __same_type(a, b) __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(a), typeof(b))
 #endif
 
+/* Compile time object size, -1 for unknown */
+#ifndef __compiletime_object_size
+# define __compiletime_object_size(obj) -1
+#endif
 /*
  * Prevent the compiler from merging or refetching accesses.  The compiler
  * is also forbidden from reordering successive instances of ACCESS_ONCE(),
-- 
1.6.0.6

From 350cf3cd513e6759ae6852946532a47249f25600 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 12:57:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86: Turn the copy_from_user check into an (optional) compile time warning

A previous patch added the buffer size check to copy_from_user().

One of the things learned from analyzing the result of the previous patch
is that in general, gcc is really good at proving that the code contains
sufficient security checks to not need to do a runtime check. But that
for those cases where gcc could not prove this, there was a relatively
high percentage of real security issues.

This patch turns the case of "gcc cannot prove" into a compile time
warning, as long as a sufficiently new gcc is in use.
The objective is that these warnings will trigger developers checking
new cases out before a security hole enters a linux kernel release.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |   12 +++++++++---
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c        |    6 ++++++
 include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h     |    3 +++
 include/linux/compiler.h          |    4 ++++
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 582d6ae..7826639 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@ unsigned long __must_check _copy_from_user(void *to,
 					  const void __user *from,
 					  unsigned long n);
 
+
+extern void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
+	__compiletime_warning("copy_from_user buffer size is not provably correct")
+#endif
+;
+
 static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to,
 					  const void __user *from,
 					  unsigned long n)
@@ -200,10 +207,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to,
 
 	if (likely(sz == -1 || sz >= n))
 		ret = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
 	else
-		WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-#endif
+		copy_from_user_overflow();
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
index 8498684..e218d5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -883,3 +883,9 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	return n;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
+
+void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
+{
+	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h
index a3aef5d..f1709c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h
@@ -39,3 +39,6 @@
 #endif
 
 #define __compiletime_object_size(obj) __builtin_object_size(obj, 0)
+#if __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 4
+#define __compiletime_warning(message) __attribute__((warning(message)))
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 9c42853..241dfd8 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -189,6 +189,10 @@ extern void __chk_io_ptr(const volatile void __iomem *);
 #ifndef __compiletime_object_size
 # define __compiletime_object_size(obj) -1
 #endif
+#ifndef __compiletime_warning
+# define __compiletime_warning(message)
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Prevent the compiler from merging or refetching accesses.  The compiler
  * is also forbidden from reordering successive instances of ACCESS_ONCE(),
-- 
1.6.2.5