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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch62
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4351.patch44
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4576.patch153
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/GnuPG1-CVE-2012-6085.patch63
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/configure.patch17
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/curl_typeof_fix_backport.patch27
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/long-long-thumb.patch19
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/mips_gcc4.4.patch50
8 files changed, 435 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9addca28e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4242.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From e2202ff2b704623efc6277fb5256e4e15bac5676 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
3Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 11:17:52 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH] Mitigate a flush+reload cache attack on RSA secret
5 exponents.
6
7commit e2202ff2b704623efc6277fb5256e4e15bac5676 from
8git://git.gnupg.org/libgcrypt.git
9
10* mpi/mpi-pow.c (gcry_mpi_powm): Always perfrom the mpi_mul for
11exponents in secure memory.
12
13Upstream-Status: Backport
14
15Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
16--
17
18The attack is published as http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448 :
19
20Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel
21Attack by Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. 18 July 2013.
22
23 Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to
24 data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the
25 attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high
26 resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy
27 program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a
28 single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the
29 attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy
30 program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of
31 the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be
32 used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs
33 executing in a different VM.
34
35Index: gnupg-1.4.7/mpi/mpi-pow.c
36===================================================================
37--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/mpi/mpi-pow.c
38+++ gnupg-1.4.7/mpi/mpi-pow.c
39@@ -212,7 +212,13 @@ mpi_powm( MPI res, MPI base, MPI exponen
40 tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
41 rsize = xsize;
42
43- if( (mpi_limb_signed_t)e < 0 ) {
44+ /* To mitigate the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload cache
45+ * side-channel attack on the RSA secret exponent, we do
46+ * the multiplication regardless of the value of the
47+ * high-bit of E. But to avoid this performance penalty
48+ * we do it only if the exponent has been stored in secure
49+ * memory and we can thus assume it is a secret exponent. */
50+ if (esec || (mpi_limb_signed_t)e < 0) {
51 /*mpihelp_mul( xp, rp, rsize, bp, bsize );*/
52 if( bsize < KARATSUBA_THRESHOLD ) {
53 mpihelp_mul( xp, rp, rsize, bp, bsize );
54@@ -227,6 +233,8 @@ mpi_powm( MPI res, MPI base, MPI exponen
55 mpihelp_divrem(xp + msize, 0, xp, xsize, mp, msize);
56 xsize = msize;
57 }
58+ }
59+ if ( (mpi_limb_signed_t)e < 0 ) {
60
61 tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
62 rsize = xsize;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4351.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4351.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b29ede4233
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4351.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Index: gnupg-1.4.7/g10/getkey.c
4===================================================================
5--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/g10/getkey.c 2007-03-05 16:54:41.000000000 +0800
6+++ gnupg-1.4.7/g10/getkey.c 2013-11-28 14:41:59.640212240 +0800
7@@ -1454,7 +1454,11 @@
8
9 if(flags)
10 key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN;
11+ if (!key_usage)
12+ key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE;
13 }
14+ else if (p)
15+ key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE;
16
17 /* We set PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN to indicate that this key has a
18 capability that we do not handle. This serves to distinguish
19Index: gnupg-1.4.7/g10/keygen.c
20===================================================================
21--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/g10/keygen.c 2007-02-05 00:27:40.000000000 +0800
22+++ gnupg-1.4.7/g10/keygen.c 2013-11-28 14:43:05.016670092 +0800
23@@ -209,9 +209,6 @@
24 if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)
25 buf[0] |= 0x20;
26
27- if (!buf[0])
28- return;
29-
30 build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, buf, 1);
31 }
32
33Index: gnupg-1.4.7/include/cipher.h
34===================================================================
35--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/include/cipher.h 2006-04-21 20:39:49.000000000 +0800
36+++ gnupg-1.4.7/include/cipher.h 2013-11-28 14:49:24.159322744 +0800
37@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
38 #define PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT 4 /* key is also good to certify other keys*/
39 #define PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH 8 /* key is good for authentication */
40 #define PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN 128 /* key has an unknown usage bit */
41+#define PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE 256 /* No usage given. */
42
43 #define DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 1
44 #define DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 2
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4576.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4576.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1a22f5853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/CVE-2013-4576.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Index: gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/dsa.c
4===================================================================
5--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/cipher/dsa.c 2006-12-12 02:27:21.000000000 +0800
6+++ gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/dsa.c 2014-01-23 11:30:17.300915919 +0800
7@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@
8 MPI kinv;
9 MPI tmp;
10
11+ mpi_normalize (hash);
12+
13 /* select a random k with 0 < k < q */
14 k = gen_k( skey->q );
15
16Index: gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/elgamal.c
17===================================================================
18--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/cipher/elgamal.c 2006-12-12 03:08:05.000000000 +0800
19+++ gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/elgamal.c 2014-01-23 11:30:17.300915919 +0800
20@@ -376,6 +376,9 @@
21 {
22 MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( skey->p ) );
23
24+ mpi_normalize (a);
25+ mpi_normalize (b);
26+
27 /* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
28 mpi_powm( t1, a, skey->x, skey->p );
29 mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
30Index: gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/random.c
31===================================================================
32--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/cipher/random.c 2006-11-03 18:09:39.000000000 +0800
33+++ gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/random.c 2014-01-23 11:31:53.993495462 +0800
34@@ -273,6 +273,18 @@
35 }
36
37
38+/* Randomize the MPI */
39+void
40+randomize_mpi (MPI mpi, size_t nbits, int level)
41+{
42+ unsigned char *buffer;
43+
44+ buffer = get_random_bits (nbits, level, mpi_is_secure (mpi));
45+ mpi_set_buffer (mpi, buffer, (nbits+7)/8, 0);
46+ xfree (buffer);
47+}
48+
49+
50 int
51 random_is_faked()
52 {
53Index: gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/random.h
54===================================================================
55--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/cipher/random.h 2006-02-09 19:29:29.000000000 +0800
56+++ gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/random.h 2014-01-23 11:30:17.300915919 +0800
57@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
58 int random_is_faked(void);
59 void random_disable_locking (void);
60 void randomize_buffer( byte *buffer, size_t length, int level );
61+void randomize_mpi (MPI mpi, size_t nbits, int level);
62 byte *get_random_bits( size_t nbits, int level, int secure );
63 void fast_random_poll( void );
64
65Index: gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/rsa.c
66===================================================================
67--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/cipher/rsa.c 2006-12-12 03:09:00.000000000 +0800
68+++ gnupg-1.4.7/cipher/rsa.c 2014-01-23 11:35:04.330639125 +0800
69@@ -301,9 +301,26 @@
70 #if 0
71 mpi_powm( output, input, skey->d, skey->n );
72 #else
73- MPI m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
74- MPI m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
75- MPI h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
76+ int nlimbs = mpi_get_nlimbs (skey->n)+1;
77+ MPI m1 = mpi_alloc_secure (nlimbs);
78+ MPI m2 = mpi_alloc_secure (nlimbs);
79+ MPI h = mpi_alloc_secure (nlimbs);
80+# if 1
81+ MPI bdata= mpi_alloc_secure (nlimbs);
82+ MPI r = mpi_alloc_secure (nlimbs);
83+# endif
84+
85+ /* Remove superfluous leading zeroes from INPUT. */
86+ mpi_normalize (input);
87+
88+# if 1
89+ /* Blind: bdata = (data * r^e) mod n */
90+ randomize_mpi (r, mpi_get_nbits (skey->n), 0);
91+ mpi_fdiv_r (r, r, skey->n);
92+ mpi_powm (bdata, r, skey->e, skey->n);
93+ mpi_mulm (bdata, bdata, input, skey->n);
94+ input = bdata;
95+# endif
96
97 /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
98 mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 );
99@@ -321,8 +338,15 @@
100 /* m = m2 + h * p */
101 mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
102 mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
103- /* ready */
104-
105+
106+# if 1
107+ mpi_free (bdata);
108+ /* Unblind: output = (output * r^(-1)) mod n */
109+ mpi_invm (r, r, skey->n);
110+ mpi_mulm (output, output, r, skey->n);
111+ mpi_free (r);
112+# endif
113+
114 mpi_free ( h );
115 mpi_free ( m1 );
116 mpi_free ( m2 );
117@@ -397,6 +421,7 @@
118 rsa_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey )
119 {
120 RSA_secret_key sk;
121+ MPI input;
122
123 if( algo != 1 && algo != 2 )
124 return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
125@@ -407,8 +432,14 @@
126 sk.p = skey[3];
127 sk.q = skey[4];
128 sk.u = skey[5];
129- *result = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.n ) );
130- secret( *result, data[0], &sk );
131+
132+ /* Mitigates side-channel attacks (CVE-2013-4576). */
133+ input = mpi_alloc (0);
134+ mpi_normalize (data[0]);
135+ mpi_fdiv_r (input, data[0], sk.n);
136+ *result = mpi_alloc_secure (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.n));
137+ secret (*result, input, &sk);
138+ mpi_free (input);
139 return 0;
140 }
141
142Index: gnupg-1.4.7/g10/gpgv.c
143===================================================================
144--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/g10/gpgv.c 2006-12-13 19:25:04.000000000 +0800
145+++ gnupg-1.4.7/g10/gpgv.c 2014-01-23 11:30:17.300915919 +0800
146@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@
147 void random_dump_stats(void) {}
148 int quick_random_gen( int onoff ) { return -1;}
149 void randomize_buffer( byte *buffer, size_t length, int level ) {}
150+void randomize_mpi (MPI mpi, size_t nbits, int level) {}
151 int random_is_faked() { return -1;}
152 byte *get_random_bits( size_t nbits, int level, int secure ) { return NULL;}
153 void set_random_seed_file( const char *name ) {}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/GnuPG1-CVE-2012-6085.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/GnuPG1-CVE-2012-6085.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b5d9a1693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/GnuPG1-CVE-2012-6085.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
1commit f0b33b6fb8e0586e9584a7a409dcc31263776a67
2Author: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
3Date: Thu Dec 20 09:43:41 2012 +0100
4
5 gpg: Import only packets which are allowed in a keyblock.
6
7 * g10/import.c (valid_keyblock_packet): New.
8 (read_block): Store only valid packets.
9 --
10
11 A corrupted key, which for example included a mangled public key
12 encrypted packet, used to corrupt the keyring. This change skips all
13 packets which are not allowed in a keyblock.
14
15 GnuPG-bug-id: 1455
16
17 (cherry-picked from commit f795a0d59e197455f8723c300eebf59e09853efa)
18
19Upstream-Status: Backport
20
21Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
22
23diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
24index bfe02eb..a57b32e 100644
25--- a/g10/import.c
26+++ b/g10/import.c
27@@ -384,6 +384,27 @@ import_print_stats (void *hd)
28 }
29
30
31+/* Return true if PKTTYPE is valid in a keyblock. */
32+static int
33+valid_keyblock_packet (int pkttype)
34+{
35+ switch (pkttype)
36+ {
37+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
38+ case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
39+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
40+ case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
41+ case PKT_SIGNATURE:
42+ case PKT_USER_ID:
43+ case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
44+ case PKT_RING_TRUST:
45+ return 1;
46+ default:
47+ return 0;
48+ }
49+}
50+
51+
52 /****************
53 * Read the next keyblock from stream A.
54 * PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
55@@ -461,7 +482,7 @@ read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root )
56 }
57 in_cert = 1;
58 default:
59- if( in_cert ) {
60+ if (in_cert && valid_keyblock_packet (pkt->pkttype)) {
61 if( !root )
62 root = new_kbnode( pkt );
63 else
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/configure.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/configure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e005ac658f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/configure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
1
2Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
3
4Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
5
6Index: gnupg-1.4.7/configure.ac
7===================================================================
8--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/configure.ac
9+++ gnupg-1.4.7/configure.ac
10@@ -827,7 +827,6 @@ else
11 AC_SUBST(USE_NLS)
12 AC_SUBST(USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL)
13 AC_SUBST(BUILD_INCLUDED_LIBINTL)
14- AM_PO_SUBDIRS
15 fi
16
17 if test "$try_extensions" = yes || test x"$card_support" = xyes ; then
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/curl_typeof_fix_backport.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/curl_typeof_fix_backport.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5fb24aa63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/curl_typeof_fix_backport.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
1
2This has been discussed in a couple of different bug reported
3upstream:
4
5http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=486250
6http://bugs.sourcemage.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14446
7
8Fix:
9http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2008-April/024344.html
10
11Upstream-Status: Backport [Debian]
12
13Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
14
15Index: gnupg-1.4.7/keyserver/gpgkeys_curl.c
16===================================================================
17--- gnupg-1.4.7.orig/keyserver/gpgkeys_curl.c
18+++ gnupg-1.4.7/keyserver/gpgkeys_curl.c
19@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ main(int argc,char *argv[])
20 curl_easy_setopt(curl,CURLOPT_VERBOSE,1);
21 }
22
23- curl_easy_setopt(curl,CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER,opt->flags.check_cert);
24+ curl_easy_setopt(curl,CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER,(long)opt->flags.check_cert);
25 curl_easy_setopt(curl,CURLOPT_CAINFO,opt->ca_cert_file);
26
27 if(proxy)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/long-long-thumb.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/long-long-thumb.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2855cab24b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/long-long-thumb.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
1Orignal Patch came from OpenWrt via OE-Classic
2https://dev.openwrt.org/browser/packages/utils/gnupg/patches/001-mips_gcc4.4
3which is no longer a valid revision!
4
5Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
6
7
8--- gnupg/mpi/longlong.h~ 2006-02-14 10:09:55.000000000 +0000
9+++ gnupg/mpi/longlong.h 2008-10-27 13:11:09.000000000 +0000
10@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
11 /***************************************
12 ************** ARM ******************
13 ***************************************/
14-#if defined (__arm__) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 32
15+#if defined (__arm__) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 32 && !defined(__thumb__)
16 #define add_ssaaaa(sh, sl, ah, al, bh, bl) \
17 __asm__ ("adds %1, %4, %5\n" \
18 "adc %0, %2, %3" \
19
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/mips_gcc4.4.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/mips_gcc4.4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a03b2b705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.7/mips_gcc4.4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
1
2From Openembedded-Classic
3
4 gnupg-1.4.10: Readd the ARM Thumb patch as debian has no thumb support
5
6
7Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [embedded-specific]
8
9Index: gnupg-1.4.10/mpi/longlong.h
10===================================================================
11--- gnupg-1.4.10.orig/mpi/longlong.h 2008-12-11 17:39:43.000000000 +0100
12+++ gnupg-1.4.10/mpi/longlong.h 2010-03-27 14:27:53.000000000 +0100
13@@ -706,18 +706,35 @@
14 #endif /* __m88110__ */
15 #endif /* __m88000__ */
16
17+/* Test for gcc >= maj.min, as per __GNUC_PREREQ in glibc */
18+#if defined (__GNUC__) && defined (__GNUC_MINOR__)
19+#define __GNUC_PREREQ(maj, min) \
20+ ((__GNUC__ << 16) + __GNUC_MINOR__ >= ((maj) << 16) + (min))
21+#else
22+#define __GNUC_PREREQ(maj, min) 0
23+#endif
24+
25 /***************************************
26 ************** MIPS *****************
27 ***************************************/
28 #if defined (__mips__) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 32
29-#if __GNUC__ > 2 || __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 7
30+#if __GNUC_PREREQ (4,4)
31+#define umul_ppmm(w1, w0, u, v) \
32+ do { \
33+ UDItype __ll = (UDItype)(u) * (v); \
34+ w1 = __ll >> 32; \
35+ w0 = __ll; \
36+ } while (0)
37+#endif
38+#if !defined (umul_ppmm) && __GNUC_PREREQ (2,7)
39 #define umul_ppmm(w1, w0, u, v) \
40 __asm__ ("multu %2,%3" \
41 : "=l" ((USItype)(w0)), \
42 "=h" ((USItype)(w1)) \
43 : "d" ((USItype)(u)), \
44 "d" ((USItype)(v)))
45-#else
46+#endif
47+#if !defined (umul_ppmm)
48 #define umul_ppmm(w1, w0, u, v) \
49 __asm__ ("multu %2,%3 \n" \
50 "mflo %0 \n" \
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2024-06-07 02:35:30 +0000