1 files changed, 145 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f81ed1566
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From 6d49272e6d6741496e3456f2cc22ebc2b9f7f989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=aab04ca5d359150e17631e6a9b44b65e93bdc467
+https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-glibc/glibc.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=2755c57269f24e9d59c22c49788f92515346c1bb
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-1000366
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog  |  7 ++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 7a999802dd..ea5ecd4a1e 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
++2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
++
++       * elf/rtld.c (SECURE_NAME_LIMIT, SECURE_PATH_LIMIT): Define.
++       (dso_name_valid_for_suid): New function.
++       (handle_ld_preload): Likewise.
++       (dl_main): Call it.  Remove alloca.
++
+ 2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
+ 
+        [BZ #21624]
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 215a9aec8f..1d8eab9fe2 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
++   particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active.  */
++#ifdef NAME_MAX
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
++#endif
++#ifdef PATH_MAX
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
++#endif
++
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++   directories and is not overly long.  Reject empty names
++   unconditionally.  */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++    {
++      /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++        programs, and also skip overlong names.  */
++      size_t len = strlen (p);
++      if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++       return false;
++    }
++  return *p != '\0';
++}
+ 
+ /* List of auditing DSOs.  */
+ static struct audit_list
+@@ -730,6 +759,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed.  */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
+ 
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++   separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++   executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++   (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++   ignored since it is insecure.)  Return the number of preloads
++   performed.  */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++{
++  unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++  const char *p = preloadlist;
++  char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
++
++  while (*p != '\0')
++    {
++      /* Split preload list at space/colon.  */
++      size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++      if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
++       {
++         memcpy (fname, p, len);
++         fname[len] = '\0';
++       }
++      else
++       fname[0] = '\0';
++
++      /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
++      p += len;
++      if (*p != '\0')
++       ++p;
++
++      if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++       npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++    }
++  return npreloads;
++}
++
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+         ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1481,23 +1546,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ 
+   if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+     {
+-      /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+-        separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+-        executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+-        list.  If the binary is running setuid all elements
+-        containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure.  */
+-      char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+-      char *p;
+-
+       HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+-      /* Prevent optimizing strsep.  Speed is not important here.  */
+-      while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+-       if (p[0] != '\0'
+-           && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+-               || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+-         npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++      npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+       HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+       HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+       HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+-- 
+2.15.0
+