diff options
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch | 59 |
2 files changed, 60 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc index 711982ba8d..55aced9f9a 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | |||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ | |||
29 | file://0010-hw-pvrdma-Protect-against-buggy-or-malicious-guest-d.patch \ | 29 | file://0010-hw-pvrdma-Protect-against-buggy-or-malicious-guest-d.patch \ |
30 | file://0001-net-tulip-Restrict-DMA-engine-to-memories.patch \ | 30 | file://0001-net-tulip-Restrict-DMA-engine-to-memories.patch \ |
31 | file://arm-cpreg-fix.patch \ | 31 | file://arm-cpreg-fix.patch \ |
32 | file://CVE-2022-3165.patch \ | ||
32 | " | 33 | " |
33 | UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" | 34 | UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" |
34 | 35 | ||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b4a6694c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ | |||
1 | CVE: CVE-2022-3165 | ||
2 | Upstream-Status: Backport | ||
3 | Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> | ||
4 | |||
5 | From d307040b18bfcb1393b910f1bae753d5c12a4dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
6 | From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com> | ||
7 | Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 22:45:11 +0200 | ||
8 | Subject: [PATCH] ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in | ||
9 | vnc_client_cut_text_ext | ||
10 | |||
11 | Extended ClientCutText messages start with a 4-byte header. If len < 4, | ||
12 | an integer underflow occurs in vnc_client_cut_text_ext. The result is | ||
13 | used to decompress data in a while loop in inflate_buffer, leading to | ||
14 | CPU consumption and denial of service. Prevent this by checking dlen in | ||
15 | protocol_client_msg. | ||
16 | |||
17 | Fixes: CVE-2022-3165 | ||
18 | Fixes: 0bf41cab93e5 ("ui/vnc: clipboard support") | ||
19 | Reported-by: TangPeng <tangpeng@qianxin.com> | ||
20 | Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com> | ||
21 | Message-Id: <20220925204511.1103214-1-mcascell@redhat.com> | ||
22 | Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> | ||
23 | --- | ||
24 | ui/vnc.c | 11 ++++++++--- | ||
25 | 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) | ||
26 | |||
27 | diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c | ||
28 | index 6a05d06147..acb3629cd8 100644 | ||
29 | --- a/ui/vnc.c | ||
30 | +++ b/ui/vnc.c | ||
31 | @@ -2442,8 +2442,8 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) | ||
32 | if (len == 1) { | ||
33 | return 8; | ||
34 | } | ||
35 | + uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4)); | ||
36 | if (len == 8) { | ||
37 | - uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4)); | ||
38 | if (dlen > (1 << 20)) { | ||
39 | error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes" | ||
40 | " which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen); | ||
41 | @@ -2456,8 +2456,13 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) | ||
42 | } | ||
43 | |||
44 | if (read_s32(data, 4) < 0) { | ||
45 | - vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, abs(read_s32(data, 4)), | ||
46 | - read_u32(data, 8), data + 12); | ||
47 | + if (dlen < 4) { | ||
48 | + error_report("vnc: malformed payload (header less than 4 bytes)" | ||
49 | + " in extended clipboard pseudo-encoding."); | ||
50 | + vnc_client_error(vs); | ||
51 | + break; | ||
52 | + } | ||
53 | + vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, dlen, read_u32(data, 8), data + 12); | ||
54 | break; | ||
55 | } | ||
56 | vnc_client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8); | ||
57 | -- | ||
58 | GitLab | ||
59 | |||