curl: Security fix for CVE-2016-8624

Affected versions: curl 7.1 to and including 7.50.3
Not affected versions: curl >= 7.51.0

(From OE-Core rev: 26e464767ab53cb78e4ede10c77fe12907a7daad)

Signed-off-by: Thiruvadi Rajaraman <trajaraman@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 69 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-8624.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-8624.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b9e000ecb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-8624.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From 44ab42e55bbe329777ee05d50aea1ee059221652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2016 00:48:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] urlparse: accept '#' as end of host name
+
+'http://example.com#@127.0.0.1/x.txt' equals a request to example.com
+for the '/' document with the rest of the URL being a fragment.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-8624
+Signed-off-by: Thiruvadi Rajaraman <trajaraman@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ lib/url.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 74e9bf5..ce94281 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -4159,11 +4159,11 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+     /* clear path */
+     char slashbuf[4];
+     path[0]=0;
+ 
+     rc = sscanf(data->change.url,
+-                "%15[^\n:]:%3[/]%[^\n/?]%[^\n]",
++                "%15[^\n:]:%3[/]%[^\n/?#]%[^\n]",
+                 protobuf, slashbuf, conn->host.name, path);
+     if(2 == rc) {
+       failf(data, "Bad URL");
+       return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
+     }
+@@ -4171,11 +4171,11 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ 
+       /*
+        * The URL was badly formatted, let's try the browser-style _without_
+        * protocol specified like 'http://'.
+        */
+-      rc = sscanf(data->change.url, "%[^\n/?]%[^\n]", conn->host.name, path);
++      rc = sscanf(data->change.url, "%[^\n/?#]%[^\n]", conn->host.name, path);
+       if(1 > rc) {
+         /*
+          * We couldn't even get this format.
+          * djgpp 2.04 has a sscanf() bug where 'conn->host.name' is
+          * assigned, but the return value is EOF!
+@@ -4276,14 +4276,14 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+     strcpy(path, "/");
+     rebuild_url = TRUE;
+   }
+ 
+   /* If the URL is malformatted (missing a '/' after hostname before path) we
+-   * insert a slash here. The only letter except '/' we accept to start a path
+-   * is '?'.
++   * insert a slash here. The only letters except '/' that can start a path is
++   * '?' and '#' - as controlled by the two sscanf() patterns above.
+    */
+-  if(path[0] == '?') {
++  if(path[0] != '/') {
+     /* We need this function to deal with overlapping memory areas. We know
+        that the memory area 'path' points to is 'urllen' bytes big and that
+        is bigger than the path. Use +1 to move the zero byte too. */
+     memmove(&path[1], path, strlen(path)+1);
+     path[0] = '/';
+-- 
+2.9.3
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.50.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.50.1.bb
index ad7d83dac7..bdf5d73b31 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.50.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.50.1.bb
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI += " file://configure_ac.patch \
              file://CVE-2016-8621.patch \
              file://CVE-2016-8623.patch \
              file://CVE-2016-8617.patch \
+             file://CVE-2016-8624.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "015f6a0217ca6f2c5442ca406476920b"