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authorChen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>2018-07-27 16:04:34 +0800
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2018-07-30 12:44:35 +0100
commitffb63803eac6ba97d1b9e1f3d648bc4d81bf0276 (patch)
treed29c106cf81ae93e47b30aaaf87e10bbcdfc10eb /meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2017-2616.patch
parent96f011e628fe360644bfdd7650145b996d61740c (diff)
downloadpoky-ffb63803eac6ba97d1b9e1f3d648bc4d81bf0276.tar.gz
shadow: upgrade 4.2.1 -> 4.6
The following patches are removed because problems have been fixed in this version. 0001-shadow-CVE-2017-12424 fix-installation-failure-with-subids-disabled.patch usermod-fix-compilation-failure-with-subids-disabled.patch CVE-2017-2616.patch check_size_of_uid_t_and_gid_t_using_AC_CHECK_SIZEOF.patch 0001-Do-not-read-login.defs-before-doing-chroot.patch The following patches are rebased. 0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch 0001-useradd-copy-extended-attributes-of-home.patch 0001-useradd.c-create-parent-directories-when-necessary.patch allow-for-setting-password-in-clear-text.patch (From OE-Core rev: 79dd22729d5b8a2f2cf4294ff6b261c9d6ecd977) Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2017-2616.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2017-2616.patch64
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2017-2616.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2017-2616.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ee728f0952..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2017-2616.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
1shadow-4.2.1: Fix CVE-2017-2616
2
3[No upstream tracking] -- https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=855943
4
5su: properly clear child PID
6
7If su is compiled with PAM support, it is possible for any local user
8to send SIGKILL to other processes with root privileges. There are
9only two conditions. First, the user must be able to perform su with
10a successful login. This does NOT have to be the root user, even using
11su with the same id is enough, e.g. "su $(whoami)". Second, SIGKILL
12can only be sent to processes which were executed after the su process.
13It is not possible to send SIGKILL to processes which were already
14running. I consider this as a security vulnerability, because I was
15able to write a proof of concept which unlocked a screen saver of
16another user this way.
17
18Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/08fd4b69e84364677a10e519ccb25b71710ee686]
19CVE: CVE-2017-2616
20bug: 855943
21Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
22
23diff --git a/src/su.c b/src/su.c
24index 3704217..1efcd61 100644
25--- a/src/su.c
26+++ b/src/su.c
27@@ -363,20 +363,35 @@ static void prepare_pam_close_session (void)
28 /* wake child when resumed */
29 kill (pid, SIGCONT);
30 stop = false;
31+ } else {
32+ pid_child = 0;
33 }
34 } while (!stop);
35 }
36
37- if (0 != caught) {
38+ if (0 != caught && 0 != pid_child) {
39 (void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
40 (void) fputs (_("Session terminated, terminating shell..."),
41 stderr);
42 (void) kill (-pid_child, caught);
43
44 (void) signal (SIGALRM, kill_child);
45+ (void) signal (SIGCHLD, catch_signals);
46 (void) alarm (2);
47
48- (void) wait (&status);
49+ sigemptyset (&ourset);
50+ if ((sigaddset (&ourset, SIGALRM) != 0)
51+ || (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL) != 0)) {
52+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"), Prog);
53+ kill_child (0);
54+ } else {
55+ while (0 == waitpid (pid_child, &status, WNOHANG)) {
56+ sigsuspend (&ourset);
57+ }
58+ pid_child = 0;
59+ (void) sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL);
60+ }
61+
62 (void) fputs (_(" ...terminated.\n"), stderr);
63 }
64