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authorKhem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>2022-08-14 15:20:31 -0700
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2022-08-16 14:57:58 +0100
commit6baf9b07a8571c7b0a0b3f5635873059b92059ed (patch)
treeeb23e59df425bc53ab26dd43868a080e6898b166 /meta/recipes-devtools/rsync
parentddb63d9e02b17877d5e56f8ab73befa1632861f7 (diff)
downloadpoky-6baf9b07a8571c7b0a0b3f5635873059b92059ed.tar.gz
rsync: Backport fix to address CVE-2022-29154
CVE: CVE-2022-29154 (From OE-Core rev: a0a0358418c2bf6bc7a7128acbfcb4e99f8f764a) Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/rsync')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch372
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb1
2 files changed, 373 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e43b092ea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
1From b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
3Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 16:55:34 -0700
4Subject: [PATCH] Some extra file-list safety checks.
5
6Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871]
7CVE: CVE-2022-29154
8Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
9---
10 exclude.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
11 flist.c | 17 ++++++-
12 io.c | 4 ++
13 main.c | 7 ++-
14 receiver.c | 11 +++--
15 rsync.1.md | 44 ++++++++++++++++--
16 6 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
17
18--- a/exclude.c
19+++ b/exclude.c
20@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server;
21 extern int am_sender;
22 extern int eol_nulls;
23 extern int io_error;
24+extern int xfer_dirs;
25+extern int recurse;
26 extern int local_server;
27 extern int prune_empty_dirs;
28 extern int ignore_perishable;
29+extern int old_style_args;
30+extern int relative_paths;
31 extern int delete_mode;
32 extern int delete_excluded;
33 extern int cvs_exclude;
34 extern int sanitize_paths;
35 extern int protocol_version;
36+extern int list_only;
37 extern int module_id;
38
39+extern char *filesfrom_host;
40 extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
41 extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
42 extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
43@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
44 filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
45 filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
46 filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
47+filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
48
49 int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
50+int trust_sender_filter = 0;
51
52 /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
53 #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
54@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *l
55 }
56 }
57
58+/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
59+ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
60+void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
61+{
62+ filter_rule *rule;
63+ int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
64+ int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
65+ const char *cp;
66+ char *p;
67+ if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
68+ return;
69+ if (relative_paths) {
70+ cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
71+ if (cp)
72+ arg = cp+3;
73+ } else {
74+ if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
75+ arg = cp + 1;
76+ }
77+ arg_len = strlen(arg);
78+ if (arg_len) {
79+ if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
80+ /* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
81+ cp = arg;
82+ while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) {
83+ arg_len++;
84+ cp++;
85+ }
86+ saw_wild = 1;
87+ }
88+ arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
89+ rule = new0(filter_rule);
90+ if (!implied_filter_list.head)
91+ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
92+ else {
93+ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
94+ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
95+ }
96+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
97+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
98+ *p++ = '/';
99+ cp = arg;
100+ while (*cp) {
101+ switch (*cp) {
102+ case '\\':
103+ backslash_cnt++;
104+ if (saw_wild)
105+ *p++ = '\\';
106+ *p++ = *cp++;
107+ break;
108+ case '/':
109+ if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
110+ break;
111+ if (relative_paths) {
112+ filter_rule const *ent;
113+ int found = 0;
114+ *p = '\0';
115+ for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
116+ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
117+ found = 1;
118+ }
119+ if (!found) {
120+ filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
121+ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
122+ R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
123+ R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
124+ R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
125+ implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
126+ }
127+ }
128+ slash_cnt++;
129+ *p++ = *cp++;
130+ break;
131+ default:
132+ *p++ = *cp++;
133+ break;
134+ }
135+ }
136+ *p = '\0';
137+ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
138+ arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
139+ }
140+
141+ if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
142+ /* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
143+ rule = new0(filter_rule);
144+ if (recurse)
145+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2;
146+ else
147+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
148+ /* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */
149+ if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
150+ /* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
151+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
152+ cp = arg;
153+ while (*cp) {
154+ if (*cp == '\\')
155+ *p++ = '\\';
156+ *p++ = *cp++;
157+ }
158+ } else {
159+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
160+ if (arg_len) {
161+ memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
162+ p += arg_len;
163+ }
164+ }
165+ if (p[-1] != '/')
166+ *p++ = '/';
167+ *p++ = '*';
168+ if (recurse)
169+ *p++ = '*';
170+ *p = '\0';
171+ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
172+ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
173+ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
174+ }
175+}
176+
177 /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
178 static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
179 {
180@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum lo
181 : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
182 : "file";
183 rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
184- w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
185+ w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
186 t, name, ent->pattern,
187 ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
188 }
189@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const
190 }
191 switch (ch) {
192 case ':':
193+ trust_sender_filter = 1;
194 rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
195 | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
196 /* FALL THROUGH */
197--- a/flist.c
198+++ b/flist.c
199@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
200 extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
201 extern int output_needs_newline;
202 extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
203+extern int trust_sender_filter;
204 extern int unsort_ndx;
205 extern uid_t our_uid;
206 extern struct stats stats;
207@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
208
209 extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
210
211-extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
212-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
213+extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
214
215 #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
216 extern int filesfrom_convert;
217@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_ent
218 exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
219 }
220
221+ if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
222+ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
223+ if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
224+ && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
225+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
226+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
227+ }
228+ if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
229+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
230+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
231+ }
232+ }
233+
234 if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
235 if (one_file_system) {
236 /* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
237--- a/io.c
238+++ b/io.c
239@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
240 while (s != eob) {
241 if (*s++ == '\0') {
242 ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
243+ add_implied_include(sob);
244 if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
245 exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
246 write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
247@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
248 char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
249 char *t = ff_xb.buf;
250 char *eob = f + len;
251+ char *cur = t;
252 /* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
253 while (f != eob) {
254 if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
255+ add_implied_include(cur);
256+ cur = t;
257 while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
258 f++;
259 }
260--- a/main.c
261+++ b/main.c
262@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
263 extern int basis_dir_cnt;
264 extern int default_af_hint;
265 extern int stdout_format_has_i;
266+extern int trust_sender_filter;
267 extern struct stats stats;
268 extern char *stdout_format;
269 extern char *logfile_format;
270@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
271 extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
272 extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
273 extern struct file_list *first_flist;
274-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
275+extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
276
277 uid_t our_uid;
278 gid_t our_gid;
279@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *mac
280 #ifdef ICONV_CONST
281 setup_iconv();
282 #endif
283+ trust_sender_filter = 1;
284 } else if (local_server) {
285 /* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
286 * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
287@@ -1500,6 +1502,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
288 char *dummy_host;
289 int dummy_port = rsync_port;
290 int i;
291+ if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
292+ add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]);
293 /* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
294 * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
295 for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
296@@ -1523,6 +1527,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
297 if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
298 arg = ".";
299 remote_argv[i] = arg;
300+ add_implied_include(arg);
301 }
302 }
303
304--- a/receiver.c
305+++ b/receiver.c
306@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
307 if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
308 rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
309
310- if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
311- && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
312- rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
313- exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
314+ if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
315+ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
316+ if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
317+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
318+ fname);
319+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
320+ }
321 }
322
323 #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
324--- a/rsync.1.md
325+++ b/rsync.1.md
326@@ -154,6 +154,33 @@ rsync daemon by leaving off the module n
327
328 See the following section for more details.
329
330+## MULTI-HOST SECURITY
331+
332+Rsync takes steps to ensure that the file requests that are shared in a
333+transfer are protected against various security issues. Most of the potential
334+problems arise on the receiving side where rsync takes steps to ensure that the
335+list of files being transferred remains within the bounds of what was
336+requested.
337+
338+Toward this end, rsync 3.1.2 and later have aborted when a file list contains
339+an absolute or relative path that tries to escape out of the top of the
340+transfer. Also, beginning with version 3.2.5, rsync does two more safety
341+checks of the file list to (1) ensure that no extra source arguments were added
342+into the transfer other than those that the client requested and (2) ensure
343+that the file list obeys the exclude rules that we sent to the sender.
344+
345+For those that don't yet have a 3.2.5 client rsync, it is safest to do a copy
346+into a dedicated destination directory for the remote files rather than
347+requesting the remote content get mixed in with other local content. For
348+example, doing an rsync copy into your home directory is potentially unsafe on
349+an older rsync if the remote rsync is being controlled by a bad actor:
350+
351+> rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~
352+
353+A safer command would be:
354+
355+> rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~/host1-files
356+
357 ## ADVANCED USAGE
358
359 The syntax for requesting multiple files from a remote host is done by
360@@ -2323,6 +2350,12 @@ your home directory (remove the '=' for
361 behavior. The environment is always overridden by manually specified
362 positive or negative options (the negative is `--no-old-args`).
363
364+ Note that this option also disables the extra safety check added in 3.2.5
365+ that ensures that a remote sender isn't including extra top-level items in
366+ the file-list that you didn't request. This side-effect is necessary
367+ because we can't know for sure what names to expect when the remote shell
368+ is interpreting the args.
369+
370 This option conflicts with the [`--protect-args`](#opt) option.
371
372 0. `--protect-args`, `-s`
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb
index e6f917b5cd..711e97002d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
14 file://rsyncd.conf \ 14 file://rsyncd.conf \
15 file://makefile-no-rebuild.patch \ 15 file://makefile-no-rebuild.patch \
16 file://determism.patch \ 16 file://determism.patch \
17 file://CVE-2022-29154.patch \
17 " 18 "
18 19
19SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6f761838d08052b0b6579cf7f6737d93e47f01f4da04c5d24d3447b7f2a5fad1" 20SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6f761838d08052b0b6579cf7f6737d93e47f01f4da04c5d24d3447b7f2a5fad1"
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2024-05-22 10:17:27 +0000