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authorOleksandr Kravchuk <open.source@oleksandr-kravchuk.com>2020-07-27 11:00:35 +0200
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2020-07-27 19:58:09 +0100
commit7b78e1b4de0421de9f876aeb4ff11d6d017a4b7b (patch)
tree9fc68e89247a8a4b65b3178ba6195fdad5812260 /meta/recipes-devtools/json-c
parent49e92f8d6d82850ea91ddd80c0cc3ebb4f4613d7 (diff)
downloadpoky-7b78e1b4de0421de9f876aeb4ff11d6d017a4b7b.tar.gz
json-c: update to 0.15
Remove upstreamed patch. (From OE-Core rev: 411f47cdcb74109a103166477d606c88db6175ee) Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Kravchuk <open.source@oleksandr-kravchuk.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/json-c')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch160
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.15.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb)6
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 164 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a45cfb61bc..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
1From 099016b7e8d70a6d5dd814e788bba08d33d48426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
3Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:41:16 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Protect array_list_del_idx against size_t overflow.
5
6If the assignment of stop overflows due to idx and count being
7larger than SIZE_T_MAX in sum, out of boundary access could happen.
8
9It takes invalid usage of this function for this to happen, but
10I decided to add this check so array_list_del_idx is as safe against
11bad usage as the other arraylist functions.
12
13Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/json-c/json-c/commit/31243e4d1204ef78be34b0fcae73221eee6b83be]
14CVE: CVE-2020-12762
15Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
16
17---
18 arraylist.c | 3 +++
19 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
20
21diff --git a/arraylist.c b/arraylist.c
22index 12ad8af6d3..e5524aca75 100644
23--- a/arraylist.c
24+++ b/arraylist.c
25@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ int array_list_del_idx(struct array_list *arr, size_t idx, size_t count)
26 {
27 size_t i, stop;
28
29+ /* Avoid overflow in calculation with large indices. */
30+ if (idx > SIZE_T_MAX - count)
31+ return -1;
32 stop = idx + count;
33 if (idx >= arr->length || stop > arr->length)
34 return -1;
35
36From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
37From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
38Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200
39Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Prevent division by zero in linkhash.
40
41If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations
42are prone to division by zero operations.
43
44Purely protective measure against bad usage.
45---
46 linkhash.c | 3 +++
47 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
48
49diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c
50index 7ea58c0abf..f05cc38030 100644
51--- a/linkhash.c
52+++ b/linkhash.c
53@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
54
55 #include "config.h"
56
57+#include <assert.h>
58 #include <limits.h>
59 #include <stdarg.h>
60 #include <stddef.h>
61@@ -499,6 +500,8 @@ struct lh_table *lh_table_new(int size, lh_entry_free_fn *free_fn, lh_hash_fn *h
62 int i;
63 struct lh_table *t;
64
65+ /* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */
66+ assert(size > 0);
67 t = (struct lh_table *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table));
68 if (!t)
69 return NULL;
70
71From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
72From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
73Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200
74Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix integer overflows.
75
76The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size
77due to a signed integer being used to track their current size.
78
79If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is
80an undefined behaviour in C programming language.
81
82Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value,
83like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then
84printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems.
85---
86 linkhash.c | 7 +++++--
87 printbuf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
88 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
89
90diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c
91index f05cc38030..51e90b13a2 100644
92--- a/linkhash.c
93+++ b/linkhash.c
94@@ -580,9 +580,12 @@ int lh_table_insert_w_hash(struct lh_table *t, const void *k, const void *v, con
95 {
96 unsigned long n;
97
98- if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR)
99- if (lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2) != 0)
100+ if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) {
101+ /* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */
102+ int new_size = INT_MAX / 2 < t->size ? t->size * 2 : INT_MAX;
103+ if (t->size == INT_MAX || lh_table_resize(t, new_size) != 0)
104 return -1;
105+ }
106
107 n = h % t->size;
108
109diff --git a/printbuf.c b/printbuf.c
110index 976c12dde5..00822fac4f 100644
111--- a/printbuf.c
112+++ b/printbuf.c
113@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
114
115 #include "config.h"
116
117+#include <limits.h>
118 #include <stdio.h>
119 #include <stdlib.h>
120 #include <string.h>
121@@ -65,10 +66,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size)
122
123 if (p->size >= min_size)
124 return 0;
125-
126- new_size = p->size * 2;
127- if (new_size < min_size + 8)
128+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
129+ if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8)
130+ return -1;
131+ if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2)
132 new_size = min_size + 8;
133+ else {
134+ new_size = p->size * 2;
135+ if (new_size < min_size + 8)
136+ new_size = min_size + 8;
137+ }
138 #ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG
139 MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc "
140 "bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n",
141@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size)
142
143 int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size)
144 {
145+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
146+ if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1)
147+ return -1;
148 if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1)
149 {
150 if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0)
151@@ -100,6 +110,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb, int offset, int charvalue, int len)
152
153 if (offset == -1)
154 offset = pb->bpos;
155+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
156+ if (len > INT_MAX - offset)
157+ return -1;
158 size_needed = offset + len;
159 if (pb->size < size_needed)
160 {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.15.bb
index 1d501d1294..2968590dd8 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.15.bb
@@ -4,11 +4,9 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/json-c/json-c/wiki"
4LICENSE = "MIT" 4LICENSE = "MIT"
5LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=de54b60fbbc35123ba193fea8ee216f2" 5LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=de54b60fbbc35123ba193fea8ee216f2"
6 6
7SRC_URI = "https://s3.amazonaws.com/json-c_releases/releases/${BP}.tar.gz \ 7SRC_URI = "https://s3.amazonaws.com/json-c_releases/releases/${BP}.tar.gz"
8 file://CVE-2020-12762.patch \
9"
10 8
11SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b377de08c9b23ca3b37d9a9828107dff1de5ce208ff4ebb35005a794f30c6870" 9SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b8d80a1ddb718b3ba7492916237bbf86609e9709fb007e7f7d4322f02341a4c6"
12 10
13UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases" 11UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases"
14UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "json-c-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)-\d+" 12UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "json-c-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)-\d+"