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| author | De Huo <De.Huo@windriver.com> | 2020-09-24 10:39:44 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-10-06 14:15:21 +0100 |
| commit | 0ff8b73db40cdf333e02f86a443320275b686e82 (patch) | |
| tree | 632fa63116f41ed75cd19b1221b0ef7a5b830d76 /meta/recipes-core | |
| parent | a88aa7cf7e6e7e70b8e711904822250b192da037 (diff) | |
| download | poky-0ff8b73db40cdf333e02f86a443320275b686e82.tar.gz | |
bash: fix CVE-2019-18276
An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bash
through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its
effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared
object that calls setuid() and therefore regains privileges. However,
binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.
Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
[1] https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
(From OE-Core rev: aee0f56a9b3b510649672d0b4427a0e94a001ec4)
Signed-off-by: De Huo <De.Huo@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f01acae9c279e0a580f46d1ba4c015caa3f8c2c)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-core')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions