wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146

wpa-supplicant: backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4141,
 CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146

Backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146.
This patch is originally from:

For CVE-2015-4141:
http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch

For CVE-2015-4143:
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch

For CVE-2015-4144 and CVE-2015-4145:
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch

For CVE-2015-4146:
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch

(From OE-Core rev: ce16e95de05db24e4e4132660d793cc7b1d890b9)

Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin at jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c477c2f93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
+
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+        BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+        EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+        int res = 0;
++       size_t prime_len, order_len;
+ 
+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ 
++       prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++       order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++       if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++                          (unsigned int) payload_len,
++                          (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++               goto fin;
++       }
++
+        if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+            ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+            ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+        u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+        int offset;
+ 
++       if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++                          (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++               goto fin;
++       }
++
+        /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+        grp = htons(data->group_num);
+        ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+