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authorHitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>2023-11-28 10:29:52 +0530
committerSteve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>2023-12-01 04:14:19 -1000
commitc64835823aa57e2adfd6937171333880476857f7 (patch)
tree9b6cdd9724a9b44d01b7b2eda529f62eb56c4dc6 /meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch
parent716693ccccb82ad398ff7470c360d047baeaec07 (diff)
downloadpoky-c64835823aa57e2adfd6937171333880476857f7.tar.gz
grub: fix CVE-2023-4692 & CVE-2023-4693
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea && https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 (From OE-Core rev: f461056d88db0eae5573a0c0ad23c408cff80bd8) Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e6b6efdec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
3Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
4Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident
5 $DATA attribute
6
7When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
8the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
9there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
10file record segment.
11
12When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
13read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
14arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
15
16This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
17contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
18obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
19
20This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
21corresponding file record segment only.
22
23Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
24
25Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
26Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
27Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
28
29Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94]
30CVE: CVE-2023-4693
31Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
32---
33 grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
34 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
35
36diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
37index c8d3683..4d1fe42 100644
38--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
39+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
40@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
41 {
42 if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
43 return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
44- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
45+
46+ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
47+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
48+
49+ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
50+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
51+
52+ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
53+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
54+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
55+
56+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
57 return 0;
58 }
59
60--
612.25.1
62