grub2: fix several CVEs

Backport CVE patches from upstream to fix:
  CVE-2021-3695
  CVE-2021-3696
  CVE-2021-3697
  CVE-2022-28733
  CVE-2022-28734
  CVE-2022-28735

Backport the following 5 patches to make CVE patches be applied smoothly.
  video-Remove-trailing-whitespaces.patch
  video-readers-jpeg-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-.patch
  video-readers-jpeg-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-start-o.patch

(From OE-Core rev: db43401a3a4c201f02f4128fa4bac8ce993bfec0)

Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 84 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9fc52df86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 22a3f97d39f6a10b08ad7fd1cc47c4dcd10413f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 15:38:19 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer write
+
+Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in
+grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(),
+we have the following loop:
+
+for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+     data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
+
+We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1.
+
+On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow,
+be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so
+we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.:
+
+0x6180_0000_0480 to
+0x6181_0000_0498
+     ^
+     ~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from
+          any object.
+
+On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer
+that won't crash but will overwrite random data.
+
+Catch the underflow and error out.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3697
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-3697
+
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=22a3f97d39f6a10b08ad7fd1cc47c4dcd10413f6
+
+Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu@windriver.com>
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index 579bbe8a4..09596fbf5 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/misc.h>
+ #include <grub/bufio.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ 
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+ 
+@@ -699,6 +700,7 @@ static grub_err_t
+ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ {
+   unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1;
++  unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride;
+   int rst = data->dri;
+   grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ 
+@@ -711,8 +713,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+                       "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
+ 
++  if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) ||
++      grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) ||
++      grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride))
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++                      "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions");
++
+   for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+-       data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
++       data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3)
+     for (c1 = 0;  c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+        c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3)
+       {
+-- 
+2.34.1
+