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authorRoss Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>2022-04-26 13:07:20 +0100
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2022-04-27 11:21:04 +0100
commit5bca57859b280f73b23247aac7dec6b05f48fde8 (patch)
tree6ce5e30f03833ceeb47d3ebc577f7be732d5501d /bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/osc.py
parent5546a868b52400ed1487b2ac7149f3a9e7293bd2 (diff)
downloadpoky-5bca57859b280f73b23247aac7dec6b05f48fde8.tar.gz
bitbake.conf: mark all directories as safe for git to read
Recent git releases containing [1] have an ownership check when opening repositories, and refuse to open a repository if it is owned by a different user. This breaks any use of git in do_install, as that is executed by the (fake) root user. Whilst not common, this does happen. Setting the git configuration safe.directories=* disables this check, so that git is usable in fakeroot tasks. This can be set globally via the internal environment variable GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS, we can't use GIT_CONFIG_*_KEY/VALUE as that isn't present in all the releases which have the ownership check. We already set GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES to ensure that git doesn't recurse up out of the work directory, so this isn't a security issue. [1] https://github.com/git/git/commit/8959555cee7ec045958f9b6dd62e541affb7e7d9 (From OE-Core rev: 8bed8e6993e7297bdcd68940aa0d47ef47120117) Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/osc.py')
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