1 files changed, 160 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/libtar/files/CVE-2013-4420.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/libtar/files/CVE-2013-4420.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93b35cbcd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/libtar/files/CVE-2013-4420.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+From 2c81f47508fa6bce9df84e3b43dfb16dffb742a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 15:51:05 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid directory traversal when extracting archives
+
+Description of the vulnerability from the NIST CVE tracker [1]:
+
+    Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the (1)
+    tar_extract_glob and (2) tar_extract_all functions in libtar 1.2.20
+    and earlier allow remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via
+    a .. (dot dot) in a crafted tar file.
+
+Imported from the Debian libtar package 1.2.20-8 [2]. Original Debian
+description:
+
+    Author: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
+    Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/731860
+    Description: Avoid directory traversal when extracting archives
+    by skipping over leading slashes and any prefix containing ".." components.
+    Forwarded: yes
+
+meta-openembedded uses Debian's release tarball [3]. Debian uses
+repo.or.cz/libtar.git as their upstream [4]. repo.or.cz/libtar.git has
+been inactive since 2013 [5].
+
+CVE: CVE-2013-4420
+
+Upstream-Status: Inactive-Upstream [lastrelease: 2013 lastcommit: 2013]
+
+Comments: Added the commit message
+
+[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4420
+[2] https://sources.debian.org/patches/libtar/1.2.20-8/CVE-2013-4420.patch/
+[3] https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded/tree/meta-oe/recipes-support/libtar/libtar_1.2.20.bb?h=master#n8
+[4] http://svn.kibibyte.se/libtar/trunk/debian/control (rev 51; not tagged)
+[5] https://repo.or.cz/libtar.git/shortlog/refs/heads/master
+
+Signed-off-by: Katariina Lounento <katariina.lounento@vaisala.com>
+---
+ lib/decode.c   | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ lib/extract.c  |  8 ++++----
+ lib/internal.h |  1 +
+ lib/output.c   |  4 ++--
+ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/decode.c b/lib/decode.c
+index 35312be..edd5f2e 100644
+--- a/lib/decode.c
++++ b/lib/decode.c
+@@ -22,13 +22,42 @@
+ # include <string.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++char *
++safer_name_suffix (char const *file_name)
++{
++       char const *p, *t;
++       p = t = file_name;
++       while (*p == '/') t = ++p;
++       while (*p)
++       {
++               while (p[0] == '.' && p[0] == p[1] && p[2] == '/')
++               {
++                       p += 3;
++                       t = p;
++               }
++               /* advance pointer past the next slash */
++               while (*p && (p++)[0] != '/');
++       }
++
++       if (!*t)
++       {
++               t = ".";
++       }
++
++       if (t != file_name)
++       {
++               /* TODO: warn somehow that the path was modified */
++       }
++       return (char*)t;
++}
++
+ 
+ /* determine full path name */
+ char *
+ th_get_pathname(TAR *t)
+ {
+        if (t->th_buf.gnu_longname)
+-               return t->th_buf.gnu_longname;
++               return safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.gnu_longname);
+ 
+        /* allocate the th_pathname buffer if not already */
+        if (t->th_pathname == NULL)
+@@ -50,7 +79,7 @@ th_get_pathname(TAR *t)
+        }
+ 
+        /* will be deallocated in tar_close() */
+-       return t->th_pathname;
++       return safer_name_suffix(t->th_pathname);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/extract.c b/lib/extract.c
+index 9fc6ad5..4ff1a95 100644
+--- a/lib/extract.c
++++ b/lib/extract.c
+@@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ tar_extract_hardlink(TAR * t, char *realname)
+        if (mkdirhier(dirname(filename)) == -1)
+                return -1;
+        libtar_hashptr_reset(&hp);
+-       if (libtar_hash_getkey(t->h, &hp, th_get_linkname(t),
++       if (libtar_hash_getkey(t->h, &hp, safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)),
+                               (libtar_matchfunc_t)libtar_str_match) != 0)
+        {
+                lnp = (char *)libtar_hashptr_data(&hp);
+                linktgt = &lnp[strlen(lnp) + 1];
+        }
+        else
+-               linktgt = th_get_linkname(t);
++               linktgt = safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t));
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+        printf("  ==> extracting: %s (link to %s)\n", filename, linktgt);
+@@ -347,9 +347,9 @@ tar_extract_symlink(TAR *t, char *realname)
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+        printf("  ==> extracting: %s (symlink to %s)\n",
+-              filename, th_get_linkname(t));
++              filename, safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)));
+ #endif
+-       if (symlink(th_get_linkname(t), filename) == -1)
++       if (symlink(safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)), filename) == -1)
+        {
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+                perror("symlink()");
+diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h
+index da7be7f..f05ca4f 100644
+--- a/lib/internal.h
++++ b/lib/internal.h
+@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@
+ #define TLS_THREAD
+ #endif
+ 
++char* safer_name_suffix(char const*);
+diff --git a/lib/output.c b/lib/output.c
+index a5262ee..af754f1 100644
+--- a/lib/output.c
++++ b/lib/output.c
+@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ th_print_long_ls(TAR *t)
+                else
+                        printf(" link to ");
+                if ((t->options & TAR_GNU) && t->th_buf.gnu_longlink != NULL)
+-                       printf("%s", t->th_buf.gnu_longlink);
++                       printf("%s", safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.gnu_longlink));
+                else
+-                       printf("%.100s", t->th_buf.linkname);
++                       printf("%.100s", safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.linkname));
+        }
+ 
+        putchar('\n');