dnsmasq: backport CVE fixes from dnsmasq 2.78morty-nextmorty

CVE-2017-1449{1-6}

Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

8 files changed, 582 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e73feb68e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From e441ac5247cf8252ac8db08d53862af4065d9586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 22:00:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14491, DNS heap buffer overflow.
+
+commit 62cb936cb7ad5f219715515ae7d32dd281a5aa1f upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Further fix to 0549c73b7ea6b22a3c49beb4d432f185a81efcbc
+Handles case when RR name is not a pointer to the question,
+only occurs for some auth-mode replies, therefore not
+detected by fuzzing (?)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rfc1035.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 78410d6..e5628ba 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1071,32 +1071,35 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ 
+   va_start(ap, format);   /* make ap point to 1st unamed argument */
+ 
+-  /* nameoffset (1 or 2) + type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + 0 (2) */
+-  CHECK_LIMIT(12);
+-
+   if (nameoffset > 0)
+     {
++      CHECK_LIMIT(2);
+       PUTSHORT(nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+       char *name = va_arg(ap, char *);
+-      if (name)
+-       p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit);
+-        if (!p)
+-          {
+-            va_end(ap);
+-            goto truncated;
+-          }
+-
++      if (name && !(p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit)))
++       {
++         va_end(ap);
++         goto truncated;
++       }
++      
+       if (nameoffset < 0)
+        {
++         CHECK_LIMIT(2);
+          PUTSHORT(-nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+        }
+       else
+-       *p++ = 0;
++       {
++         CHECK_LIMIT(1);
++         *p++ = 0;
++       }
+     }
+ 
++  /* type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + rdlen (2) */
++  CHECK_LIMIT(10);
++  
+   PUTSHORT(type, p);
+   PUTSHORT(class, p);
+   PUTLONG(ttl, p);      /* TTL */
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05986788d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+From 8644f7c99c5e2fde6b6872a4ab820d3520f44e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:17:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14491 DNS heap buffer overflow.
+
+commit 0549c73b7ea6b22a3c49beb4d432f185a81efcbc upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix heap overflow in DNS code. This is a potentially serious
+security hole. It allows an attacker who can make DNS
+requests to dnsmasq, and who controls the contents of
+a domain, which is thereby queried, to overflow
+(by 2 bytes) a heap buffer and either crash, or
+even take control of, dnsmasq.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/dnsmasq.h |  2 +-
+ src/dnssec.c  |  2 +-
+ src/option.c  |  2 +-
+ src/rfc1035.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/rfc2131.c |  4 ++--
+ src/rfc3315.c |  4 ++--
+ src/util.c    |  7 ++++++-
+ 7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
+index 1896a64..ed5da36 100644
+--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
+@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ u32 rand32(void);
+ u64 rand64(void);
+ int legal_hostname(char *c);
+ char *canonicalise(char *s, int *nomem);
+-unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval);
++unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit);
+ void *safe_malloc(size_t size);
+ void safe_pipe(int *fd, int read_noblock);
+ void *whine_malloc(size_t size);
+diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
+index 3c77c7d..f45c804 100644
+--- a/src/dnssec.c
++++ b/src/dnssec.c
+@@ -2227,7 +2227,7 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char
+ 
+   p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+        
+-  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
++  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, NULL);
+   *p++ = 0;
+   PUTSHORT(type, p);
+   PUTSHORT(class, p);
+diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
+index d8c57d6..0e1c326 100644
+--- a/src/option.c
++++ b/src/option.c
+@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static int parse_dhcp_opt(char *errstr, char *arg, int flags)
+                    }
+                  
+                  p = newp;
+-                 end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom);
++                 end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom, NULL);
+                  *end++ = 0;
+                  len = end - p;
+                  free(dom);
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 24d08c1..78410d6 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1049,6 +1049,7 @@ int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bog
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
++
+ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int nameoffset, unsigned char **pp, 
+                        unsigned long ttl, int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...)
+ {
+@@ -1058,12 +1059,21 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+   unsigned short usval;
+   long lval;
+   char *sval;
++#define CHECK_LIMIT(size) \
++  if (limit && p + (size) > (unsigned char*)limit) \
++    { \
++      va_end(ap); \
++      goto truncated; \
++    }
+ 
+   if (truncp && *truncp)
+     return 0;
+- 
++
+   va_start(ap, format);   /* make ap point to 1st unamed argument */
+-  
++
++  /* nameoffset (1 or 2) + type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + 0 (2) */
++  CHECK_LIMIT(12);
++
+   if (nameoffset > 0)
+     {
+       PUTSHORT(nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+@@ -1072,7 +1082,13 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+     {
+       char *name = va_arg(ap, char *);
+       if (name)
+-       p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
++       p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit);
++        if (!p)
++          {
++            va_end(ap);
++            goto truncated;
++          }
++
+       if (nameoffset < 0)
+        {
+          PUTSHORT(-nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+@@ -1093,6 +1109,7 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+       {
+ #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+       case '6':
++        CHECK_LIMIT(IN6ADDRSZ);
+        sval = va_arg(ap, char *); 
+        memcpy(p, sval, IN6ADDRSZ);
+        p += IN6ADDRSZ;
+@@ -1100,36 +1117,47 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ #endif
+        
+       case '4':
++        CHECK_LIMIT(INADDRSZ);
+        sval = va_arg(ap, char *); 
+        memcpy(p, sval, INADDRSZ);
+        p += INADDRSZ;
+        break;
+        
+       case 'b':
++        CHECK_LIMIT(1);
+        usval = va_arg(ap, int);
+        *p++ = usval;
+        break;
+        
+       case 's':
++        CHECK_LIMIT(2);
+        usval = va_arg(ap, int);
+        PUTSHORT(usval, p);
+        break;
+        
+       case 'l':
++        CHECK_LIMIT(4);
+        lval = va_arg(ap, long);
+        PUTLONG(lval, p);
+        break;
+        
+       case 'd':
+-       /* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
+-       if (offset)
+-         *offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
+-       p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *));
+-       *p++ = 0;
++        /* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
++        if (offset)
++          *offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
++        p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *), limit);
++        if (!p)
++          {
++            va_end(ap);
++            goto truncated;
++          }
++        CHECK_LIMIT(1);
++        *p++ = 0;
+        break;
+        
+       case 't':
+        usval = va_arg(ap, int);
++        CHECK_LIMIT(usval);
+        sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
+        if (usval != 0)
+          memcpy(p, sval, usval);
+@@ -1141,20 +1169,24 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+        usval = sval ? strlen(sval) : 0;
+        if (usval > 255)
+          usval = 255;
++        CHECK_LIMIT(usval + 1);
+        *p++ = (unsigned char)usval;
+        memcpy(p, sval, usval);
+        p += usval;
+        break;
+       }
+ 
++#undef CHECK_LIMIT
+   va_end(ap);  /* clean up variable argument pointer */
+   
+   j = p - sav - 2;
+-  PUTSHORT(j, sav);     /* Now, store real RDLength */
++ /* this has already been checked against limit before */
++ PUTSHORT(j, sav);     /* Now, store real RDLength */
+   
+   /* check for overflow of buffer */
+   if (limit && ((unsigned char *)limit - p) < 0)
+     {
++truncated:
+       if (truncp)
+        *truncp = 1;
+       return 0;
+diff --git a/src/rfc2131.c b/src/rfc2131.c
+index b7c167e..0dffd36 100644
+--- a/src/rfc2131.c
++++ b/src/rfc2131.c
+@@ -2419,10 +2419,10 @@ static void do_options(struct dhcp_context *context,
+ 
+              if (fqdn_flags & 0x04)
+                {
+-                 p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname);
++                 p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname, NULL);
+                  if (domain)
+                    {
+-                     p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain);
++                     p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain, NULL);
+                      *p++ = 0;
+                    }
+                }
+diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
+index 3f4d69c..73bdee4 100644
+--- a/src/rfc3315.c
++++ b/src/rfc3315.c
+@@ -1472,10 +1472,10 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct state *state, int do_refresh)
+       if ((p = expand(len + 2)))
+        {
+          *(p++) = state->fqdn_flags;
+-         p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname);
++         p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname, NULL);
+          if (state->send_domain)
+            {
+-             p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain);
++             p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain, NULL);
+              *p = 0;
+            }
+        }
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 93b24f5..a377e6f 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -218,15 +218,20 @@ char *canonicalise(char *in, int *nomem)
+   return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval)
++unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit)
+ {
+   int j;
+   
+   while (sval && *sval)
+     {
++      if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
++        return p;
++
+       unsigned char *cp = p++;
+       for (j = 0; *sval && (*sval != '.'); sval++, j++)
+        {
++          if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
++            return p;
+ #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+          if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && *sval == NAME_ESCAPE)
+            *p++ = (*(++sval))-1;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19949314c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 6a0e7dbac67a8393e4505e593e5c46544c53eae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:47:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14492, DHCPv6 RA heap overflow.
+
+commit 24036ea507862c7b7898b68289c8130f85599c10 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix heap overflow in IPv6 router advertisement code.
+This is a potentially serious security hole, as a
+crafted RA request can overflow a buffer and crash or
+control dnsmasq. Attacker must be on the local network.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/radv.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/radv.c b/src/radv.c
+index 749b666..d09fe0e 100644
+--- a/src/radv.c
++++ b/src/radv.c
+@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ void icmp6_packet(time_t now)
+       /* look for link-layer address option for logging */
+       if (sz >= 16 && packet[8] == ICMP6_OPT_SOURCE_MAC && (packet[9] * 8) + 8 <= sz)
+        {
++         if ((packet[9] * 8 - 2) * 3 - 1 >= MAXDNAME) {
++           return;
++         }
+          print_mac(daemon->namebuff, &packet[10], (packet[9] * 8) - 2);
+          mac = daemon->namebuff;
+        }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae99cf49a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From f23f4be3cb72d307806e3d3ca14779f69ac5494c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:52:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14493, DHCPv6 - Stack buffer
+ overflow.
+
+commit 3d4ff1ba8419546490b464418223132529514033 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix stack overflow in DHCPv6 code. An attacker who can send
+a DHCPv6 request to dnsmasq can overflow the stack frame and
+crash or control dnsmasq.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rfc3315.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
+index 73bdee4..8d18a28 100644
+--- a/src/rfc3315.c
++++ b/src/rfc3315.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, void *inbuff, size_t sz,
+   /* RFC-6939 */
+   if ((opt = opt6_find(opts, end, OPTION6_CLIENT_MAC, 3)))
+     {
++      if (opt6_len(opt) - 2 > DHCP_CHADDR_MAX) {
++        return 0;
++      }
+       state->mac_type = opt6_uint(opt, 0, 2);
+       state->mac_len = opt6_len(opt) - 2;
+       memcpy(&state->mac[0], opt6_ptr(opt, 2), state->mac_len);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a6f0e2abe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From aba3f8df87d104d599920ea44e96191601638961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:05:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14494, Infoleak handling DHCPv6
+ forwarded requests.
+
+commit 33e3f1029c9ec6c63e430ff51063a6301d4b2262 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix information leak in DHCPv6. A crafted DHCPv6 packet can
+cause dnsmasq to forward memory from outside the packet
+buffer to a DHCPv6 server when acting as a relay.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rfc3315.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
+index 8d18a28..03b3f84 100644
+--- a/src/rfc3315.c
++++ b/src/rfc3315.c
+@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, void *inbuff, size_t sz,
+   
+   for (opt = opts; opt; opt = opt6_next(opt, end))
+     {
++      if (opt6_ptr(opt, 0) + opt6_len(opt) >= end) {
++        return 0;
++      }
+       int o = new_opt6(opt6_type(opt));
+       if (opt6_type(opt) == OPTION6_RELAY_MSG)
+        {
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31014d102e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From e4ae220ee00dcad20a716432badd3210b442ddb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:16:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14495, OOM in DNS response
+ creation.
+
+commit 51eadb692a5123b9838e5a68ecace3ac579a3a45 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix out-of-memory Dos vulnerability. An attacker which can
+send malicious DNS queries to dnsmasq can trigger memory
+allocations in the add_pseudoheader function
+The allocated memory is never freed which leads to a DoS
+through memory exhaustion. dnsmasq is vulnerable only
+if one of the following option is specified:
+--add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/edns0.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/edns0.c b/src/edns0.c
+index a2ef0ea..f48c084 100644
+--- a/src/edns0.c
++++ b/src/edns0.c
+@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+          !(p = skip_section(p, 
+                             ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->arcount), 
+                             header, plen)))
++      {
++       free(buff);
+        return plen;
++      }
+       if (p + 11 > limit)
+-       return plen; /* Too big */
++      {
++        free(buff);
++        return plen; /* Too big */
++      }
+       *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
+       PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
+       PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given in EDNS0 header */
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc50ef0848
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From c25545680679a12d78dd80662ed1bc5d97a38d6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:11:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14496, Integer underflow in DNS
+ response creation.
+
+commit 897c113fda0886a28a986cc6ba17bb93bd6cb1c7 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix DoS in DNS. Invalid boundary checks in the
+add_pseudoheader function allows a memcpy call with negative
+size An attacker which can send malicious DNS queries
+to dnsmasq can trigger a DoS remotely.
+dnsmasq is vulnerable only if one of the following option is
+specified: --add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/edns0.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/edns0.c b/src/edns0.c
+index c7a101e..a2ef0ea 100644
+--- a/src/edns0.c
++++ b/src/edns0.c
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+          GETSHORT(len, p);
+          
+          /* malformed option, delete the whole OPT RR and start again. */
+-         if (i + len > rdlen)
++         if (i + 4 + len > rdlen)
+            {
+              rdlen = 0;
+              is_last = 0;
+@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+                             ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->arcount), 
+                             header, plen)))
+        return plen;
++      if (p + 11 > limit)
++       return plen; /* Too big */
+       *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
+       PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
+       PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given in EDNS0 header */
+@@ -204,6 +206,11 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+       /* Copy back any options */
+       if (buff)
+        {
++          if (p + rdlen > limit)
++          {
++            free(buff);
++            return plen; /* Too big */
++          }
+          memcpy(p, buff, rdlen);
+          free(buff);
+          p += rdlen;
+@@ -217,8 +224,12 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+   /* Add new option */
+   if (optno != 0 && replace != 2)
+     {
++      if (p + 4 > limit)
++       return plen; /* Too big */
+       PUTSHORT(optno, p);
+       PUTSHORT(optlen, p);
++      if (p + optlen > limit)
++       return plen; /* Too big */
+       memcpy(p, opt, optlen);
+       p += optlen;  
+       PUTSHORT(p - datap, lenp);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb
index 41573d9dd6..5b68d98f84 100644
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ require dnsmasq.inc
 
 SRC_URI += "\
     file://lua.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch \
+    file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[dnsmasq-2.76.md5sum] = "6610f8233ca89b15a1bb47c788ffb84f"