1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/qoriq/0016-Fixed-DH-keygen-pair-generator.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/qoriq/0016-Fixed-DH-keygen-pair-generator.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8923cb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/qoriq/0016-Fixed-DH-keygen-pair-generator.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From d2c868c6370bcc0d0a254e641907da2cdf992d62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@freescale.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 May 2014 06:35:45 +0545
+Subject: [PATCH 16/26] Fixed DH keygen pair generator
+
+Upstream-status: Pending
+
+Wrong Padding results into keygen length error
+
+Signed-off-by: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@freescale.com>
+Tested-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
+---
+ crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+index dab8fea..13d924f 100644
+--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
++++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+@@ -3396,44 +3396,60 @@ sw_try:
+ static int cryptodev_dh_keygen(DH *dh)
+ {
+        struct crypt_kop kop;
+-       int ret = 1, g_len;
+-       unsigned char *g = NULL;
++       int ret = 1, q_len = 0;
++       unsigned char *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *s = NULL, *w = NULL;
++       BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++       int generate_new_key = 1;
+ 
+-       if (dh->priv_key == NULL)       {
+-               if ((dh->priv_key=BN_new()) == NULL)
+-                       goto sw_try;
+-       }
++       if (dh->priv_key)
++               priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+ 
+-       if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
+-               if ((dh->pub_key=BN_new()) == NULL)
+-                       goto sw_try;
+-       }
++       if (dh->pub_key)
++               pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+ 
+-       g_len = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
++       q_len = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+        /**
+         * Get generator into a plain buffer. If length is less than
+         * q_len then add leading padding bytes.
+         */
+-       if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->g, &g, &g_len)) {
++       if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->g, &g, &q_len)) {
++               DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++               goto sw_try;
++       }
++
++       if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->p, &q, &q_len)) {
+                DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto sw_try;
+        }
+ 
+        memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+        kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_GENERATE_KEY;
+-       if (bn2crparam(dh->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+-               goto sw_try;
++       kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = q;
++       kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = q_len * 8;
+        if (!dh->q || bn2crparam(dh->q, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+                goto sw_try;
+        kop.crk_param[2].crp_p = g;
+-       kop.crk_param[2].crp_nbits = g_len * 8;
++       kop.crk_param[2].crp_nbits = q_len * 8;
+        kop.crk_iparams = 3;
+ 
++       s = OPENSSL_malloc (q_len);
++       if (!s) {
++               DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++               goto sw_try;
++       }
++
++       w = OPENSSL_malloc (q_len);
++       if (!w) {
++               DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++               goto sw_try;
++       }
++
+        /* pub_key is or prime length while priv key is of length of order */
+-       if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dh->p), dh->pub_key,
+-           BN_num_bytes(dh->q), dh->priv_key))
++       if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, q_len, w, q_len, s))
+            goto sw_try;
+ 
++       dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(w, q_len, pub_key);
++       dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(s, q_len, priv_key);
+        return ret;
+ sw_try:
+        {
+-- 
+2.3.5
+