linux-qoriq: update to revision f488de6

Minor version update to 3.12.37-rt51 with new features:
* e6500 hugepage TLB miss performance improvement
* T1023RDB support
* T1040D4RDB and T1042D4RDB support
* DIU [T1042]
* DPAA Ethernet: loadable module
* eMMC: DDR mode [T2080]
* eTSEC: Gianfar upstream updates and fixes
* fmlib: table statistics, stats extension
* IEEE802.1AE (MACSEC) and IEEE802.1X (port-based network access control) [T104x, T102x]
* IEEE1588 ptpd open source stack includes more DPAA processors: P1023, P2041, P3041, P5020, P5040, T4240, T1023
* LAG SGMII 2.5G ports support - IPv4 traffics forwarding on aggregated 2 x 2.5Gb L2 Switch FMAN ports [1040]
* LAG support of IPv6 traffics forwarding and TCP/UDP traffics over IPv6 forwarding (2 x 2.5Gb L2 Switch WAN) [1040]
* LAG support of IPv6 traffics forwarding and TCP/UDP traffics over IPv6 forwarding on both 1 G RGMII port and 1G SGMII port [1040]
* Power Management: Power off feature for all QDS boards except B9132QDS and B4860QDS
* SEC: QI Driver IPSec performance improvement
* SGMII 2.5G fixed link [T1024]
* USB: Dual UTMI

For detailed history, see
http://git.freescale.com/git/cgit.cgi/ppc/sdk/linux.git/tag/?id=fsl-sdk-v1.8

Also remove the patches which already merged in 3.12.37-rt51

Signed-off-by: Ting Liu <ting.liu@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 137 deletions

diff --git a/meta-fsl-ppc/recipes-kernel/linux/files/0003-mnt-CVE-2014-5206_CVE-2014-5207.patch b/meta-fsl-ppc/recipes-kernel/linux/files/0003-mnt-CVE-2014-5206_CVE-2014-5207.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aa5ca1bc..00000000
--- a/meta-fsl-ppc/recipes-kernel/linux/files/0003-mnt-CVE-2014-5206_CVE-2014-5207.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-From 8b18c0adbc5d0cb1530692e72bcfb88fd7bb77bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 17:26:07 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
-
-commit 9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705 upstream.
-
-While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
-would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
-the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
-additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
-
-In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
-flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked.  These
-flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
-and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
-
-The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
-- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
-- nodev  may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
-- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
-- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
-
-The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
-global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
-atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
-and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
-updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled.  Therefore an
-unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
-by a more privileged user.
-
-The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
-MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
-mnt flags.
-
-Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
-should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
-namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
-the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
-
-Fix for CVE-2014-5206 and CVE-2014-5207
-Upstream-Status: backport
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
-Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
----
- fs/namespace.c        | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- include/linux/mount.h |  5 +++++
- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
-index 8e90b03..7c67de8 100644
---- a/fs/namespace.c
-+++ b/fs/namespace.c
-@@ -827,8 +827,21 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
- 
-        mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_WRITE_HOLD;
-        /* Don't allow unprivileged users to change mount flags */
--       if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
--               mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
-+       if (flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) {
-+               mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME;
-+
-+               if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)
-+                       mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
-+
-+               if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)
-+                       mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NODEV;
-+
-+               if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
-+                       mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NOSUID;
-+
-+               if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
-+                       mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC;
-+       }
- 
-        /* Don't allow unprivileged users to reveal what is under a mount */
-        if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
-@@ -1841,6 +1854,23 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
-            !(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) {
-                return -EPERM;
-        }
-+       if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
-+           !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
-+               return -EPERM;
-+       }
-+       if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
-+           !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
-+               return -EPERM;
-+       }
-+       if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC) &&
-+           !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
-+               return -EPERM;
-+       }
-+       if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
-+           ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK))) {
-+               return -EPERM;
-+       }
-+
-        err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-@@ -2043,7 +2073,7 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *path, const char *fstype, int flags,
-                 */
-                if (!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
-                        flags |= MS_NODEV;
--                       mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
-+                       mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV | MNT_LOCK_NODEV;
-                }
-        }
- 
-diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
-index 8707c9e..22e5b96 100644
---- a/include/linux/mount.h
-+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
-@@ -45,10 +45,15 @@ struct mnt_namespace;
- #define MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK  (MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV | MNT_NOEXEC \
-                                 | MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME \
-                                 | MNT_READONLY)
-+#define MNT_ATIME_MASK (MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME )
- 
- 
- #define MNT_INTERNAL   0x4000
- 
-+#define MNT_LOCK_ATIME         0x040000
-+#define MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC                0x080000
-+#define MNT_LOCK_NOSUID                0x100000
-+#define MNT_LOCK_NODEV         0x200000
- #define MNT_LOCK_READONLY      0x400000
- #define MNT_LOCKED             0x800000
- 
--- 
-1.9.1
-