openssl: Revert 9 CVE fixes merged upstreamkrogoth

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-6306"
This reverts commit f73e0eb5d77764c00d6ae8db10528522fc8516bc.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-6304"
This reverts commit 35f3007f0e0c56bc2f96ab5893686191d099949f.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-6303"
This reverts commit 744b01090f6cf4984c11bb682693647a62103644.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-6302"
This reverts commit 8ac9ad185c0889af0bfb2fcd90a6987cb972eb0a.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2182"
This reverts commit c95a5d22dedc5701d18e91e40a0c54802915187d.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2181"
This reverts commit f0e2e3d84763477138d902f7d48ac2658266aa2b.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2180"
This reverts commit 5493231d1ff5e9b259cd074245e909b5e39d926e.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2179"
This reverts commit 331ca6f05824e5b005cbf504233b3c72275181d5.

Revert "openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178"
This reverts commit ac47871dfb962355c3c8971cd2fde2e4d03c9790.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Dudau <adrian.dudau@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Borg <martin.borg@enea.com>

12 files changed, 0 insertions, 1032 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 07b1310..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
-Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
-
-Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
-order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
-implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
-certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
-attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
-
-CVE-2016-2178
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2178
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
-             goto err;
-     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
--    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
--        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
--    }
- 
-     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
-         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
-@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-         }
- 
-         K = &kq;
-+
-+        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     } else {
-         K = &k;
-     }
-+
-     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
-                    dsa->method_mont_p);
-     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2179.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2179.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3a80696..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2179.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From 26f2c5774f117aea588e8f31fad38bcf14e83bec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 13:17:08 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
-
-DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
-handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
-messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
-That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
-reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
-future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
-early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
-or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.
-
-The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
-when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
-point that we need to use it.
-
-However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
-messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
-message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
-that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
-non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
-removed.
-
-Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
-in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
-(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
-message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
-However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
-greater than that in the queue is just left there.
-
-So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
-that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
-that point all the queues are flushed.
-
-An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
-lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
-attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.
-
-I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
-seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
-client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
-an issue.
-
-A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
-incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
-CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
-to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
-Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
-that could get orphaned would typically be 15.
-
-The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
-max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
-"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.
-
-Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
-renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
-orphaned per connection.
-
-As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
-Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
-to open many simultaneous connections.
-
-Issue reported by Quan Luo.
-
-CVE-2016-2179
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2179
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- ssl/d1_both.c  | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
- ssl/d1_clnt.c  |  1 +
- ssl/d1_lib.c   | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- ssl/d1_srvr.c  |  3 ++-
- ssl/ssl_locl.h |  3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
-
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_both.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/d1_both.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_both.c
-@@ -618,11 +618,23 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragm
-     int al;
- 
-     *ok = 0;
--    item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
--    if (item == NULL)
--        return 0;
-+    do {
-+        item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-+        if (item == NULL)
-+            return 0;
-+
-+        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-+
-+        if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
-+            /* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */
-+            pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-+            dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-+            pitem_free(item);
-+            item = NULL;
-+            frag = NULL;
-+        }
-+    } while (item == NULL);
- 
--    frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- 
-     /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
-     if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
-@@ -1296,18 +1308,6 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigne
-     return ret;
- }
- 
--/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
--void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
--{
--    pitem *item;
--
--    for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
--         item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
--        dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
--        pitem_free(item);
--    }
--}
--
- unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
-                                         unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
-                                         unsigned long frag_off,
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_clnt.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/d1_clnt.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_clnt.c
-@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
-             /* done with handshaking */
-             s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
-             s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
-+            dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
-             goto end;
-             /* break; */
- 
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_lib.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/d1_lib.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_lib.c
-@@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
- static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
- {
-     pitem *item = NULL;
--    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-     DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
- 
-     while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
-@@ -191,28 +190,44 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
-         pitem_free(item);
-     }
- 
-+    while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
-+        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
-+        if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
-+            OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
-+        }
-+        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-+        pitem_free(item);
-+    }
-+
-+    dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
-+    dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
-+}
-+
-+void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s)
-+{
-+    pitem *item = NULL;
-+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-+
-     while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
-         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-         dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-         pitem_free(item);
-     }
-+}
-+
-+void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s)
-+{
-+    pitem *item = NULL;
-+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- 
-     while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
-         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-         dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-         pitem_free(item);
-     }
--
--    while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
--        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
--        if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
--            OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
--        }
--        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
--        pitem_free(item);
--    }
- }
- 
-+
- void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
- {
-     ssl3_free(s);
-@@ -456,7 +471,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
-     BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
-              &(s->d1->next_timeout));
-     /* Clear retransmission buffer */
--    dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-+    dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
- }
- 
- int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_srvr.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/d1_srvr.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_srvr.c
-@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
-         case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
- 
-             s->shutdown = 0;
--            dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-+            dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
-             dtls1_start_timer(s);
-             ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
-             if (ret <= 0)
-@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
-             /* next message is server hello */
-             s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
-             s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
-+            dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
-             goto end;
-             /* break; */
- 
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-@@ -1242,7 +1242,8 @@ int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, uns
-                              unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
- int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
- int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
--void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
-+void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s);
-+void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s);
- void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data,
-                               struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
- void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2180.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2180.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c71aaa5..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2180.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From b746aa3fe05b5b5f7126df247ac3eceeb995e2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 15:24:16 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
-
-TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
-as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
-length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
-data written.
-
-CVE-2016-2180
-
-Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acce328ec16a3aa635f1ca37365e8c7403a)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2180
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- crypto/ts/ts_lib.c | 5 ++---
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c b/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
-index c51538a..e0f1063 100644
---- a/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
-+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
-@@ -90,9 +90,8 @@ int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
- {
-     char obj_txt[128];
- 
--    int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
--    BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
--    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
-+    OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
-+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", obj_txt);
- 
-     return 1;
- }
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9149dbe..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-From 20744f6b40b5ded059a848f66d6ba922f2a62eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 11:46:26 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug
-
-During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
-arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
-verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
-the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.
-
-Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
-that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
-epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
-buffered records if we've not got any data left.
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2180 patch 1
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- ssl/d1_pkt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-index fe30ec7..1fb119d 100644
---- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
- static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
- {
-     pitem *item;
-+    SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
- 
-     item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
-     if (item) {
-@@ -326,6 +327,19 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
-         if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
-             return (1);         /* Nothing to do. */
- 
-+        rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
-+
-+        if (rb->left > 0) {
-+            /*
-+             * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
-+             * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
-+             * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
-+             * finished reading the current packet).
-+             */
-+            return 1;
-+        }
-+
-+
-         /* Process all the records. */
-         while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
-             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
-@@ -581,6 +595,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
- 
-     rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
- 
-+ again:
-     /*
-      * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
-      * This is a non-blocking operation.
-@@ -593,7 +608,6 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
-         return 1;
- 
-     /* get something from the wire */
-- again:
-     /* check if we have the header */
-     if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
-         (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
-@@ -1830,8 +1844,13 @@ static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
-     if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
-         return &s->d1->bitmap;
- 
--    /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
-+    /*
-+     * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
-+     * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
-+     * epoch
-+     */
-     else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
-+             s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch &&
-              (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
-         *is_next_epoch = 1;
-         return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ecf138a..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
-From 3884b47b7c255c2e94d9b387ee83c7e8bb981258 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 12:04:37 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS replay protection
-
-The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
-in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.
-
-A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
-the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
-have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
-edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
-against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
-we also reject the new record.
-
-If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
-the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
-If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
-the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
-of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
-is in line with the newly received sequence number.
-
-Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
-sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
-have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
-validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
-unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
-even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
-currently in a handshake/renegotiation.
-
-This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
-epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
-large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
-moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
-dropped causing a denial of service.
-
-A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
-case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
-message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
-will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
-(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
-so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
-handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
-legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
-security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
-initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
-injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
-the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
-to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
-Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
-issue isn't addressed here though.
-
-This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.
-
-CVE-2016-2181
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2181 patch2
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
----
- ssl/d1_pkt.c  | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- ssl/ssl.h     |  1 +
- ssl/ssl_err.c |  4 +++-
- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(
- #endif
- static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
-                                unsigned char *priority);
--static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
-+static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
- 
- /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
- static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
-@@ -320,13 +320,18 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_record
- {
-     pitem *item;
-     SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
-+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-+    DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
-+    unsigned int is_next_epoch;
-+    int replayok = 1;
- 
-     item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
-     if (item) {
-         /* Check if epoch is current. */
-         if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
--            return (1);         /* Nothing to do. */
-+            return 1;         /* Nothing to do. */
- 
-+        rr = &s->s3->rrec;
-         rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
- 
-         if (rb->left > 0) {
-@@ -343,11 +348,41 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_record
-         /* Process all the records. */
-         while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
-             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
--            if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
--                return (0);
-+            bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
-+            if (bitmap == NULL) {
-+                /*
-+                 * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
-+                 * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
-+                 * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
-+                 */
-+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
-+                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+                 return 0;
-+            }
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-+            /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
-+            if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
-+#endif
-+            {
-+                /*
-+                 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
-+                 * check once already when we first received the record - but
-+                 * we might have updated the window since then due to
-+                 * records we subsequently processed.
-+                 */
-+                replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
-+            }
-+
-+            if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
-+                /* dump this record */
-+                rr->length = 0;
-+                s->packet_length = 0;
-+                continue;
-+            }
-+
-             if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
-                                     s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
--                return -1;
-+                return 0;
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -358,7 +393,7 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_record
-     s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
-     s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
- 
--    return (1);
-+    return 1;
- }
- 
- #if 0
-@@ -405,7 +440,7 @@ static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL
- 
- #endif
- 
--static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
-+static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
- {
-     int i, al;
-     int enc_err;
-@@ -565,6 +600,10 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
- 
-     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
-     s->packet_length = 0;
-+
-+    /* Mark receipt of record. */
-+    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
-+
-     return (1);
- 
-  f_err:
-@@ -600,7 +639,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
-      * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
-      * This is a non-blocking operation.
-      */
--    if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
-+    if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
-         return -1;
- 
-     /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
-@@ -735,20 +774,17 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
-             if (dtls1_buffer_record
-                 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
-                 return -1;
--            /* Mark receipt of record. */
--            dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
-         }
-         rr->length = 0;
-         s->packet_length = 0;
-         goto again;
-     }
- 
--    if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
-+    if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
-         rr->length = 0;
-         s->packet_length = 0;   /* dump this record */
-         goto again;             /* get another record */
-     }
--    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
- 
-     return (1);
- 
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl.h
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
-@@ -2623,6 +2623,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT                            305
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN                    255
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT                  288
-+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             404
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE           256
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD                       257
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES                           258
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl_err.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl_err.c
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
- /* ====================================================================
-- * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]
-     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "dtls1_heartbeat"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "dtls1_output_cert_chain"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
-+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS),
-+     "DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),
-      "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a752f89..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 26aebca74e38ae09f673c2045cc8e2ef762d265a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 17:55:36 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Update function error code
-
-A function error code needed updating due to merge issues.
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2181 patch 3
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- ssl/ssl.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/ssl.h
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/ssl.h
-@@ -2623,7 +2623,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT                            305
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN                    255
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT                  288
--# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             404
-+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             424
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE           256
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD                       257
- # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES                           258
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2182.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2182.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5995cbe..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2182.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From e36f27ddb80a48e579783bc29fb3758988342b71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2016 14:26:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()
-
-If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause
-BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting
-in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing.
-
-Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes
-don't overflow buffer.
-
-Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
-
-CVE-2016-2182
-
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-(cherry picked from commit 07bed46f332fce8c1d157689a2cdf915a982ae34)
-
-Conflicts:
-        crypto/bn/bn_print.c
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-2182
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- crypto/bn/bn_print.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
-index bfa31ef..b44403e 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
-@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
-     char *p;
-     BIGNUM *t = NULL;
-     BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
-+    int bn_data_num;
- 
-     /*-
-      * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
-@@ -120,9 +121,9 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
-      */
-     i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
-     num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
--    bn_data =
--        (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc((num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
--    buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
-+    bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1;
-+    bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
-     if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) {
-         BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-         goto err;
-@@ -143,7 +144,11 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
-         i = 0;
-         while (!BN_is_zero(t)) {
-             *lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV);
-+            if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1)
-+                goto err;
-             lp++;
-+            if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num)
-+                goto err;
-         }
-         lp--;
-         /*
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6302.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6302.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a72ee70..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6302.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From baaabfd8fdcec04a691695fad9a664bea43202b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 18:14:54 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Sanity check ticket length.
-
-If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing
-sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS
-attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on
-HMAC size.
-
-Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
-
-CVE-2016-6302
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-6302
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- ssl/t1_lib.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/t1_lib.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -3397,9 +3397,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, co
-     HMAC_CTX hctx;
-     EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-     SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
--    /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
--    if (eticklen < 48)
--        return 2;
-+
-     /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
-     HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-@@ -3433,6 +3431,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, co
-     if (mlen < 0) {
-         goto err;
-     }
-+    /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
-+    if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
-+        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-+        return 2;
-+    }
-+
-     eticklen -= mlen;
-     /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-     if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6303.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6303.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 95bdec4..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6303.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 1027ad4f34c30b8585592764b9a670ba36888269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2016 23:28:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update()
-
-Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.
-
-CVE-2016-6303
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(cherry picked from commit 55d83bf7c10c7b205fffa23fa7c3977491e56c07)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-6303
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
-index 6615cf8..2dce493 100644
---- a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
-+++ b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
-@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
- 
-     i = c->num;
-     if (i != 0) {
--        if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
-+        if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
-             /* partial block */
-             memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
-             c->num += (int)len;
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 64508b5..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 10:08:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
-
-A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
-extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
-sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
-be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
-Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
-default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
-Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
-
-I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
-problem but I could not find any other issues.
-
-CVE-2016-6304
-
-Issue reported by Shi Lei.
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-6304
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- ssl/t1_lib.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-index fbcf2e6..e4b4e27 100644
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -2316,6 +2316,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-                 size -= 2;
-                 if (dsize > size)
-                     goto err;
-+
-+                /*
-+                 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
-+                 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
-+                 */
-+                sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
-+                                        OCSP_RESPID_free);
-+                if (dsize > 0) {
-+                    s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
-+                    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
-+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+                        return 0;
-+                    }
-+                } else {
-+                    s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
-+                }
-+
-                 while (dsize > 0) {
-                     OCSP_RESPID *id;
-                     int idsize;
-@@ -2335,13 +2352,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-                         OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
-                         goto err;
-                     }
--                    if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
--                        && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
--                             sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
--                        OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
--                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--                        return 0;
--                    }
-                     if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
-                         OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
-                         *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6306.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6306.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9e7d576..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6306.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From ff553f837172ecb2b5c8eca257ec3c5619a4b299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
-Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 12:36:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix small OOB reads.
-
-In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and
-ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room
-before reading a length.
-
-Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs.
-
-CVE-2016-6306
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2016-6306
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
----
- ssl/s3_clnt.c | 11 +++++++++++
- ssl/s3_srvr.c |  6 ++++++
- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
-
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/s3_clnt.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/s3_clnt.c
-@@ -1216,6 +1216,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-         goto f_err;
-     }
-     for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
-+        if (nc + 3 > llen) {
-+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
-+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-+            goto f_err;
-+        }
-         n2l3(p, l);
-         if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-@@ -2167,6 +2173,11 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-     }
- 
-     for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
-+        if (nc + 2 > llen) {
-+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-         n2s(p, l);
-         if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
-             if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
-Index: openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.2h/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-@@ -3213,6 +3213,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-         goto f_err;
-     }
-     for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
-+        if (nc + 3 > llen) {
-+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
-+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-+            goto f_err;
-+        }
-         n2l3(p, l);
-         if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bbappend b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bbappend
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f635bf..0000000
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bbappend
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${THISDIR}/${PN}:"
-
-SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-2181_p3.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-2182.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-6302.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
-           file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \
-           "