From 31ea437bf7785201dd4fb04622ec97feba110c93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Soumya Sambu Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2024 12:50:49 +0000 Subject: python3: Fix CVE-2024-8088 There is a HIGH severity vulnerability affecting the CPython "zipfile" module. When iterating over names of entries in a zip archive (for example, methodsof "zipfile.ZipFile" like "namelist()", "iterdir()", "extractall()", etc) the process can be put into an infinite loop with a maliciously crafted zip archive. This defect applies when reading only metadata or extracting the contents of the zip archive. Programs that are not handling user-controlled zip archives are not affected. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8088 Upstream-Patch: https://github.com/corydolphin/flask-cors/commit/7ae310c56ac30e0b94fb42129aa377bf633256ec (From OE-Core rev: 2d98276ba70ed6c44afecd42a7352f1b3030438f) Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- .../python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3') diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13836f1ccc --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From dcc5182f27c1500006a1ef78e10613bb45788dea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 02:35:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] gh-122905: Sanitize names in zipfile.Path. (GH-122906) + (#122923) + +CVE: CVE-2024-8088 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/dcc5182f27c1500006a1ef78e10613bb45788dea] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu +--- + Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py | 17 +++++ + Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py | 64 ++++++++++++++++++- + ...-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst | 1 + + 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py b/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py +index 06d5aab..90885db 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py +@@ -577,3 +577,20 @@ class TestPath(unittest.TestCase): + zipfile.Path(alpharep) + with self.assertRaises(KeyError): + alpharep.getinfo('does-not-exist') ++ ++ def test_malformed_paths(self): ++ """ ++ Path should handle malformed paths. ++ """ ++ data = io.BytesIO() ++ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w") ++ zf.writestr("/one-slash.txt", b"content") ++ zf.writestr("//two-slash.txt", b"content") ++ zf.writestr("../parent.txt", b"content") ++ zf.filename = '' ++ root = zipfile.Path(zf) ++ assert list(map(str, root.iterdir())) == [ ++ 'one-slash.txt', ++ 'two-slash.txt', ++ 'parent.txt', ++ ] +diff --git a/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py b/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py +index 78c4135..42f9fde 100644 +--- a/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py ++++ b/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py +@@ -83,7 +83,69 @@ class InitializedState: + super().__init__(*args, **kwargs) + + +-class CompleteDirs(InitializedState, zipfile.ZipFile): ++class SanitizedNames: ++ """ ++ ZipFile mix-in to ensure names are sanitized. ++ """ ++ ++ def namelist(self): ++ return list(map(self._sanitize, super().namelist())) ++ ++ @staticmethod ++ def _sanitize(name): ++ r""" ++ Ensure a relative path with posix separators and no dot names. ++ ++ Modeled after ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/bcc1be39cb1d04ad9fc0bd1b9193d3972835a57c/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py#L1799-L1813 ++ but provides consistent cross-platform behavior. ++ ++ >>> san = SanitizedNames._sanitize ++ >>> san('/foo/bar') ++ 'foo/bar' ++ >>> san('//foo.txt') ++ 'foo.txt' ++ >>> san('foo/.././bar.txt') ++ 'foo/bar.txt' ++ >>> san('foo../.bar.txt') ++ 'foo../.bar.txt' ++ >>> san('\\foo\\bar.txt') ++ 'foo/bar.txt' ++ >>> san('D:\\foo.txt') ++ 'D/foo.txt' ++ >>> san('\\\\server\\share\\file.txt') ++ 'server/share/file.txt' ++ >>> san('\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Volume3') ++ '?/GLOBALROOT/Volume3' ++ >>> san('\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive1\\root') ++ 'PhysicalDrive1/root' ++ ++ Retain any trailing slash. ++ >>> san('abc/') ++ 'abc/' ++ ++ Raises a ValueError if the result is empty. ++ >>> san('../..') ++ Traceback (most recent call last): ++ ... ++ ValueError: Empty filename ++ """ ++ ++ def allowed(part): ++ return part and part not in {'..', '.'} ++ ++ # Remove the drive letter. ++ # Don't use ntpath.splitdrive, because that also strips UNC paths ++ bare = re.sub('^([A-Z]):', r'\1', name, flags=re.IGNORECASE) ++ clean = bare.replace('\\', '/') ++ parts = clean.split('/') ++ joined = '/'.join(filter(allowed, parts)) ++ if not joined: ++ raise ValueError("Empty filename") ++ return joined + '/' * name.endswith('/') ++ ++ ++class CompleteDirs(InitializedState, SanitizedNames, zipfile.ZipFile): + """ + A ZipFile subclass that ensures that implied directories + are always included in the namelist. +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..1be44c9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++:class:`zipfile.Path` objects now sanitize names from the zipfile. +-- +2.40.0 -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf