| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/cgi/commit/9907b76dad0777ee300de236dad4b559e07596ab]
(From OE-Core rev: 31d67739490ec2abf92328b3f0ceff22ce5d4974)
Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/ruby/cgi/commit/cd1eb08076c8b8e310d4d553d427763f2577a1b6
(From OE-Core rev: 44665939783cb2b32f5ade1772e0ceef47f9a853)
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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PR32560 stack-buffer-overflow at objdump disassemble_bytes
Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2025-0840
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=baac6c221e9d69335bf41366a1c7d87d8ab2f893]
(From OE-Core rev: e12ee4b1713aa25465aa3f866d345d84e9eb948a)
Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Backport fixes for:
* CVE-2025-1352 - Upstream-Status: Backport from https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=2636426a091bd6c6f7f02e49ab20d4cdc6bfc753
* CVE-2025-1372 - Upstream-Status: Backport from https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=73db9d2021cab9e23fd734b0a76a612d52a6f1db
(From OE-Core rev: 8ea258ad9c83be5d9548a796f7dda4ac820fc435)
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem 3.3.2 has a DoS
vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many entity expansions
with SAX2 or pull parser API. The REXML gem 3.3.3 or later include
the patch to fix the vulnerability.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41946
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/033d1909a8f259d5a7c53681bcaf14f13bcf0368
(From OE-Core rev: b0e74fd8922bba8e954a223ec46de5c33d2ff743)
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Reference: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45720
This CVE is relevant only for subversion running on Windows.
(From OE-Core rev: 52cbf6b96952896b16dad34d9eb215fcab88ded2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Reviewed-by: Sofiane Hamam <sofiane.hamam@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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This fixes ptest failures on 32bit architectures
AssertionError:
Failed ptests:
{'python3': ['test_extractall_none_gid',
'test_extractall_none_gname',
'test_extractall_none_mode',
'test_extractall_none_mtime',
'test_extractall_none_uid',
'test_extractall_none_uname',
'setUpClass',
'python3']}
(From OE-Core rev: 838f3cff2a123fb7d5833b6760772ded6efb60bd)
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 43104b547cb79693c83df0882773ae8dd74b1d35)
Signed-off-by: Haixiao Yan <haixiao.yan.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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The HTTP client drops sensitive headers after following a cross-domain redirect.
For example, a request to a.com/ containing an Authorization header which is redirected to
b.com/ will not send that header to b.com. In the event that the client received a subsequent
same-domain redirect, however, the sensitive headers would be restored. For example, a chain
of redirects from a.com/, to b.com/1, and finally to b.com/2 would incorrectly send the
Authorization header to b.com/2.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45336
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/b72d56f98d6620ebe07626dca4bb67ea8e185379
(From OE-Core rev: 63e84b64f055ad7c91de67194e6739c96fb95496)
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-53589
(From OE-Core rev: 4ddd1e5aea1c4b84a6c4e1db5ded4938c4a35393)
Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-53589
(From OE-Core rev: 2d6df18f4a694d6499b337bbbab10ba8bb6e3fe4)
Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Using the package architecture to select the right qemu options to pass
to qemu-user is incorrect, and fails for recipes that set PACKAGE_ARCH
to MACHINE_ARCH (as the qemuppc workarounds suggest) because there are
not typically any options set for the machine name.
Solve this by using TUNE_PKGARCH instead: for the majority of recipes
this is the same value, but for machine-specific recipes it remains the
same instead of changing to the machine name.
This means we can remove the qemuppc workarounds, as they're obsolete.
Also update the gcc-testsuite recipe which uses the same pattern to use
TUNE_PKGARCH, and generalise the else codepath to avoid needing to
update the list of architectures.
[ YOCTO #15647 ]
(From OE-Core rev: 077aab43f2c928eb8da71934405c62327010f552)
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in rsync. This vulnerability arises from a race condition during
rsync's handling of symbolic links. Rsync's default behavior when encountering
symbolic links is to skip them. If an attacker replaced a regular file with a
symbolic link at the right time, it was possible to bypass the default behavior
and traverse symbolic links. Depending on the privileges of the rsync process,
an attacker could leak sensitive information, potentially leading to privilege escalation.
(From OE-Core rev: c0905ffb2f1aa3bc4c6187ff4860dcc8d3dbfb01)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in rsync. When using the `--safe-links` option, rsync fails to
properly verify if a symbolic link destination contains another symbolic link within it.
This results in a path traversal vulnerability, which may lead to arbitrary file write
outside the desired directory
(From OE-Core rev: 741200c41a19ef5b4876d9a80667dfde2e5f4a9d)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A path traversal vulnerability exists in rsync. It stems from behavior enabled
by the `--inc-recursive` option, a default-enabled option for many client options
and can be enabled by the server even if not explicitly enabled by the client.
When using the `--inc-recursive` option, a lack of proper symlink verification
coupled with deduplication checks occurring on a per-file-list basis could allow
a server to write files outside of the client's intended destination directory.
A malicious server could write malicious files to arbitrary locations named after
valid directories/paths on the client.
(From OE-Core rev: 12328df8dfcdc73ef70af299e9ebdc1d8ae73f37)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an
arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being
copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send
checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what
data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values
for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files
byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client.
(From OE-Core rev: b49c8f58c20d7deb354a86a34488cb798c49eba3)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in the rsync daemon which could be triggered when rsync compares
file checksums. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the checksum length
(s2length) to cause a comparison between a checksum and uninitialized memory and
leak one byte of uninitialized stack data at a time.
(From OE-Core rev: 3fd8bea3e72573cca03cd3f6f4fc077cd2fd45a3)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the rsync daemon. This issue is due
to improper handling of attacker-controlled checksum lengths (s2length) in the code.
When MAX_DIGEST_LEN exceeds the fixed SUM_LENGTH (16 bytes), an attacker can write
out of bounds in the sum2 buffer.
(From OE-Core rev: 17fac276e27af19b00b6263f22156a55bae6a5c9)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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It has been fixed by removing the check upstream see
https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/9a3449a3980421f84ac55498ba565bc112b20d6c
(From OE-Core rev: c6228b8371ea5c3c452db7b536948ae96d83844b)
(From OE-Core rev: 3746c60f38a6cf99f293131b8b1bfed7c73a1944)
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Rebase patches.
(From OE-Core rev: 827c787893caa973c509acf7cac9e17fec5692a4)
(From OE-Core rev: 798009f46f2044aaa0bac753430cca1964677741)
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.9 has a ReDoS
vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many digits between &# and x...;
in a hex numeric character reference (&#x.... This does not happen with
Ruby 3.2 or later. Ruby 3.1 is the only affected maintained Ruby.
The REXML gem 3.3.9 or later include the patch to fix the vulnerability.
CVE-2024-49761-0009.patch is the CVE fix and rest are dependent commits.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49761
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/810d2285235d5501a0a124f300832e6e9515da3c
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/83ca5c4b0f76cf7b307dd1be1dc934e1e8199863
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/51217dbcc64ecc34aa70f126b103bedf07e153fc
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/7e4049f6a68c99c4efec2df117057ee080680c9f
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/fc6cad570b849692a28f26a963ceb58edc282bbc
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/77128555476cb0db798e2912fb3a07d6411dc320
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/370666e314816b57ecd5878e757224c3b6bc93f5
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/a579730f25ec7443796495541ec57c071b91805d
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/ce59f2eb1aeb371fe1643414f06618dbe031979f
(From OE-Core rev: 5b453400e9dd878b81b1447d14b3f518809de17e)
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Calling Parse on a "// +build" build tag line with deeply nested
expressions can cause a panic due to stack exhaustion.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34158
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/d4c53812e6ce2ac368173d7fcd31d0ecfcffb002
(From OE-Core rev: eb14e9722d023b4d1668c55ce4bc6ef02f8ce6c2)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Calling Decoder.Decode on a message which contains deeply nested structures can
cause a panic due to stack exhaustion. This is a follow-up to CVE-2022-30635.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34156
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/2092294f2b097c5828f4eace6c98a322c1510b01
(From OE-Core rev: 3aeeee86a53cee14bb1a6a485f8781459b6f2ffc)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Calling any of the Parse functions on Go source code which contains
deeply nested literals can cause a panic due to stack exhaustion.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34155
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/b232596139dbe96a62edbe3a2a203e856bf556eb
(From OE-Core rev: 9d21d527e2448e202030ae7ad38c88e25943a2f3)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Handles CVE-2024-50602, CVE-2024-11168 and CVE-2024-9287.
(From OE-Core rev: 5a611fbbdb3e373d379f922ffc5606ff70279831)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Insufficient validation of filenames against control characters in
Apache Subversion repositories served via mod_dav_svn allows
authenticated users with commit access to commit a corrupted revision,
leading to disruption for users of the repository. All versions of
Subversion up to and including Subversion 1.14.4 are affected if serving
repositories via mod_dav_svn. Users are recommended to upgrade to
version 1.14.5, which fixes this issue. Repositories served via other
access methods are not affected.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46901
Upstream patches:
https://subversion.apache.org/security/CVE-2024-46901-advisory.txt
(From OE-Core rev: 2082038de00090e4b10a151068876f83c83f94c7)
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Requests is a HTTP library. Prior to 2.32.0, when making requests
through a Requests `Session`, if the first request is made with
`verify=False` to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to
the same host will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of
changes to the value of `verify`. This behavior will continue for the
lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool. This vulnerability
is fixed in 2.32.0.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35195
Upstream patches:
https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/a58d7f2ffb4d00b46dca2d70a3932a0b37e22fac
(From OE-Core rev: 8bc8d316a6e8ac08b4eb2b9e2ec30b1f2309c31c)
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A heap-based buffer overflow was found in the SDHCI device
emulation of QEMU. The bug is triggered when both
`s->data_count` and the size of `s->fifo_buffer` are set to
0x200, leading to an out-of-bound access. A malicious guest
could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process on the host,
resulting in a denial of service condition.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3447
Upstream patch:
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/2429cb7a9f460b544f4b07bcf02dbdedfc4dcb39
(From OE-Core rev: 01d7ac9244364b7f89cd2f99fff11c2417bcad03)
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A double free vulnerability was found in QEMU virtio devices
(virtio-gpu, virtio-serial-bus, virtio-crypto), where the
mem_reentrancy_guard flag insufficiently protects against DMA
reentrancy issues. This issue could allow a malicious privileged
guest to crash the QEMU process on the host, resulting in a d
enial of service or allow arbitrary code execution within the
context of the QEMU process on the host.
CVE-2024-3446-0004, CVE-2024-3446-0005, CVE-2024-3446-0006
are CVE fix and CVE-2024-3446-0001, CVE-2024-3446-0002,
CVE-2024-3446-0003 are dependent commits to fix the CVE.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3446
Upstream patches:
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/9c86c97f12c060bf7484dd931f38634e166a81f0
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f63192b0544af5d3e4d5edfd85ab520fcf671377
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/ec0504b989ca61e03636384d3602b7bf07ffe4da
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/ba28e0ff4d95b56dc334aac2730ab3651ffc3132
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/b4295bff25f7b50de1d9cc94a9c6effd40056bca
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f4729ec39ad97a42ceaa7b5697f84f440ea6e5dc
(From OE-Core rev: db7e3a56656db0bc61ec2e35ccc149e9b90a389b)
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Backport patch [3] as linked from [1] via [2].
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6505
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2295760
[3] https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f1595ceb
(From OE-Core rev: 7e725e126689cc44055e27a05efafb7b52e89192)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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The CVE has disputed flag in NVD DB.
(From OE-Core rev: bd01091c33c1de6ae7e1605301e3f73350ee7e7e)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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According to [1] which provided the fix link [2], but upstream author
reworked it later [3][4][5]
Backport and rebase all the patches for tracing
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5569
[2] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/fd604bd34f0343472521a36da1fbd22e793e14fd
[3] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/3cb5609002263eb19f7b5efda82d96f1f57fe876
[4] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/f89b93f0370dd85d23d243e25dfc1f99f4d8de48
[5] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/cc61e6140f0dfde2ff372db932442cf6df890f09
(From OE-Core rev: 13bd99e17f0aca108839e81e9aa0b14351116fdf)
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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python 3.13 removed the pipes module. Thus build fails for host machines that run python 3.13
This commit adds a backport patch to use subprocess module instead
(From OE-Core rev: 1a02cf1997216cb943d8965fe74f971a8cb2f70f)
Signed-off-by: Markus Volk <f_l_k@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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When installing a package from a Mercurial VCS URL (ie "pip install
hg+...") with pip prior to v23.3, the specified Mercurial revision could
be used to inject arbitrary configuration options to the "hg clone" call
(ie "--config"). Controlling the Mercurial configuration can modify how
and which repository is installed. This vulnerability does not affect
users who aren't installing from Mercurial.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5752
Upstream patches:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/12306/commits/389cb799d0da9a840749fcd14878928467ed49b4
(From OE-Core rev: 862c0338fba06077a26c775b49f993eac63762c9)
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Unless DEBUG_BUILD is enabled, pass -g1 to massively reduce the size of
the debug symbols
Level 1 produces minimal information, enough for making backtraces in
parts of the program that you don't plan to debug. This includes
descriptions of functions and external variables, and line number
tables, but no information about local variables.
This makes the sstate objects a lot more manageable, and packaging
faster.
(From OE-Core rev: 13a2f43920c53f9f1bc5ec52eba9eb48da265ef6)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Fix pseudo with python 3.13 by adding a wrapper for posix_spawn and
fixing a NULL pointer dereference in envp handling it uncovered. This
fixes issues on Fedora 41.
(From OE-Core rev: 89b64526ac2bf0609a18c4d44b4835028f686978)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Update to a new revision which includes "Bugfix for Linux open(O_CREAT|O_EXCL)"
(From OE-Core rev: cc87b332c5d09d4d7aaa2569fa046a16012597d2)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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glibc 2.40 renames some internal header variables. Update our hack to
work with the new version. These kinds of problems illustrate we need to
address the issue properly.
(From OE-Core rev: 63d7c11b46119f0c97d08f2fa837c02e633ab75f)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Pull in a fix which avoids syntax warnings with python 3.12.
(From OE-Core rev: 82526703823e252070dbf689e6f82a12ceb3b035)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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This is needed to work with coreutils 9.5.
Also contains some README tweaks.
(From OE-Core rev: c2549844031c30d2c1a6965ee66f163878d46fab)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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rpm 4.19 now builds with LFS64 support enabled by default,
so it calls statvfs64() to get the space available on the
filesystem it is installing packages into. This is not
getting caught by pseudo, so rpm is checking the host's
root filesystem, rather than the filesystem where the
build is happening.
Merge in that fix and a gcc14 fix.
(From OE-Core rev: 1b181d1fcef45f969ef9147912995d80dbe87d87)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Pulls in the changes:
Eilís 'pidge' Ní Fhlannagáin (1):
subports: Add _GNU_SOURCE for syncfs probe
Richard Purdie (1):
SECURITY.md: Add file
Wu Zhenyu (1):
pseudo.1: Fix a typo
(From OE-Core rev: 40a013f7134aec1d0e953ad4906944072cfb2ca1)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Pull in:
pseudo_util.c: Open file with O_CLOEXEC to avoid fd leak
Use close-on-exec (O_CLOEXEC) flag when open log file to
make sure its file descriptor is not leaked to parent
process on fork/exec.
Fixes [YOCTO #13311]
(From OE-Core rev: b8445072f4009b3e912792931bd71a4201d541e9)
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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The logic in the previous commit was reversed, update to fix it.
(From OE-Core rev: 9b06d2741191333c7b11c66e9ab5848f95cb4e42)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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OE is the main user of pseudo and we've had the changes in the oe-core branch
around long enough that we're going to run with them. Swicth back to directly
using the master branch.
(From OE-Core rev: 198ff9141f94c551d2a29f3a036c209e3e554a37)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
[Luca: re-add 'branch' parameter to fix "does not set any branch parameter" warning]
Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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pseudo overrides certain libc functions which are aliases when LFS64 is
enabled. In anycase pseudo may not be of much use on 32bit systems
(From OE-Core rev: 215367b62ac1f48ba224e56e7b8862c0a7bdbcd0)
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Update to pull in:
pseudo.c: Avoid patch mismatch errors for NAMELESS file entries
In rare cases we see failures, often in linux-libc-headers for things like:
| INSTALL /XXX/linux-libc-headers/6.1-r0/image/usr/include
| abort()ing pseudo client by server request. See https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Pseudo_Abort for more details on this.
Pseudo log:
path mismatch [2 links]: ino 46662476 db 'NAMELESS FILE' req '/XXX/linux-libc-headers/6.1-r0/image/usr'.
Setup complete, sending SIGUSR1 to pid 3630890.
Whilst this doesn't easily reproduce, the issue is that multiple different processes are
likely working on the directory and the creation in pseudo might not match accesses
made by other processes.
Ultimately, the "NAMELESS FILE" is harmless and pseudo will reconcile things
so rather than error out, we should ignore this case.
(From OE-Core rev: 77d018ce3b3a9390a5cc020bce9f9ea9017820dd)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f30a1a74828e105cbe69677b3fbe5623f371543)
Signed-off-by: Fabio Berton <fabio.berton@criticaltechworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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When `-pipe` is enabled, GCC passes data between its different
executables using pipes instead of temporary files. This leads to issues
when cmake attempts to infer compiler internals via the `-v` parameter
as each executable will print to `stderr` in parallel.
In turn this may lead to compilation issues down the line as for example
the system include directories could not be determined properly which
may then propagate to issues such as:
recipe-sysroot/usr/include/c++/11.3.0/cstdlib:75:15: fatal error:
stdlib.h: No such file or directory
| 75 | #include_next <stdlib.h>
| | ^~~~~~~~~~
| compilation terminated.
| ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed.
| WARNING: exit code 1 from a shell command.
Fix this stripping `-pipe` from the command line used to determine
compiler internals.
(From OE-Core rev: 8e2233fd0509b9f20c19d5006dd7ef0c2260bdba)
Signed-off-by: Philip Lorenz <philip.lorenz@bmw.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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* need to add dependency on flex-native because now when the
.l file is modified by the .patch file it will try to regenerate
the c code and fail:
| make[1]: Entering directory 'work/x86_64-linux/xmlto-native/0.0.28-r0/build'
| /bin/bash ../xmlto-0.0.28/ylwrap ../xmlto-0.0.28/xmlif/xmlif.l .c xmlif/xmlif.c -- /bin/bash 'work/x86_64-linux/xmlto-native/0.0.28-r0/xmlto-0.0.28/missing' flex
| work/x86_64-linux/xmlto-native/0.0.28-r0/xmlto-0.0.28/missing: line 81: flex: command not found
| WARNING: 'flex' is missing on your system.
| You should only need it if you modified a '.l' file.
| You may want to install the Fast Lexical Analyzer package:
| <https://github.com/westes/flex>
* backport
https://pagure.io/xmlto/c/32376c053733c6c0ebaca3c25c0725509342fdf3?branch=master
as well, so that patched xmlif/xmlif.c is newer than xmlif/xmlif.l and the build
won't try to regenerate it with flex as that leads to random build failures reported
in:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/206412
https://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Details/810853/
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/206496
https://valkyrie.yoctoproject.org/#/builders/29/builds/355
(From OE-Core rev: 2e8819c0b9ada2b600aecc40c974a18eb7c0a666)
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <martin.jansa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Commit 7806e21e7d47 ("gcc: upgrade to v11.5") removed one patch named
0001-aarch64-Update-Neoverse-N2-core-defini.patch by mistake, this will
cause the Neoverse N2 core to be identified as the armv8.5 architecture,
restore this patch to avoid related compilation issues.
(From OE-Core rev: 4c75edda8ec28fb8dee19ca90a1ea7f33ba80999)
Signed-off-by: Ruiqiang Hao <Ruiqiang.Hao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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* to allow building vala-native on hosts with gcc-14
* we could backport:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/vala/-/commit/23ec71b1a5c4cead3d1bdac82e184d0a63fa7b79
which is already included in scarthgap, but that's big patch doing almost the same
(From OE-Core rev: 0f850f213071d4bc3a7065334debabd32c7bd9a1)
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <martin.jansa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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