glibc: Fix CVE-2017-1000366

Add backported patches from the upstream release/2.24/master branch to
fix CVE-2017-1000366. Also add a backported patch that resolves SSE
related build problems introduced by these patches.

(From OE-Core rev: 07e041138f0b037e7ddc75a33c7960668acdb8bb)

Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

5 files changed, 513 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0001-CVE-2017-1000366-Ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECUR.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0001-CVE-2017-1000366-Ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECUR.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78e9ea9e65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0001-CVE-2017-1000366-Ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECUR.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 400f170750a4b2c94a2670ca44de166cc5dd6e3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 18:33:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-1000366: Ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs [BZ #21624]
+
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH can only be used to reorder system search paths, which
+is not useful functionality.
+
+This makes an exploitable unbounded alloca in _dl_init_paths unreachable
+for AT_SECURE=1 programs.
+
+(cherry picked from commit f6110a8fee2ca36f8e2d2abecf3cba9fa7b8ea7d)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=87bd4186da10371f46e2f1a7bf7c0a45bb04f1ac
+https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-glibc/glibc.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=2755c57269f24e9d59c22c49788f92515346c1bb
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-1000366
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog  | 7 +++++++
+ NEWS       | 1 +
+ elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 2bdaf69e43..7a999802dd 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
++2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
++
++       [BZ #21624]
++       CVE-2017-1000366
++       * elf/rtld.c (process_envvars): Ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for
++       __libc_enable_secure.
++
+ 2016-12-31  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
+ 
+        [BZ #18784]
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index 4b1ca3cb65..66b49dbbc0 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ using `glibc' in the "product" field.
+   question type which is outside the range of valid question type values.
+   (CVE-2015-5180)
+ 
++  [21624] Unsafe alloca allows local attackers to alias stack and heap (CVE-2017-1000366)
+ Version 2.24
+ 
+ * The minimum Linux kernel version that this version of the GNU C Library
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 647661ca45..215a9aec8f 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -2437,7 +2437,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+ 
+        case 12:
+          /* The library search path.  */
+-         if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
++         if (!__libc_enable_secure
++             && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
+            {
+              library_path = &envline[13];
+              break;
+-- 
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f81ed1566
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From 6d49272e6d6741496e3456f2cc22ebc2b9f7f989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=aab04ca5d359150e17631e6a9b44b65e93bdc467
+https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-glibc/glibc.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=2755c57269f24e9d59c22c49788f92515346c1bb
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-1000366
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog  |  7 ++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 7a999802dd..ea5ecd4a1e 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
++2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
++
++       * elf/rtld.c (SECURE_NAME_LIMIT, SECURE_PATH_LIMIT): Define.
++       (dso_name_valid_for_suid): New function.
++       (handle_ld_preload): Likewise.
++       (dl_main): Call it.  Remove alloca.
++
+ 2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
+ 
+        [BZ #21624]
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 215a9aec8f..1d8eab9fe2 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
++   particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active.  */
++#ifdef NAME_MAX
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
++#endif
++#ifdef PATH_MAX
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
++#endif
++
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++   directories and is not overly long.  Reject empty names
++   unconditionally.  */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++    {
++      /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++        programs, and also skip overlong names.  */
++      size_t len = strlen (p);
++      if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++       return false;
++    }
++  return *p != '\0';
++}
+ 
+ /* List of auditing DSOs.  */
+ static struct audit_list
+@@ -730,6 +759,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed.  */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
+ 
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++   separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++   executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++   (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++   ignored since it is insecure.)  Return the number of preloads
++   performed.  */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++{
++  unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++  const char *p = preloadlist;
++  char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
++
++  while (*p != '\0')
++    {
++      /* Split preload list at space/colon.  */
++      size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++      if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
++       {
++         memcpy (fname, p, len);
++         fname[len] = '\0';
++       }
++      else
++       fname[0] = '\0';
++
++      /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
++      p += len;
++      if (*p != '\0')
++       ++p;
++
++      if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++       npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++    }
++  return npreloads;
++}
++
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+         ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1481,23 +1546,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ 
+   if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+     {
+-      /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+-        separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+-        executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+-        list.  If the binary is running setuid all elements
+-        containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure.  */
+-      char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+-      char *p;
+-
+       HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+-      /* Prevent optimizing strsep.  Speed is not important here.  */
+-      while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+-       if (p[0] != '\0'
+-           && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+-               || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+-         npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++      npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+       HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+       HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+       HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+-- 
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0003-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0003-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b52b8a1fa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0003-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+From c0b25407def32718147530da72959a034cd1318d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
+
+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=2febff860b31df3666bef5ade0d0744c93f76a74
+https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-glibc/glibc.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=2755c57269f24e9d59c22c49788f92515346c1bb
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-1000366
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog  |  11 +++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index ea5ecd4a1e..638cb632b1 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
++2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
++
++       * elf/rtld.c (audit_list_string): New variable.
++       (audit_list): Update comment.
++       (struct audit_list_iter): Define.
++       (audit_list_iter_init, audit_list_iter_next): New function.
++       (dl_main): Use struct audit_list_iter to process audit modules.
++       (process_dl_audit): Call dso_name_valid_for_suid.
++       (process_envvars): Set audit_list_string instead of calling
++       process_dl_audit.
++
+ 2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
+ 
+        * elf/rtld.c (SECURE_NAME_LIMIT, SECURE_PATH_LIMIT): Define.
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 1d8eab9fe2..302bb63620 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+   return *p != '\0';
+ }
+ 
+-/* List of auditing DSOs.  */
++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents.  Must be processed before the
++   audit_list below.  */
++const char *audit_list_string;
++
++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs.  audit_list->next is the first
++   element.  */
+ static struct audit_list
+ {
+   const char *name;
+   struct audit_list *next;
+ } *audit_list;
+ 
++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list.  */
++struct audit_list_iter
++{
++  /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL.  */
++  const char *audit_list_tail;
++
++  /* The list element returned in the previous iteration.  NULL before
++     the first element.  */
++  struct audit_list *previous;
++
++  /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
++     audit_list_string.  */
++  char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
++};
++
++/* Initialize an audit list iterator.  */
++static void
++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++  iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
++  iter->previous = NULL;
++}
++
++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list.  */
++static const char *
++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++  if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
++    {
++      /* First iterate over audit_list_string.  */
++      while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
++       {
++         /* Split audit list at colon.  */
++         size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
++         if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
++           {
++             memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
++             iter->fname[len] = '\0';
++           }
++         else
++           /* Do not return this name to the caller.  */
++           iter->fname[0] = '\0';
++
++         /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
++         iter->audit_list_tail += len;
++         if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
++           ++iter->audit_list_tail;
++
++         /* If the name is valid, return it.  */
++         if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
++           return iter->fname;
++         /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name.  */
++       }
++      /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list.  */
++    }
++
++  if (iter->previous == NULL)
++    {
++      if (audit_list == NULL)
++       /* No pre-parsed audit list.  */
++       return NULL;
++      /* Start of audit list.  The first list element is at
++        audit_list->next (cyclic list).  */
++      iter->previous = audit_list->next;
++      return iter->previous->name;
++    }
++  if (iter->previous == audit_list)
++    /* Cyclic list wrap-around.  */
++    return NULL;
++  iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
++  return iter->previous->name;
++}
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
+    libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs.  This
+@@ -1322,11 +1400,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+     GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
+ 
+   /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now.  */
+-  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
++  bool need_security_init = true;
++  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
++      || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
+     {
+-      /* Iterate over all entries in the list.  The order is important.  */
+       struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
+-      struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
++      struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
++      audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
+ 
+       /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
+         initialize the data structures now.  */
+@@ -1337,9 +1417,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+         use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
+         fail later on.  */
+       security_init ();
++      need_security_init = false;
+ 
+-      do
++      while (true)
+        {
++         const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
++         if (name == NULL)
++           break;
++
+          int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
+ 
+          /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
+@@ -1348,7 +1433,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+             no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set.  The reason is that we know
+             glibc will use the static model.  */
+          struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
+-         dlmargs.fname = al->name;
++         dlmargs.fname = name;
+          dlmargs.map = NULL;
+ 
+          const char *objname;
+@@ -1361,7 +1446,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+            not_loaded:
+              _dl_error_printf ("\
+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+-                               al->name, err_str);
++                               name, err_str);
+              if (malloced)
+                free ((char *) err_str);
+            }
+@@ -1465,10 +1550,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+                  goto not_loaded;
+                }
+            }
+-
+-         al = al->next;
+        }
+-      while (al != audit_list->next);
+ 
+       /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
+         have two objects loaded.  */
+@@ -1732,7 +1814,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+   if (tcbp == NULL)
+     tcbp = init_tls ();
+ 
+-  if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
++  if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
+     /* Initialize security features.  But only if we have not done it
+        earlier.  */
+     security_init ();
+@@ -2363,9 +2445,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
+   char *p;
+ 
+   while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
+-    if (p[0] != '\0'
+-       && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+-           || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
++    if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
+       {
+        /* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc.  The
+           memory can never be freed.  */
+@@ -2429,7 +2509,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+              break;
+            }
+          if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
+-           process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
++           audit_list_string = &envline[6];
+          break;
+ 
+        case 7:
+-- 
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0004-i686-Add-missing-IS_IN-libc-guards-to-vectorized-str.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0004-i686-Add-missing-IS_IN-libc-guards-to-vectorized-str.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..43c4398fec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0004-i686-Add-missing-IS_IN-libc-guards-to-vectorized-str.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 203835b3bf6f1edfe1ebe4a7fa15dc085e6dc8f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 08:11:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] i686: Add missing IS_IN (libc) guards to vectorized strcspn
+
+Since commit d957c4d3fa48d685ff2726c605c988127ef99395 (i386: Compile
+rtld-*.os with -mno-sse -mno-mmx -mfpmath=387), vector intrinsics can
+no longer be used in ld.so, even if the compiled code never makes it
+into the final ld.so link.  This commit adds the missing IS_IN (libc)
+guard to the SSE 4.2 strcspn implementation, so that it can be used from
+ld.so in the future.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 69052a3a95da37169a08f9e59b2cc1808312753c)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=86ac4a78a9218d1e1dcfbacc6f7d09957c1fe3a4
+
+Required to build fixes for CVE-2017-1000366.
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog                               | 5 +++++
+ sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c | 6 ++++--
+ sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c  | 4 +++-
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 638cb632b1..3f89a2cdb2 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
++2017-06-14  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
++
++       * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c: Add IS_IN (libc) guard.
++       * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c: Likewise.
++
+ 2017-06-19  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
+ 
+        * elf/rtld.c (audit_list_string): New variable.
+diff --git a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+index 6d61e190a8..ec230fb383 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#endif
+diff --git a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+index 7760b966e2..6742a35d41 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#endif
+-- 
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.24.bb b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.24.bb
index 4c7d901149..359379bac5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.24.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.24.bb
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ SRC_URI = "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0005-Remove-__ASSUME_REQUEUE_PI.patch \
            file://0006-Fix-atomic_fetch_xor_release.patch \
            file://0001-CVE-2015-5180-resolv-Fix-crash-with-internal-QTYPE-B.patch \
+           file://0001-CVE-2017-1000366-Ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECUR.patch \
+           file://0002-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch \
+           file://0003-ld.so-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch \
+           file://0004-i686-Add-missing-IS_IN-libc-guards-to-vectorized-str.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI += "\