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| author | Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> | 2019-03-14 20:34:04 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-05-22 00:31:47 +0100 |
| commit | 5dca0e00914d0795ac4e812f45cceab802cca66f (patch) | |
| tree | 42db113a427fd549eac044f1ce2a23bf2db96e22 /meta/recipes-connectivity | |
| parent | 5bcdd22c2386a5eed8df54d203c51462a252bfa3 (diff) | |
| download | poky-5dca0e00914d0795ac4e812f45cceab802cca66f.tar.gz | |
openssl: fix CVE-2019-1543
(From OE-Core rev: d8fc8bbab4bf5c34d316cc884e83fc6e66d57954)
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch | 69 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59a92f06e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ | |||
| 1 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3] | ||
| 2 | Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> | ||
| 3 | |||
| 4 | From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
| 5 | From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | ||
| 6 | Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 | ||
| 7 | Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 | ||
| 8 | |||
| 9 | ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for | ||
| 10 | every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) | ||
| 11 | should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and | ||
| 12 | front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it | ||
| 13 | also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case | ||
| 14 | only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are | ||
| 15 | ignored. | ||
| 16 | |||
| 17 | It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. | ||
| 18 | Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious | ||
| 19 | confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the | ||
| 20 | default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to | ||
| 21 | the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique | ||
| 22 | nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a | ||
| 23 | reused nonce. | ||
| 24 | |||
| 25 | Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the | ||
| 26 | integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the | ||
| 27 | integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further | ||
| 28 | affected. | ||
| 29 | |||
| 30 | Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe | ||
| 31 | because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user | ||
| 32 | applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce | ||
| 33 | length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. | ||
| 34 | |||
| 35 | CVE-2019-1543 | ||
| 36 | |||
| 37 | Fixes #8345 | ||
| 38 | |||
| 39 | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> | ||
| 40 | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | ||
| 41 | (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406) | ||
| 42 | |||
| 43 | (cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6) | ||
| 44 | --- | ||
| 45 | crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++- | ||
| 46 | 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | ||
| 47 | |||
| 48 | diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | ||
| 49 | index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644 | ||
| 50 | --- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | ||
| 51 | +++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | ||
| 52 | @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct { | ||
| 53 | |||
| 54 | #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) | ||
| 55 | |||
| 56 | +#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12 | ||
| 57 | + | ||
| 58 | static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, | ||
| 59 | const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], | ||
| 60 | const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) | ||
| 61 | @@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, | ||
| 62 | return 1; | ||
| 63 | |||
| 64 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: | ||
| 65 | - if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) | ||
| 66 | + if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN) | ||
| 67 | return 0; | ||
| 68 | actx->nonce_len = arg; | ||
| 69 | return 1; | ||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb index c660e766b1..1e8b9d037e 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb | |||
| @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ | |||
| 17 | file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \ | 17 | file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \ |
| 18 | file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ | 18 | file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ |
| 19 | file://afalg.patch \ | 19 | file://afalg.patch \ |
| 20 | file://CVE-2019-1543.patch \ | ||
| 20 | " | 21 | " |
| 21 | 22 | ||
| 22 | SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ | 23 | SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ |
