diff options
| author | Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com> | 2023-11-09 12:35:29 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-11-10 17:44:27 +0000 |
| commit | 8e73cd04459eb6e5feac9331f3381a5fc8f5367a (patch) | |
| tree | ebb1820d9ca8208995e34797dc86cce132524d47 | |
| parent | 1f5d257006cc5dd0d676c4a7ebe4ea89b773e137 (diff) | |
| download | poky-8e73cd04459eb6e5feac9331f3381a5fc8f5367a.tar.gz | |
grub: Fix for CVE-2023-4692 and CVE-2023-4693
CVE: CVE-2023-4692
Crafted file system images can cause heap-based buffer
overflow and may allow arbitrary code execution and secure boot bypass.
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea]
CVE: CVE-2023-4693
There an out-of-bounds read at fs/ntfs.c, a physically present attacker
may leverage that by presenting a specially crafted NTFS file system
image to read arbitrary memory locations. A successful attack may allow
sensitive data cached in memory or EFI variables values to be leaked
presenting a high Confidentiality risk.
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94]
(From OE-Core rev: a8bc6f041599ce8da275c163c87f155a2f09369c)
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch | 98 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch | 63 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 2 |
3 files changed, 163 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..305fcc93d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ | |||
| 1 | From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
| 2 | From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com> | ||
| 3 | Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300 | ||
| 4 | Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute | ||
| 5 | for the $MFT file | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described | ||
| 8 | using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer | ||
| 9 | containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers, | ||
| 10 | which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer. | ||
| 11 | |||
| 12 | These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined | ||
| 13 | offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within | ||
| 14 | the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem. | ||
| 15 | |||
| 16 | However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause | ||
| 17 | the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely | ||
| 18 | causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain | ||
| 19 | values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system. | ||
| 20 | |||
| 21 | Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not | ||
| 22 | assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver. | ||
| 23 | |||
| 24 | This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never | ||
| 25 | written beyond the boundary. | ||
| 26 | |||
| 27 | Fixes: CVE-2023-4692 | ||
| 28 | |||
| 29 | Upstream-Status: Backport from | ||
| 30 | [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea] | ||
| 31 | CVE: CVE-2023-4692 | ||
| 32 | |||
| 33 | Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com> | ||
| 34 | Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com> | ||
| 35 | Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> | ||
| 36 | Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com> | ||
| 37 | --- | ||
| 38 | grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- | ||
| 39 | 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | ||
| 40 | |||
| 41 | diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | ||
| 42 | index bbdbe24..c3c4db1 100644 | ||
| 43 | --- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | ||
| 44 | +++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | ||
| 45 | @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) | ||
| 46 | } | ||
| 47 | if (at->attr_end) | ||
| 48 | { | ||
| 49 | - grub_uint8_t *pa; | ||
| 50 | + grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end; | ||
| 51 | |||
| 52 | at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); | ||
| 53 | if (at->emft_buf == NULL) | ||
| 54 | @@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) | ||
| 55 | } | ||
| 56 | at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf; | ||
| 57 | at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30); | ||
| 58 | + pa_end = at->edat_buf + n; | ||
| 59 | } | ||
| 60 | else | ||
| 61 | { | ||
| 62 | at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14); | ||
| 63 | at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4); | ||
| 64 | + pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); | ||
| 65 | } | ||
| 66 | at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST; | ||
| 67 | while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end) | ||
| 68 | @@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) | ||
| 69 | at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS; | ||
| 70 | at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt; | ||
| 71 | pa = at->attr_cur; | ||
| 72 | + | ||
| 73 | + if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18)) | ||
| 74 | + { | ||
| 75 | + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list"); | ||
| 76 | + return NULL; | ||
| 77 | + } | ||
| 78 | + | ||
| 79 | grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10, | ||
| 80 | grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start)); | ||
| 81 | grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14, | ||
| 82 | @@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) | ||
| 83 | { | ||
| 84 | if (*pa != attr) | ||
| 85 | break; | ||
| 86 | + | ||
| 87 | + if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18)) | ||
| 88 | + { | ||
| 89 | + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list"); | ||
| 90 | + return NULL; | ||
| 91 | + } | ||
| 92 | + | ||
| 93 | if (read_attr | ||
| 94 | (at, pa + 0x10, | ||
| 95 | u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR), | ||
| 96 | -- | ||
| 97 | cgit v1.1 | ||
| 98 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..420fe92ac3 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ | |||
| 1 | From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
| 2 | From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@...> | ||
| 3 | Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300 | ||
| 4 | Subject: fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident $DATA | ||
| 5 | attribute | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in | ||
| 8 | the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters, | ||
| 9 | there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding | ||
| 10 | file record segment. | ||
| 11 | |||
| 12 | When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will | ||
| 13 | read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of | ||
| 14 | arbitrary, attacker-chosen length. | ||
| 15 | |||
| 16 | This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could | ||
| 17 | contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text, | ||
| 18 | obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables. | ||
| 19 | |||
| 20 | This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the | ||
| 21 | corresponding file record segment only. | ||
| 22 | |||
| 23 | Fixes: CVE-2023-4693 | ||
| 24 | |||
| 25 | Upstream-Status: Backport from | ||
| 26 | [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94] | ||
| 27 | CVE: CVE-2023-4693 | ||
| 28 | |||
| 29 | Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@...> | ||
| 30 | Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@...> | ||
| 31 | Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...> | ||
| 32 | Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@...> | ||
| 33 | --- | ||
| 34 | grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++- | ||
| 35 | 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | ||
| 36 | |||
| 37 | diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | ||
| 38 | index c3c4db1..a68e173 100644 | ||
| 39 | --- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | ||
| 40 | +++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | ||
| 41 | @@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest, | ||
| 42 | { | ||
| 43 | if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10)) | ||
| 44 | return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range"); | ||
| 45 | - grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len); | ||
| 46 | + | ||
| 47 | + if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)) | ||
| 48 | + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large"); | ||
| 49 | + | ||
| 50 | + if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)) | ||
| 51 | + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range"); | ||
| 52 | + | ||
| 53 | + if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) > | ||
| 54 | + (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa) | ||
| 55 | + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range"); | ||
| 56 | + | ||
| 57 | + grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len); | ||
| 58 | return 0; | ||
| 59 | } | ||
| 60 | |||
| 61 | -- | ||
| 62 | cgit v1.1 | ||
| 63 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc index 41839698dc..f594e7d3a4 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | |||
| @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ | |||
| 42 | file://CVE-2022-3775.patch \ | 42 | file://CVE-2022-3775.patch \ |
| 43 | file://0001-risc-v-Handle-R_RISCV_CALL_PLT-reloc.patch \ | 43 | file://0001-risc-v-Handle-R_RISCV_CALL_PLT-reloc.patch \ |
| 44 | file://0001-fs-ext2-Ignore-checksum-seed-incompat-feature.patch \ | 44 | file://0001-fs-ext2-Ignore-checksum-seed-incompat-feature.patch \ |
| 45 | file://CVE-2023-4692.patch \ | ||
| 46 | file://CVE-2023-4693.patch \ | ||
| 45 | " | 47 | " |
| 46 | 48 | ||
| 47 | SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23b64b4c741569f9426ed2e3d0e6780796fca081bee4c99f62aa3f53ae803f5f" | 49 | SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23b64b4c741569f9426ed2e3d0e6780796fca081bee4c99f62aa3f53ae803f5f" |
