openssl: backport fix for CVE-2014-0160

Fixes the "heartbleed" TLS vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160). More
information here:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0160

Patch borrowed from Debian; this is just a tweaked version of the
upstream commit (without patching the CHANGES file which otherwise
would fail to apply on top of this version).

(From OE-Core rev: c3acfdfe0c0c3579c5f469f10b87a2926214ba5d)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 119 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c06cd64fc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+From 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 00:51:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
+
+A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+server.
+
+Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+
+Patch (tweaked version of upstream fix without CHANGES change) borrowed
+from Debian.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--------
+ ssl/t1_lib.c  | 14 +++++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 7a5596a..2e8cf68 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+        unsigned int payload;
+        unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-       /* Read type and payload length first */
+-       hbtype = *p++;
+-       n2s(p, payload);
+-       pl = p;
+-
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                        &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+                        s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++       /* Read type and payload length first */
++       if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++               return 0; /* silently discard */
++       hbtype = *p++;
++       n2s(p, payload);
++       if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++               return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++       pl = p;
++
+        if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+                {
+                unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
++               unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
++                                           2 /* heartbeat length */ +
++                                           payload + padding;
+                int r;
+ 
++               if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
++                       return 0;
++
+                /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
+                 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+                 * payload, plus padding
+                 */
+-               buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
++               buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+                bp = buffer;
+ 
+                /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+                /* Random padding */
+                RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+ 
+-               r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
++               r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+ 
+                if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+                        s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+-                               buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
++                               buffer, write_length,
+                                s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
+                OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index b82fada..bddffd9 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+        unsigned int payload;
+        unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-       /* Read type and payload length first */
+-       hbtype = *p++;
+-       n2s(p, payload);
+-       pl = p;
+-
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                        &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+                        s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++       /* Read type and payload length first */
++       if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++               return 0; /* silently discard */
++       hbtype = *p++;
++       n2s(p, payload);
++       if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++               return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++       pl = p;
++
+        if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+                {
+                unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 3313ed57f6..949f3a19e3 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://0001-Fix-for-TLS-record-tampering-bug-CVE-2013-4353.patch \
             file://0001-Fix-DTLS-retransmission-from-previous-session.patch \
             file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \
+            file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"