ecryptfs-utils: add new recipe

eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem that ships
in Linux kernel versions 2.6.19 and above. This package
provides the mount helper and supporting libraries to
perform key management and mount functions.

Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

2 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-CVE-2016-6224.patch b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-CVE-2016-6224.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4252f97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-CVE-2016-6224.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From 558a513ba3100ea5190de1a24cf1fed663367765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 10:28:08 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] ecryptfs-utils: CVE-2016-6224
+
+src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap: Prevent unencrypted swap partitions from
+being automatically enabled by systemd. This bug affected GPT partitioned
+NVMe/MMC drives and resulted in the swap partition being used without
+encryption. It also resulted in a usability issue in that users were
+erroneously prompted to enter a pass-phrase to unlock their swap partition
+at boot. (LP: #1597154)
+
+the patch comes from:
+https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-6224
+https://bazaar.launchpad.net/~ecryptfs/ecryptfs/trunk/revision/882
+
+Upstream-Status: backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog                     |  9 +++++++++
+ src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap | 10 ++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index d255a94..2c9c73e 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
++ecryptfs-utils-112
++  [ Jason Gerard DeRose ]
++  * src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap: Prevent unencrypted swap partitions from
++    being automatically enabled by systemd. This bug affected GPT partitioned
++    NVMe/MMC drives and resulted in the swap partition being used without
++    encryption. It also resulted in a usability issue in that users were
++    erroneously prompted to enter a pass-phrase to unlock their swap partition
++    at boot. (LP: #1597154)
++
+ ecryptfs-utils-74
+   [ Michal Hlavinka ]
+   * Changes for RH/Fedora release
+diff --git a/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap b/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
+index 41cf18a..e4785d7 100755
+--- a/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
++++ b/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
+@@ -166,8 +166,14 @@ for swap in $swaps; do
+        # If this is a GPT partition, mark it as no-auto mounting, to avoid
+        # auto-activating it on boot
+        if [ "$(blkid -p -s PART_ENTRY_SCHEME -o value "$swap")" = "gpt" ]; then
+-               drive="${swap%[0-9]*}"
+-               partno="${swap#$drive}"
++               # Correctly handle NVMe/MMC drives, as well as any similar physical
++               # block device that follow the "/dev/foo0p1" pattern (LP: #1597154)
++               if echo "$swap" | grep -qE "^/dev/.+[0-9]+p[0-9]+$"; then
++                       drive=$(echo "$swap" | sed "s:\(.\+[0-9]\)p[0-9]\+:\1:")
++               else
++                       drive=$(echo "$swap" | sed "s:\(.\+[^0-9]\)[0-9]\+:\1:")
++               fi
++               partno=$(echo "$swap" | sed "s:.\+[^0-9]\([0-9]\+\):\1:")
+                if [ -b "$drive" ]; then
+                        if printf "x\np\n" | fdisk "$drive" | grep -q "^$swap .* GUID:.*\b63\b"; then
+                                echo "$swap is already marked as no-auto"
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs.service b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c23a03a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs.service
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=A userspace daemon that runs as the user perform file operations under the eCryptfs mount point
+After=udev.service
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ecryptfsd -f
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target