postgresql: Update to 13.5

This is a security and bugfix release. With this update, the backported
patches for CVE-2021-2314 and CVE-2021-23222 are no longer needed. Full
release notes are available at:
https://www.postgresql.org/docs/release/13.5/

Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

5 files changed, 8 insertions, 255 deletions

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch
index 0dc6ece6da..5c65e6185f 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From b06a228a5fd1589fc9bed654b3288b321fc21aa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0b60fe3c39b2f62f9867d955da82d9d20c42d028 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
 Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2016 15:04:52 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Add support for RISC-V.
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ extending the existing aarch64 macro works.
  src/include/storage/s_lock.h | 5 +++--
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
+diff --git a/src/include/storage/s_lock.h b/src/include/storage/s_lock.h
+index 6b368a5..f7d3387 100644
 --- a/src/include/storage/s_lock.h
 +++ b/src/include/storage/s_lock.h
-@@ -316,11 +316,12 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock)
+@@ -317,11 +317,12 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock)
  
  /*
   * On ARM and ARM64, we use __sync_lock_test_and_set(int *, int) if available.
@@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ extending the existing aarch64 macro works.
  #ifdef HAVE_GCC__SYNC_INT32_TAS
  #define HAS_TEST_AND_SET
  
-@@ -337,7 +338,7 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock)
+@@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock)
  #define S_UNLOCK(lock) __sync_lock_release(lock)
  
  #endif  /* HAVE_GCC__SYNC_INT32_TAS */
@@ -33,4 +35,4 @@ extending the existing aarch64 macro works.
 +#endif  /* __arm__ || __arm || __aarch64__ || __aarch64 || __riscv */
  
  
- /* S/390 and S/390x Linux (32- and 64-bit zSeries) */
+ /*
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch
index db9769f82e..17ba04b664 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ index fb14dcc..a2b4a4f 100644
 +++ b/configure.in
 @@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ m4_pattern_forbid(^PGAC_)dnl to catch undefined macros
  
- AC_INIT([PostgreSQL], [13.4], [pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org], [], [https://www.postgresql.org/])
+ AC_INIT([PostgreSQL], [13.5], [pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org], [], [https://www.postgresql.org/])
  
 -m4_if(m4_defn([m4_PACKAGE_VERSION]), [2.69], [], [m4_fatal([Autoconf version 2.69 is required.
 -Untested combinations of 'autoconf' and PostgreSQL versions are not
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 58bf810626..0000000000
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-From 24c2b9e42edb6d2f4ef2cead3b0aa1d6196adfce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
-Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:01:43 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption
- handshake.
-
-The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
-from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
-during startup, any additional data received with the initial
-request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
-already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
-Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the 
-TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
-a supposedly encryption-protected database session.
-
-This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
-although that would only work if the server did not demand any 
-authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
-authentication might well not do so.)
-
-To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
-is not empty after the encryption handshake.
-
-Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
-
-Security: CVE-2021-23214
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/28e24125541545483093819efae9bca603441951]
-CVE: CVE-2021-23214
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
-
----
- src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 11 +++++++++++
- src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
- src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
-index ee2cd86..4dd1c02 100644
---- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
-+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
-@@ -1183,6 +1183,17 @@ pq_getstring(StringInfo s)
-        }
- }
- 
-+/* -------------------------------
-+ *             pq_buffer_has_data              - is any buffered data available to read?
-+ *
-+ * This will *not* attempt to read more data.
-+ * --------------------------------
-+ */
-+bool
-+pq_buffer_has_data(void)
-+{
-+       return (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength);
-+}
- 
- /* --------------------------------
-  *             pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client.
-diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
-index 5775fc0..1fcc3f8 100644
---- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
-+++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
-@@ -2049,6 +2049,17 @@ retry1:
-                        return STATUS_ERROR;
- #endif
- 
-+               /*
-+               * At this point we should have no data already buffered.  If we do,
-+               * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't
-+               * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
-+               * We report this case to the client.
-+               */
-+               if (pq_buffer_has_data())
-+                       ereport(FATAL,
-+                               (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
-+                               errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"),
-+                               errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
-                /*
-                 * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not
-                 * another SSL negotiation request, and a GSS request should only
-@@ -2080,7 +2091,17 @@ retry1:
-                if (GSSok == 'G' && secure_open_gssapi(port) == -1)
-                        return STATUS_ERROR;
- #endif
--
-+               /*
-+               * At this point we should have no data already buffered.  If we do,
-+               * it was received before we performed the GSS handshake, so it wasn't
-+               * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
-+               * We report this case to the client.
-+               */
-+               if (pq_buffer_has_data())
-+                       ereport(FATAL,
-+                               (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
-+                               errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption request"),
-+                               errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
-                /*
-                 * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not
-                 * another GSS negotiation request, and an SSL request should only
-diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
-index b115247..9969692 100644
---- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
-+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int    pq_getbyte(void);
- extern int     pq_peekbyte(void);
- extern int     pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c);
- extern int     pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len);
-+extern bool pq_buffer_has_data(void);
- 
- /*
-  * prototypes for functions in be-secure.c
--- 
-2.17.1
-
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 42b78539b4..0000000000
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-From 79125ead2a6a234086844bb42f06d49603fe6ca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
-Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:14:56 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption
- handshake.
-
-libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
-the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
-any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
-remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
-once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
-with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
-some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
-database session.
-
-This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
-client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
-make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
-exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
-be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
-a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.
-
-To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
-is not empty after the encryption handshake.
-
-Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
-
-Security: CVE-2021-23222
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/160c0258802d10b0600d7671b1bbea55d8e17d45]
-CVE: CVE-2021-23222
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
-index e26619e1b5..b692648fca 100644
---- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
-+++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
-@@ -1471,6 +1471,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
-     and proceed without requesting <acronym>SSL</acronym>.
-    </para>
- 
-+   <para>
-+    When <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server
-+    is expected to send only the single <literal>S</literal> byte and then
-+    wait for the frontend to initiate an <acronym>SSL</acronym> handshake.
-+    If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely
-+    means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a
-+    buffer-stuffing attack
-+    (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/">CVE-2021-23222</ulink>).
-+    Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the
-+    socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to
-+    treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional
-+    bytes.
-+   </para>
-+
-    <para>
-     An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being
-     opened to send a CancelRequest message.
-@@ -1532,6 +1546,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
-     encryption.
-    </para>
- 
-+   <para>
-+    When <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server
-+    is expected to send only the single <literal>G</literal> byte and then
-+    wait for the frontend to initiate a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> handshake.
-+    If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely
-+    means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a
-+    buffer-stuffing attack
-+    (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/">CVE-2021-23222</ulink>).
-+    Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the
-+    socket before turning the socket over to their GSSAPI library, or to
-+    treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional
-+    bytes.
-+   </para>
-+
-    <para>
-     An initial GSSENCRequest can also be used in a connection that is being
-     opened to send a CancelRequest message.
-diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
-index f80f4e98d8..57aee95183 100644
---- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
-+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
-@@ -3076,6 +3076,19 @@ keep_going:                                              /* We will come back to here until there is
-                                pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn);
-                                if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
-                                {
-+                                       /*
-+                                        * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
-+                                        * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL
-+                                        * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
-+                                        * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
-+                                        */
-+                                       if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
-+                                       {
-+                                               appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
-+                                                                                        libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n"));
-+                                               goto error_return;
-+                                       }
-+
-                                        /* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */
-                                        conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
-                                        return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
-@@ -3175,6 +3188,19 @@ keep_going:                                              /* We will come back to here until there is
-                                pollres = pqsecure_open_gss(conn);
-                                if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
-                                {
-+                                       /*
-+                                        * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
-+                                        * If we do, it was received before we performed the GSS
-+                                        * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
-+                                        * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
-+                                        */
-+                                       if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
-+                                       {
-+                                               appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
-+                                                                                        libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption response\n"));
-+                                               goto error_return;
-+                                       }
-+
-                                        /* All set for startup packet */
-                                        conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
-                                        return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
--- 
-2.17.1
-
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.5.bb
index 2ed0fa49bb..81193e30e5 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.5.bb
@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ SRC_URI += "\
    file://0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch \
    file://0001-Improve-reproducibility.patch \
    file://0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch \
-   file://CVE-2021-23214.patch \
-   file://CVE-2021-23222.patch \
 "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ea93e10390245f1ce461a54eb5f99a48d8cabd3a08ce4d652ec2169a357bc0cd"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9b81067a55edbaabc418aacef457dd8477642827499560b00615a6ea6c13f6b3"