Mirror of git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded https://git.enea.com/cgit/linux/meta-openembedded.git/atom?h=master-next 2022-12-19T07:34:20+00:00 2022-12-19T07:34:20+00:00 Khem Raj raj.khem@gmail.com 2022-12-18T22:02:20+00:00 urn:sha1:a8e8825ee1b7ebb1c8af2bc95c64ed10c056414e - Disable documentation as it needs asciidoctor which is not available - Rename cryptsetup-reencrypt packageconfig to luks2-reencryption to match the relevant configure option. - Add a patch to enable 64bit off_t and lfs64 Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> 2022-06-30T11:01:38+00:00 Peter Kjellerstedt peter.kjellerstedt@axis.com 2022-06-08T18:26:54+00:00 urn:sha1:fc578274215c81b0b263b9afe47144f9a6ed0ad3 Cryptsetup SSH tokens is the only feature that has a dependency on libssh. Add a packageconfig to control this dependency. Change-Id: Iac4f91e099ad2e3a79aab183734108f8bfbff57f Signed-off-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <peter.kjellerstedt@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> 2022-05-04T14:57:13+00:00 Alejandro Enedino Hernandez Samaniego alejandro@enedino.org 2022-05-03T17:53:30+00:00 urn:sha1:f850d140d7902e3b03ca545bbd419e0a9ed8f30e Cryptsetup allows for certain luks2 related defaults to be set for libcryptsetup, these include the default PBKDF algorithm, memory limit for Argon2, parallel threads and iteration time. Set default variables defined to the same values currently coming from cryptsetup upstream, making this change transparent for the user but allow these values to be customized. Signed-off-by: Alejandro Enedino Hernandez Samaniego <alejandro@enedino.org> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> 2022-01-19T17:01:04+00:00 wangmy wangmy@fujitsu.com 2022-01-19T01:41:59+00:00 urn:sha1:9f4d806758879bd33a72fed5bf69b98622f2c658 Changelog: ========= Stable security bug-fix release that fixes CVE-2021-4122. All users of cryptsetup 2.4.x must upgrade to this version. Changes since version 2.4.2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online reencryption extension crash recovery (CVE-2021-4122). An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently decrypt part of the LUKS device. This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but no knowledge of user passphrases. The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata. There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened (except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with possible modification of revealed plaintext. The size of possible decrypted data depends on configured LUKS2 header size (metadata size is configurable for LUKS2). With the default parameters (16 MiB LUKS2 header) and only one allocated keyslot (512 bit key for AES-XTS), simulated decryption with checksum resilience SHA1 (20 bytes checksum for 4096-byte blocks), the maximal decrypted size can be over 3GiB. The attack is not applicable to LUKS1 format, but the attacker can update metadata in place to LUKS2 format as an additional step. For such a converted LUKS2 header, the keyslot area is limited to decrypted size (with SHA1 checksums) over 300 MiB. The issue is present in all cryptsetup releases since 2.2.0. Versions 1.x, 2.0.x, and 2.1.x are not affected, as these do not contain LUKS2 reencryption extension. The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect against intentional modification but such modification must not cause a violation of data confidentiality. The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots. For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0. The former reencryption operation (without the additional digest) is no longer supported (reencryption with the digest is not backward compatible). You need to finish in-progress reencryption before updating to new packages. The alternative approach is to perform a repair command from the updated package to recalculate reencryption digest and fix metadata. The reencryption repair operation always require a user passphrase. WARNING: Devices with older reencryption in progress can be no longer activated without performing the action mentioned above. Encryption in progress can be detected by running the luksDump command (output includes reencrypt keyslot with reencryption parameters). Also, during the active reencryption, no keyslot operations are available (change of passphrases, etc.). The issue was found by Milan Broz as cryptsetup maintainer. Other changes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Add configure option --disable-luks2-reencryption to completely disable LUKS2 reencryption code. When used, the libcryptsetup library can read metadata with reencryption code, but all reencryption API calls and cryptsetup reencrypt commands are disabled. Devices with online reencryption in progress cannot be activated. This option can cause some incompatibilities. Please use with care. * Improve internal metadata validation code for reencryption metadata. * Add updated documentation for LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0 (with reencryption extension description and updated metadata description). See docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf or online version in https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs repository. * Fix support for bitlk (BitLocker compatible) startup key with new metadata entry introduced in Windows 11. * Fix space restriction for LUKS2 reencryption with data shift. The code required more space than was needed. Signed-off-by: Wang Mingyu <wangmy@fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>