qemu: CVE-2017-5931

Fixes integer overflow in in handling virtio-crypto requests

Reference:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5931

Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Borg <martin.borg@enea.com>

2 files changed, 53 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-5931.patch b/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-5931.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c35c26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2017-5931.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From d6f119475d3c9c913f9140771895036be66d5c33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
+Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:50:03 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: fix possible integer and heap overflow
+
+Because the 'size_t' type is 4 bytes in 32-bit platform, which
+is the same with 'int'. It's easy to make 'max_len' to zero when
+integer overflow and then cause heap overflow if 'max_len' is zero.
+
+Using uint_64 instead of size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-5931
+Upstream-Status: Backport [backport from 2.8.1.1 releases: https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d6f119475d3c9c913f9140771895036be66d5c33]
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
+Tested-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4)
+Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+ hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+index 2f2467e..c23e1ad 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
+     uint32_t hash_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_hash = 0;
+     uint32_t cipher_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_cipher = 0;
+ 
+-    size_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
++    uint64_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
+     size_t s;
+ 
+     /* Plain cipher */
+@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+-    max_len = iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
++    max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
+     if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
+         virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
+         return NULL;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_%.bbappend b/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_%.bbappend
index 3ebff2d..e27553c 100644
--- a/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_%.bbappend
+++ b/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_%.bbappend
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-CVE-2017-2620.patch \
             file://CVE-2017-7471.patch \
             file://CVE-2017-6505.patch \
             file://CVE-2017-8309.patch \
+            file://CVE-2017-5931.patch \
            "