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| author | Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com> | 2017-10-04 12:34:29 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adrian Dudau <adrian.dudau@enea.com> | 2017-10-04 15:28:01 +0200 |
| commit | c65b24cdfd9edbc25796ba7db9a9ca68513324e9 (patch) | |
| tree | 0efeceeac14716631dcc99b73650dadcc8cf4b0f | |
| parent | 91b02ae7ac707984cd5182bb39c2fe8086a1696f (diff) | |
| download | meta-el-common-c65b24cdfd9edbc25796ba7db9a9ca68513324e9.tar.gz | |
dnsmasq: CVE-2017-14496
Invalid boundary checks here. Integer underflow leading to a huge memcpy.
References:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2017-14496
https://security.googleblog.com/2017/10/behind-masq-yet-more-dns-and-dhcp.html
Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dudau <adrian.dudau@enea.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/CVE-2017-14496.patch | 94 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_%.bbappend | 1 |
2 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/CVE-2017-14496.patch b/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/CVE-2017-14496.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..333a890 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/CVE-2017-14496.patch | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ | |||
| 1 | From 897c113fda0886a28a986cc6ba17bb93bd6cb1c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
| 2 | From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk> | ||
| 3 | Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:11:58 +0100 | ||
| 4 | Subject: [PATCH] Security fix, CVE-2017-14496, Integer underflow in DNS | ||
| 5 | response creation. | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | Fix DoS in DNS. Invalid boundary checks in the | ||
| 8 | add_pseudoheader function allows a memcpy call with negative | ||
| 9 | size An attacker which can send malicious DNS queries | ||
| 10 | to dnsmasq can trigger a DoS remotely. | ||
| 11 | dnsmasq is vulnerable only if one of the following option is | ||
| 12 | specified: --add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet. | ||
| 13 | |||
| 14 | CVE: CVE-2017-14496 | ||
| 15 | Upstream-Status: Backport | ||
| 16 | |||
| 17 | Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com> | ||
| 18 | --- | ||
| 19 | CHANGELOG | 11 +++++++++++ | ||
| 20 | src/edns0.c | 13 ++++++++++++- | ||
| 21 | 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | ||
| 22 | |||
| 23 | diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG | ||
| 24 | index d1cc074..8fe00ed 100644 | ||
| 25 | --- a/CHANGELOG | ||
| 26 | +++ b/CHANGELOG | ||
| 27 | @@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ version 2.78 | ||
| 28 | and Kevin Hamacher of the Google Security Team for | ||
| 29 | finding this. | ||
| 30 | |||
| 31 | + Fix DoS in DNS. Invalid boundary checks in the | ||
| 32 | + add_pseudoheader function allows a memcpy call with negative | ||
| 33 | + size An attacker which can send malicious DNS queries | ||
| 34 | + to dnsmasq can trigger a DoS remotely. | ||
| 35 | + dnsmasq is vulnerable only if one of the following option is | ||
| 36 | + specified: --add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet. | ||
| 37 | + CVE-2017-14496 applies. | ||
| 38 | + Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana | ||
| 39 | + and Kevin Hamacher of the Google Security Team for | ||
| 40 | + finding this. | ||
| 41 | + | ||
| 42 | |||
| 43 | version 2.77 | ||
| 44 | Generate an error when configured with a CNAME loop, | ||
| 45 | diff --git a/src/edns0.c b/src/edns0.c | ||
| 46 | index f5b798c..95b74ee 100644 | ||
| 47 | --- a/src/edns0.c | ||
| 48 | +++ b/src/edns0.c | ||
| 49 | @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l | ||
| 50 | GETSHORT(len, p); | ||
| 51 | |||
| 52 | /* malformed option, delete the whole OPT RR and start again. */ | ||
| 53 | - if (i + len > rdlen) | ||
| 54 | + if (i + 4 + len > rdlen) | ||
| 55 | { | ||
| 56 | rdlen = 0; | ||
| 57 | is_last = 0; | ||
| 58 | @@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l | ||
| 59 | ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->arcount), | ||
| 60 | header, plen))) | ||
| 61 | return plen; | ||
| 62 | + if (p + 11 > limit) | ||
| 63 | + return plen; /* Too big */ | ||
| 64 | *p++ = 0; /* empty name */ | ||
| 65 | PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p); | ||
| 66 | PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given in EDNS0 header */ | ||
| 67 | @@ -204,6 +206,11 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l | ||
| 68 | /* Copy back any options */ | ||
| 69 | if (buff) | ||
| 70 | { | ||
| 71 | + if (p + rdlen > limit) | ||
| 72 | + { | ||
| 73 | + free(buff); | ||
| 74 | + return plen; /* Too big */ | ||
| 75 | + } | ||
| 76 | memcpy(p, buff, rdlen); | ||
| 77 | free(buff); | ||
| 78 | p += rdlen; | ||
| 79 | @@ -220,8 +227,12 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l | ||
| 80 | /* Add new option */ | ||
| 81 | if (optno != 0 && replace != 2) | ||
| 82 | { | ||
| 83 | + if (p + 4 > limit) | ||
| 84 | + return plen; /* Too big */ | ||
| 85 | PUTSHORT(optno, p); | ||
| 86 | PUTSHORT(optlen, p); | ||
| 87 | + if (p + optlen > limit) | ||
| 88 | + return plen; /* Too big */ | ||
| 89 | memcpy(p, opt, optlen); | ||
| 90 | p += optlen; | ||
| 91 | PUTSHORT(p - datap, lenp); | ||
| 92 | -- | ||
| 93 | 1.7.10.4 | ||
| 94 | |||
diff --git a/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_%.bbappend b/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_%.bbappend index c0c4633..07f8a6c 100644 --- a/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_%.bbappend +++ b/recipes-networking/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_%.bbappend | |||
| @@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-CVE-2017-14491.patch \ | |||
| 6 | file://CVE-2017-14492.patch \ | 6 | file://CVE-2017-14492.patch \ |
| 7 | file://CVE-2017-14493.patch \ | 7 | file://CVE-2017-14493.patch \ |
| 8 | file://CVE-2017-14494.patch \ | 8 | file://CVE-2017-14494.patch \ |
| 9 | file://CVE-2017-14496.patch \ | ||
| 9 | " | 10 | " |
