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| author | Dan Andresan <Dan.Andresan@enea.com> | 2018-10-26 14:15:55 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dan Andresan <Dan.Andresan@enea.com> | 2018-10-26 14:15:55 +0200 |
| commit | 2596922ee809af9fb48a0fc684bb560563de0994 (patch) | |
| tree | 6b390c7354da3a76ee283c23cb56526eafd6acd6 | |
| parent | 5b8928cd5f01d83ae27824bb5d411723cabc3108 (diff) | |
| download | meta-el-common-2596922ee809af9fb48a0fc684bb560563de0994.tar.gz | |
libxcursor: Fix CVE-2017-16612
libxcursor in the upstream pyro is 1.1.14
CVE: CVE-2017-16612
Reference:
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXcursor/commit/?id=4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8
Change-Id: Ia1e81ae237e09ba67dabb0aa9426b763f1e96f8f
Signed-off-by: Andreas Wellving <andreas.wellving@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Mangeac <adrian.mangeac@enea.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612-Fix-heap-overflows-when-parsing-malicious-files.patch | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bbappend | 6 |
2 files changed, 84 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612-Fix-heap-overflows-when-parsing-malicious-files.patch b/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612-Fix-heap-overflows-when-parsing-malicious-files.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9cad31e --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612-Fix-heap-overflows-when-parsing-malicious-files.patch | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ | |||
| 1 | From 4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
| 2 | From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> | ||
| 3 | Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 23:47:52 +0200 | ||
| 4 | Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files. | ||
| 5 | (CVE-2017-16612) | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow | ||
| 8 | while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments. | ||
| 9 | |||
| 10 | The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for | ||
| 11 | dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes | ||
| 12 | 4 bytes. Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will | ||
| 13 | lead to less allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads. | ||
| 14 | |||
| 15 | The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment | ||
| 16 | as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function | ||
| 17 | XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the | ||
| 18 | check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following | ||
| 19 | addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate | ||
| 20 | less memory than needed for subsequent reads. | ||
| 21 | |||
| 22 | CVE: CVE-2017-16612 | ||
| 23 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXcursor/commit/?id=4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8] | ||
| 24 | |||
| 25 | Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> | ||
| 26 | Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> | ||
| 27 | Signed-off-by: Andreas Wellving <andreas.wellving@enea.com> | ||
| 28 | --- | ||
| 29 | src/file.c | 12 ++++++++++-- | ||
| 30 | 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) | ||
| 31 | |||
| 32 | diff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c | ||
| 33 | index 43163c2..da16277 100644 | ||
| 34 | --- a/src/file.c | ||
| 35 | +++ b/src/file.c | ||
| 36 | @@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height) | ||
| 37 | { | ||
| 38 | XcursorImage *image; | ||
| 39 | |||
| 40 | + if (width < 0 || height < 0) | ||
| 41 | + return NULL; | ||
| 42 | + if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE) | ||
| 43 | + return NULL; | ||
| 44 | + | ||
| 45 | image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) + | ||
| 46 | width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel)); | ||
| 47 | if (!image) | ||
| 48 | @@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length) | ||
| 49 | { | ||
| 50 | XcursorComment *comment; | ||
| 51 | |||
| 52 | - if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN) | ||
| 53 | + if (length < 0 || length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN) | ||
| 54 | return NULL; | ||
| 55 | |||
| 56 | comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1); | ||
| 57 | @@ -448,7 +453,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file, | ||
| 58 | if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay)) | ||
| 59 | return NULL; | ||
| 60 | /* sanity check data */ | ||
| 61 | - if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000) | ||
| 62 | + if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || | ||
| 63 | + head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE) | ||
| 64 | return NULL; | ||
| 65 | if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0) | ||
| 66 | return NULL; | ||
| 67 | @@ -457,6 +463,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file, | ||
| 68 | |||
| 69 | /* Create the image and initialize it */ | ||
| 70 | image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height); | ||
| 71 | + if (image == NULL) | ||
| 72 | + return NULL; | ||
| 73 | if (chunkHeader.version < image->version) | ||
| 74 | image->version = chunkHeader.version; | ||
| 75 | image->size = chunkHeader.subtype; | ||
| 76 | -- | ||
| 77 | 2.7.4 | ||
| 78 | |||
diff --git a/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bbappend b/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bbappend new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f67cec --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor_1.1.14.bbappend | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ | |||
| 1 | # look for files in the layer first | ||
| 2 | FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${THISDIR}/${PN}:" | ||
| 3 | |||
| 4 | SRC_URI += " \ | ||
| 5 | file://CVE-2017-16612-Fix-heap-overflows-when-parsing-malicious-files.patch \ | ||
| 6 | " | ||
