diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'recipes-support/spice/files/CVE-2017-7506-3.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | recipes-support/spice/files/CVE-2017-7506-3.patch | 54 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 54 deletions
diff --git a/recipes-support/spice/files/CVE-2017-7506-3.patch b/recipes-support/spice/files/CVE-2017-7506-3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d55502f..0000000 --- a/recipes-support/spice/files/CVE-2017-7506-3.patch +++ /dev/null | |||
| @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ | |||
| 1 | From daedc2e2bb70f7cb0eafd65fd37fd73af12df770 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
| 2 | From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> | ||
| 3 | Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 | ||
| 4 | Subject: [PATCH 3/3] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor | ||
| 5 | configuration | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | It was also possible for a malicious client to set | ||
| 8 | VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger | ||
| 9 | than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors. | ||
| 10 | This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to | ||
| 11 | read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the | ||
| 12 | host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems | ||
| 13 | complicated. | ||
| 14 | |||
| 15 | Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> | ||
| 16 | |||
| 17 | Upstream-Status: Backport | ||
| 18 | [https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=a957a90baf2c62d31f3547e56bba7d0e812d2331] | ||
| 19 | |||
| 20 | CVE: CVE-2017-7506 | ||
| 21 | |||
| 22 | Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com> | ||
| 23 | --- | ||
| 24 | server/reds.c | 7 +++++++ | ||
| 25 | 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) | ||
| 26 | |||
| 27 | diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c | ||
| 28 | index 62b1164..ee36dec 100644 | ||
| 29 | --- a/server/reds.c | ||
| 30 | +++ b/server/reds.c | ||
| 31 | @@ -1093,6 +1093,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( | ||
| 32 | VDAgentMessage *msg_header; | ||
| 33 | VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; | ||
| 34 | RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; | ||
| 35 | + uint32_t max_monitors; | ||
| 36 | |||
| 37 | // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through | ||
| 38 | // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows | ||
| 39 | @@ -1121,6 +1122,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( | ||
| 40 | goto overflow; | ||
| 41 | } | ||
| 42 | monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); | ||
| 43 | + // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows | ||
| 44 | + max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) / | ||
| 45 | + sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); | ||
| 46 | + if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) { | ||
| 47 | + goto overflow; | ||
| 48 | + } | ||
| 49 | spice_debug("%s: %d\n", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); | ||
| 50 | red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); | ||
| 51 | reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); | ||
| 52 | -- | ||
| 53 | 2.7.4 | ||
| 54 | |||
