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Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.

Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
         Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>

Upstream-Status: Pending

Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
===================================================================
diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164 +0800
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000 +0800
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
   pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
 endif
 pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
-	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS)
+	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) \
+	../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
 
 securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
 
diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8	2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201 +0800
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8	2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774 +0800
@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&.
 .RS 4
 The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
 \fBnullok\fR
-argument overrides this default\&.
+argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnullok_secure\fR
+.RS 4
+The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
+\fBnullok_secure\fR
+argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values found in /etc/securetty\&.
 .RE
 .PP
 \fBtry_first_pass\fR
diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml	2013-07-05 09:52:38.775108523 +0800
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml	2013-07-05 10:30:23.084483630 +0800
@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@
           <para>
             The default action of this module is to not permit the
             user access to a service if their official password is blank.
-            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
+            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default
+            and allows any user with a blank password to access the
+            service.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>nullok_secure</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            The default action of this module is to not permit the
+            user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+            The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
+            default and allows any user with a blank password to access
+            the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
+            the values found in /etc/securetty.
           </para>
         </listitem>
       </varlistentry>
diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
--- a/modules/pam_unix/README	2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/README	2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800
@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok
 
     The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
     service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides
-    this default.
+    this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the
+    service.
+
+nullok_secure
+
+    The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
+    service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure argument
+    overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access
+    the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values
+    found in /etc/securetty.
 
 try_first_pass
 
diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c	2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c	2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800
@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
 	/* now parse the arguments to this module */
 
 	for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
-		int j;
+		int j, sl;
 
 		D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
 
 		for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
-			if (unix_args[j].token
-			    && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
-				break;
+			if (unix_args[j].token) {
+			    sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
+			    if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
+				/* exclude argument from comparison */
+				if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
+				    break;
+			    } else {
+				/* compare full strings */
+				if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
+				    break;
+			    }
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
     child = fork();
     if (child == 0) {
         int i=0;
+        int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
         struct rlimit rlim;
 	static char *envp[] = { NULL };
 	char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
 	/* exec binary helper */
 	args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
 	args[1] = x_strdup(user);
-	if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) {	/* this means we've succeeded */
+
+	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
+	    const void *uttyname;
+	    retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
+	    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
+	        || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	    {
+	        nullok = 0;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (nullok) {
 	  args[2]=strdup("nullok");
 	} else {
 	  args[2]=strdup("nonull");
@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u
 	if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
 		return 0;	/* will fail but don't let on yet */
 
+	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
+		int retval2;
+		const void *uttyname;
+		retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
+		if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
+			return 0;
+
+		if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* UNIX passwords area */
 
 	retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t *
 			}
 		}
 	} else {
-		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
+		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt,
+		                         _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
 	}
 
 	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h	2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h	2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800
@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct {
 					   password hash algorithms */
 #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS       26	/* new password hashes will use blowfish */
 #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN        27	/* min length for password */
+#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE       28	/* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */
 /* -------------- */
-#define UNIX_CTRLS_              28	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+#define UNIX_CTRLS_              29	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
 
 #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl)	(off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
 
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
 /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */    {"not_set_pass",    _ALL_ON_,                0100},
 /* UNIX__PRELIM */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0200},
 /* UNIX__UPDATE */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0400},
-/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               01000},
+/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000),  0x200},
 /* UNIX__QUIET */          {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               02000},
 /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */     {"use_authtok",     _ALL_ON_,               04000},
 /* UNIX_SHADOW */          {"shadow",          _ALL_ON_,              010000},
@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
 /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */     {"sha512",       _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 040000000},
 /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */     {"rounds=",         _ALL_ON_,          0100000000},
 /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */   {"blowfish",    _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0200000000},
-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=",		_ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
+/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=",	        _ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
+/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */   {"nullok_secure",   _ALL_ON_^(0x200),  0x10000000},
 };
 
 #define UNIX_DEFAULTS  (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl
 			,const char *data_name
 			,const void **pass);
 
+extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
+				  const char *uttyname);
+
 extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 			unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
 #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */