path: root/meta/recipes-devtools/subversion/subversion-1.8.9/subversion-CVE-2014-3522.patch

Upstream-Status: Backport

Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com>

Index: subversion/include/private/svn_cert.h
===================================================================
--- subversion/include/private/svn_cert.h	(nonexistent)
+++ subversion/include/private/svn_cert.h	(working copy)
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/**
+ * @copyright
+ * ====================================================================
+ *    Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+ *    or more contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file
+ *    distributed with this work for additional information
+ *    regarding copyright ownership.  The ASF licenses this file
+ *    to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+ *    "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+ *    with the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *    Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+ *    software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+ *    "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+ *    KIND, either express or implied.  See the License for the
+ *    specific language governing permissions and limitations
+ *    under the License.
+ * ====================================================================
+ * @endcopyright
+ *
+ * @file svn_cert.h
+ * @brief Implementation of certificate validation functions
+ */
+
+#ifndef SVN_CERT_H
+#define SVN_CERT_H
+
+#include <apr.h>
+
+#include "svn_types.h"
+#include "svn_string.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif /* __cplusplus */
+
+
+/* Return TRUE iff @a pattern matches @a hostname as defined
+ * by the matching rules of RFC 6125.  In the context of RFC
+ * 6125 the pattern is the domain name portion of the presented
+ * identifier (which comes from the Common Name or a DNSName
+ * portion of the subjectAltName of an X.509 certificate) and
+ * the hostname is the source domain (i.e. the host portion
+ * of the URI the user entered).
+ *
+ * @note With respect to wildcards we only support matching
+ * wildcards in the left-most label and as the only character
+ * in the left-most label (i.e. we support RFC 6125 s. 6.4.3
+ * Rule 1 and 2 but not the optional Rule 3).  This may change
+ * in the future.
+ *
+ * @note Subversion does not at current support internationalized
+ * domain names.  Both values are presumed to be in NR-LDH label
+ * or A-label form (see RFC 5890 for the definition).
+ *
+ * @since New in 1.9.
+ */
+svn_boolean_t
+svn_cert__match_dns_identity(svn_string_t *pattern, svn_string_t *hostname);
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif /* __cplusplus */
+
+#endif /* SVN_CERT_H */
Index: subversion/libsvn_ra_serf/util.c
===================================================================
--- subversion/libsvn_ra_serf/util.c	(revision 1615128)
+++ subversion/libsvn_ra_serf/util.c	(working copy)
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
 #define APR_WANT_STRFUNC
 #include <apr.h>
 #include <apr_want.h>
-#include <apr_fnmatch.h>
 
 #include <serf.h>
 #include <serf_bucket_types.h>
@@ -49,6 +48,7 @@
 #include "private/svn_fspath.h"
 #include "private/svn_subr_private.h"
 #include "private/svn_auth_private.h"
+#include "private/svn_cert.h"
 
 #include "ra_serf.h"
 
@@ -274,7 +274,6 @@ ssl_server_cert(void *baton, int failures,
   apr_hash_t *subject = NULL;
   apr_hash_t *serf_cert = NULL;
   void *creds;
-  int found_matching_hostname = 0;
 
   svn_failures = (ssl_convert_serf_failures(failures)
       | conn->server_cert_failures);
@@ -286,26 +285,37 @@ ssl_server_cert(void *baton, int failures,
       ### This should really be handled by serf, which should pass an error
           for this case, but that has backwards compatibility issues. */
       apr_array_header_t *san;
+      svn_boolean_t found_san_entry = FALSE;
+      svn_boolean_t found_matching_hostname = FALSE;
+      svn_string_t *actual_hostname =
+          svn_string_create(conn->session->session_url.hostname, scratch_pool);
 
       serf_cert = serf_ssl_cert_certificate(cert, scratch_pool);
 
       san = svn_hash_gets(serf_cert, "subjectAltName");
       /* Try to find matching server name via subjectAltName first... */
-      if (san) {
+      if (san)
+        {
           int i;
-          for (i = 0; i < san->nelts; i++) {
+          found_san_entry = san->nelts > 0;
+          for (i = 0; i < san->nelts; i++)
+            {
               const char *s = APR_ARRAY_IDX(san, i, const char*);
-              if (apr_fnmatch(s, conn->session->session_url.hostname,
-                  APR_FNM_PERIOD | APR_FNM_CASE_BLIND) == APR_SUCCESS)
-              {
-                  found_matching_hostname = 1;
+              svn_string_t *cert_hostname = svn_string_create(s, scratch_pool);
+
+              if (svn_cert__match_dns_identity(cert_hostname, actual_hostname))
+                {
+                  found_matching_hostname = TRUE;
                   break;
-              }
-          }
-      }
+                }
+            }
+        }
 
-      /* Match server certificate CN with the hostname of the server */
-      if (!found_matching_hostname)
+      /* Match server certificate CN with the hostname of the server iff
+       * we didn't find any subjectAltName fields and try to match them.
+       * Per RFC 2818 they are authoritative if present and CommonName
+       * should be ignored. */
+      if (!found_matching_hostname && !found_san_entry)
         {
           const char *hostname = NULL;
 
@@ -314,13 +324,20 @@ ssl_server_cert(void *baton, int failures,
           if (subject)
             hostname = svn_hash_gets(subject, "CN");
 
-          if (!hostname
-              || apr_fnmatch(hostname, conn->session->session_url.hostname,
-                             APR_FNM_PERIOD | APR_FNM_CASE_BLIND) != APR_SUCCESS)
-          {
-              svn_failures |= SVN_AUTH_SSL_CNMISMATCH;
-          }
-      }
+          if (hostname)
+            {
+              svn_string_t *cert_hostname = svn_string_create(hostname,
+                                                              scratch_pool);
+
+              if (svn_cert__match_dns_identity(cert_hostname, actual_hostname))
+                {
+                  found_matching_hostname = TRUE;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (!found_matching_hostname)
+        svn_failures |= SVN_AUTH_SSL_CNMISMATCH;
     }
 
   if (!svn_failures)
Index: subversion/libsvn_subr/dirent_uri.c
===================================================================
--- subversion/libsvn_subr/dirent_uri.c	(revision 1615128)
+++ subversion/libsvn_subr/dirent_uri.c	(working copy)
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 
 #include "dirent_uri.h"
 #include "private/svn_fspath.h"
+#include "private/svn_cert.h"
 
 /* The canonical empty path.  Can this be changed?  Well, change the empty
    test below and the path library will work, not so sure about the fs/wc
@@ -2597,3 +2598,81 @@ svn_urlpath__canonicalize(const char *uri,
     }
   return uri;
 }
+
+
+/* -------------- The cert API (see private/svn_cert.h) ------------- */
+
+svn_boolean_t
+svn_cert__match_dns_identity(svn_string_t *pattern, svn_string_t *hostname)
+{
+  apr_size_t pattern_pos = 0, hostname_pos = 0;
+
+  /* support leading wildcards that composed of the only character in the
+   * left-most label. */
+  if (pattern->len >= 2 &&
+      pattern->data[pattern_pos] == '*' &&
+      pattern->data[pattern_pos + 1] == '.')
+    {
+      while (hostname_pos < hostname->len &&
+             hostname->data[hostname_pos] != '.')
+        {
+          hostname_pos++;
+        }
+      /* Assume that the wildcard must match something.  Rule 2 says
+       * that *.example.com should not match example.com.  If the wildcard
+       * ends up not matching anything then it matches .example.com which
+       * seems to be essentially the same as just example.com */
+      if (hostname_pos == 0)
+        return FALSE;
+
+      pattern_pos++;
+    }
+
+  while (pattern_pos < pattern->len && hostname_pos < hostname->len)
+    {
+      char pattern_c = pattern->data[pattern_pos];
+      char hostname_c = hostname->data[hostname_pos];
+
+      /* fold case as described in RFC 4343.
+       * Note: We actually convert to lowercase, since our URI
+       * canonicalization code converts to lowercase and generally
+       * most certs are issued with lowercase DNS names, meaning
+       * this avoids the fold operation in most cases.  The RFC
+       * suggests the opposite transformation, but doesn't require
+       * any specific implementation in any case.  It is critical
+       * that this folding be locale independent so you can't use
+       * tolower(). */
+      pattern_c = canonicalize_to_lower(pattern_c);
+      hostname_c = canonicalize_to_lower(hostname_c);
+
+      if (pattern_c != hostname_c)
+        {
+          /* doesn't match */
+          return FALSE;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          /* characters match so skip both */
+          pattern_pos++;
+          hostname_pos++;
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* ignore a trailing period on the hostname since this has no effect on the
+   * security of the matching.  See the following for the long explanation as
+   * to why:
+   * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=134402#c28
+   */
+  if (pattern_pos == pattern->len &&
+      hostname_pos == hostname->len - 1 &&
+      hostname->data[hostname_pos] == '.')
+    hostname_pos++;
+
+  if (pattern_pos != pattern->len || hostname_pos != hostname->len)
+    {
+      /* end didn't match */
+      return FALSE;
+    }
+
+  return TRUE;
+}
Index: subversion/tests/libsvn_subr/dirent_uri-test.c
===================================================================
--- subversion/tests/libsvn_subr/dirent_uri-test.c	(revision 1615128)
+++ subversion/tests/libsvn_subr/dirent_uri-test.c	(working copy)
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "svn_pools.h"
 #include "svn_dirent_uri.h"
 #include "private/svn_fspath.h"
+#include "private/svn_cert.h"
 
 #include "../svn_test.h"
 
@@ -2714,6 +2715,145 @@ test_fspath_get_longest_ancestor(apr_pool_t *pool)
   return SVN_NO_ERROR;
 }
 
+struct cert_match_dns_test {
+  const char *pattern;
+  const char *hostname;
+  svn_boolean_t expected;
+};
+
+static svn_error_t *
+run_cert_match_dns_tests(struct cert_match_dns_test *tests, apr_pool_t *pool)
+{
+  struct cert_match_dns_test *ct;
+  apr_pool_t *iterpool = svn_pool_create(pool);
+
+  for (ct = tests; ct->pattern; ct++)
+    {
+      svn_boolean_t result;
+      svn_string_t *pattern, *hostname;
+
+      svn_pool_clear(iterpool);
+
+      pattern = svn_string_create(ct->pattern, iterpool);
+      hostname = svn_string_create(ct->hostname, iterpool);
+
+      result = svn_cert__match_dns_identity(pattern, hostname);
+      if (result != ct->expected)
+        return svn_error_createf(SVN_ERR_TEST_FAILED, NULL,
+                                 "Expected %s but got %s for pattern '%s' on "
+                                 "hostname '%s'",
+                                 ct->expected ? "match" : "no match",
+                                 result ? "match" : "no match",
+                                 pattern->data, hostname->data);
+
+    }
+
+  svn_pool_destroy(iterpool);
+
+  return SVN_NO_ERROR;
+}
+
+static struct cert_match_dns_test cert_match_dns_tests[] = {
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.com", TRUE }, /* exact match */
+  { "foo.example.com", "FOO.EXAMPLE.COM", TRUE }, /* case differences */
+  { "FOO.EXAMPLE.COM", "foo.example.com", TRUE },
+  { "*.example.com", "FoO.ExAmPlE.CoM", TRUE },
+  { "*.ExAmPlE.CoM", "foo.example.com", TRUE },
+  { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", TRUE },
+  { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ", TRUE },
+  { "foo.example.com", "bar.example.com", FALSE }, /* difference at start */
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.net", FALSE }, /* difference at end */
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.commercial", FALSE }, /* hostname longer */
+  { "foo.example.commercial", "foo.example.com", FALSE }, /* pattern longer */
+  { "foo.example.comcom", "foo.example.com", FALSE }, /* repeated suffix */
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.comcom", FALSE },
+  { "foo.example.com.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.com.com", FALSE },
+  { "foofoo.example.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE }, /* repeated prefix */
+  { "foo.example.com", "foofoo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.foo.example.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.*.example.com", "foo.bar.example.com", FALSE }, /* RFC 6125 s. 6.4.3
+                                                            Rule 1 */
+  { "*.example.com", "foo.example.com", TRUE }, /* RFC 6125 s. 6.4.3 Rule 2 */
+  { "*.example.com", "bar.foo.example.com", FALSE }, /* Rule 2 */
+  { "*.example.com", "example.com", FALSE }, /* Rule 2 */
+  { "*.example.com", ".example.com", FALSE }, /* RFC doesn't say what to do
+                                                 here and a leading period on
+                                                 a hostname doesn't make sense
+                                                 so we'll just reject this. */
+  { "*", "foo.example.com", FALSE }, /* wildcard must be left-most label,
+                                        implies that there must be more than
+                                        one label. */
+  { "*", "example.com", FALSE },
+  { "*", "com", FALSE },
+  { "*.example.com", "foo.example.net", FALSE }, /* difference in literal text
+                                                    with a wildcard. */
+  { "*.com", "example.com", TRUE }, /* See Errata ID 3090 for RFC 6125,
+                                       probably shouldn't allow this but
+                                       we do for now. */
+  { "*.", "example.com", FALSE }, /* test some dubious 2 character wildcard
+                                     patterns */
+  { "*.", "example.", TRUE }, /* This one feels questionable */
+  { "*.", "example", FALSE },
+  { "*.", ".", FALSE },
+  { "a", "a", TRUE }, /* check that single letter exact matches work */
+  { "a", "b", FALSE }, /* and single letter not matches shouldn't */
+  { "*.*.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE }, /* unsupported wildcards */
+  { "*.*.com", "example.com", FALSE },
+  { "**.example.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "**.example.com", "example.com", FALSE },
+  { "f*.example.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "f*.example.com", "bar.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "*o.example.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "*o.example.com", "bar.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "f*o.example.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "f*o.example.com", "bar.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.e*.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.*e.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.e*e.com", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.com.", TRUE }, /* trailing dot */
+  { "*.example.com", "foo.example.com.", TRUE },
+  { "foo", "foo.", TRUE },
+  { "foo.example.com.", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "*.example.com.", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo.", "foo", FALSE },
+  { "foo.example.com", "foo.example.com..", FALSE },
+  { "*.example.com", "foo.example.com..", FALSE },
+  { "foo", "foo..", FALSE },
+  { "foo.example.com..", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "*.example.com..", "foo.example.com", FALSE },
+  { "foo..", "foo", FALSE },
+  { NULL }
+};
+
+static svn_error_t *
+test_cert_match_dns_identity(apr_pool_t *pool)
+{
+  return run_cert_match_dns_tests(cert_match_dns_tests, pool);
+}
+
+/* This test table implements results that should happen if we supported
+ * RFC 6125 s. 6.4.3 Rule 3.  We don't so it's expected to fail for now. */
+static struct cert_match_dns_test rule3_tests[] = {
+  { "baz*.example.net", "baz1.example.net", TRUE },
+  { "*baz.example.net", "foobaz.example.net", TRUE },
+  { "b*z.example.net", "buuz.example.net", TRUE },
+  { "b*z.example.net", "bz.example.net", FALSE }, /* presume wildcard can't
+                                                     match nothing */
+  { "baz*.example.net", "baz.example.net", FALSE },
+  { "*baz.example.net", "baz.example.net", FALSE },
+  { "b*z.example.net", "buuzuuz.example.net", TRUE }, /* presume wildcard
+                                                         should be greedy */
+  { NULL }
+};
+
+static svn_error_t *
+test_rule3(apr_pool_t *pool)
+{
+  return run_cert_match_dns_tests(rule3_tests, pool);
+}
+
 
 /* The test table.  */
 
@@ -2812,5 +2952,9 @@ struct svn_test_descriptor_t test_funcs[] =
                    "test svn_fspath__dirname/basename/split"),
     SVN_TEST_PASS2(test_fspath_get_longest_ancestor,
                    "test svn_fspath__get_longest_ancestor"),
+    SVN_TEST_PASS2(test_cert_match_dns_identity,
+                   "test svn_cert__match_dns_identity"),
+    SVN_TEST_XFAIL2(test_rule3,
+                    "test match with RFC 6125 s. 6.4.3 Rule 3"),
     SVN_TEST_NULL
   };