path: root/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch

From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit

eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
 forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by
 Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@

Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2016-1907

[YOCTO #8935]

Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>

---
 clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 clientloop.h |   4 +--
 mux.c        |  22 ++++++------
 ssh.c        |  23 +++++-------
 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c
===================================================================
--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.c
+++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.276 2015/10/20 03:36:35 mmcc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.279 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis
 {
 	size_t i, dlen;
 
+	if (display == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
 	dlen = strlen(display);
 	for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
 		if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis
 
 #define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
 #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
-void
+int
 client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
     u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
 {
-	char cmd[1024];
-	char line[512];
-	char xdisplay[512];
+	char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512];
+	char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
 	static char proto[512], data[512];
 	FILE *f;
-	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
-	char xauthdir[PATH_MAX] = "", xauthfile[PATH_MAX] = "";
+	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r;
 	struct stat st;
 	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
 
 	*_proto = proto;
 	*_data = data;
-	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
+	proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
 
-	if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
-		debug("No xauth program.");
-	} else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
-		logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data",
+	if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+		logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
 		    display);
-	} else {
-		if (display == NULL) {
-			debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
-			return;
-		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
+		debug("No xauth program.");
+		xauth_path = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (xauth_path != NULL) {
 		/*
 		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
 		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
 		 *      is not perfect.
 		 */
 		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
-			snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
-			    display + 10);
+			if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+			    display + 10)) < 0 ||
+			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
+				error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
+				return -1;
+			}
 			display = xdisplay;
 		}
 		if (trusted == 0) {
-			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX);
 			/*
+			 * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
+			 *
 			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
 			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
 			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
 			 */
+			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
+			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
+				error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
+				    __func__, strerror(errno));
+				return -1;
+			}
+			do_unlink = 1;
+			if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
+			    "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
+			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
+				error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
+				unlink(xauthfile);
+				rmdir(xauthdir);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
 			if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
 				x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
 			else
 				x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
-			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
-				do_unlink = 1;
-				snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile",
-				    xauthdir);
-				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
-				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
-				    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
-				    x11_timeout_real);
-				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
-				if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
-					now = monotime() + 1;
-					if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
-						x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
-					else
-						x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
-					channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
-					    x11_refuse_time);
-				}
-				if (system(cmd) == 0)
-					generated = 1;
+			if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+			    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+			    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+			    x11_timeout_real)) < 0 ||
+			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd))
+				fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__);
+			debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
+			if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+				now = monotime() + 1;
+				if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+					x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+				else
+					x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+				channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time);
 			}
+			if (system(cmd) == 0)
+				generated = 1;
 		}
 
 		/*
@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
 				got_data = 1;
 			if (f)
 				pclose(f);
-		} else
-			error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
-			    "xauth key data not generated");
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (do_unlink) {
@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
 		rmdir(xauthdir);
 	}
 
+	/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
+	if (!trusted && !got_data) {
+		error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+		    "xauth key data not generated");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
 	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
 			rnd >>= 8;
 		}
 	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h
===================================================================
--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.h
+++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.31 2013/06/02 23:36:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.32 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 
 /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
 int	 client_loop(int, int, int);
-void	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
+int	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
 	    char **, char **);
 void	 client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	 client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
Index: openssh-7.1p2/mux.c
===================================================================
--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/mux.c
+++ openssh-7.1p2/mux.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.54 2015/08/19 23:18:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.58 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success,
 		char *proto, *data;
 
 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
 		    options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
-		    &proto, &data);
-		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
-		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
-		    "spoofing.");
-		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
-		    data, 1);
-		client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
-		/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+		    &proto, &data) == 0) {
+			/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+			debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+			    "spoofing.");
+			x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
+			    data, 1);
+			/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+			client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
+			    CONFIRM_WARN);
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
Index: openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c
===================================================================
--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/ssh.c
+++ openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.420 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.433 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1604,6 +1604,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
 	struct winsize ws;
 	char *cp;
 	const char *display;
+	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
 
 	/* Enable compression if requested. */
 	if (options.compression) {
@@ -1674,13 +1675,9 @@ ssh_session(void)
 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
 	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
 		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
-	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
-		char *proto, *data;
-		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
-		    options.forward_x11_trusted,
-		    options.forward_x11_timeout,
-		    &proto, &data);
+	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
+	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
+	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
 		    "spoofing.");
@@ -1770,6 +1767,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success,
 	extern char **environ;
 	const char *display;
 	int interactive = tty_flag;
+	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
 
 	if (!success)
 		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
@@ -1777,12 +1775,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success,
 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
 	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
 		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
-	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
-		char *proto, *data;
-		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
-		    options.forward_x11_trusted,
-		    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
+	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
+	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
+	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
 		    "spoofing.");