From 47f51be021f4dfd800d4ff4630659887378baa3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Fandrich Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 19:32:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Add a failsafe on the maximum number of Canon MakerNote subtags. A malicious file could be crafted to cause extremely large values in some tags without tripping any buffer range checks. This is bad with the libexif representation of Canon MakerNotes because some arrays are turned into individual tags that the application must loop around. The largest value I've seen for failsafe_size in a (very small) sample of valid Canon files is <5000. The limit is set two orders of magnitude larger to avoid tripping up falsely in case some models use much larger values. Patch from Google. CVE-2020-13114 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexif/libexif/commit/e6a38a1a23ba94d139b1fa2cd4519fdcfe3c9bab] CVE: CVE-2020-13114 Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang --- libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c b/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c index eb53598..72fd7a3 100644 --- a/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c +++ b/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ #define DEBUG +/* Total size limit to prevent abuse by DoS */ +#define FAILSAFE_SIZE_MAX 1000000L + static void exif_mnote_data_canon_clear (ExifMnoteDataCanon *n) { @@ -202,6 +205,7 @@ exif_mnote_data_canon_load (ExifMnoteData *ne, ExifMnoteDataCanon *n = (ExifMnoteDataCanon *) ne; ExifShort c; size_t i, tcount, o, datao; + long failsafe_size = 0; if (!n || !buf || !buf_size) { exif_log (ne->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, @@ -280,6 +284,23 @@ exif_mnote_data_canon_load (ExifMnoteData *ne, memcpy (n->entries[tcount].data, buf + dataofs, s); } + /* Track the size of decoded tag data. A malicious file could + * be crafted to cause extremely large values here without + * tripping any buffer range checks. This is especially bad + * with the libexif representation of Canon MakerNotes because + * some arrays are turned into individual tags that the + * application must loop around. */ + failsafe_size += mnote_canon_entry_count_values(&n->entries[tcount]); + + if (failsafe_size > FAILSAFE_SIZE_MAX) { + /* Abort if the total size of the data in the tags extraordinarily large, */ + exif_mem_free (ne->mem, n->entries[tcount].data); + exif_log (ne->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, + "ExifMnoteCanon", "Failsafe tag size overflow (%lu > %ld)", + failsafe_size, FAILSAFE_SIZE_MAX); + break; + } + /* Tag was successfully parsed */ ++tcount; }