From 2adb210c8cc5a11bb899e7dc76c31159ff3d4116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Lock Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 13:38:52 +0100 Subject: wpa-supplicant: backport a patch to fix CVE-2015-1863 This fix was included in the master branch with the upgrade to 2.4, backport it to fido as the vulnerability was already present in 2.3. (From OE-Core rev: 12fc04731d26597bfb9d9f1713c96b11c8186c43) Signed-off-by: Joshua Lock Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc | 1 + ...e-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch (limited to 'meta') diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc index 1d171ef25a..93a2aa8b74 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ file://fix-libnl3-host-contamination.patch \ + file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \ file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \ file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \ file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \ diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e108a931c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it + (CVE-2015-1863) + +This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in +p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes) +was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in +arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the +dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the +heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P +peer discovery purposes. + +This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program +behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service +due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, +and potentially arbitrary code execution. + +Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart +hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Yue Tao + +--- + src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c +index f584fae..a45fe73 100644 +--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c ++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq, + if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) + os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); + if (msg.ssid && ++ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) && + (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN || + os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN) + != 0)) { +-- +1.7.9.5 + -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf