From 31a87d4d1dc80c6054c15a6f7dbc83b4d79bf0b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andre McCurdy Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 17:14:19 -0700 Subject: cpio: fix CVE-2016-2037 "The cpio_safer_name_suffix function in util.c in cpio 2.11 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted cpio file." https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2037 Note that there appear to be two versions of this fix. The original patch posted to the bug-cpio mailing list [1] is used by Debian [2], but apparently causes regression [3]. The patch accepted to the upstream git repo [4] seems to be the most complete fix. [1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-cpio/2016-01/msg00005.html [2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-2037 [3] https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-cpio@gnu.org/msg00584.html [4] http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/cpio.git/commit/?id=d36ec5f4e93130efb24fb9678aafd88e8070095b (From OE-Core rev: f170288ac706126e69a504a14d564b2e5c3513e4) Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy Signed-off-by: Ross Burton Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- ...-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch | 346 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 347 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/0001-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch (limited to 'meta/recipes-extended') diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/0001-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/0001-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a3054483c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/0001-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch @@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ +From ebf9a2d776474181936a720ce811d72bbd1da3b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Pavel Raiskup +Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 23:17:54 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2016-2037 - 1 byte out-of-bounds write + +Ensure that cpio_safer_name_suffix always works with dynamically +allocated buffer, and that it has size of at least 32 bytes. +Then, any call to cpio_safer_name_suffix is safe (it requires at +least 2 bytes in the buffer). + +Also ensure that c_namesize is always correctly initialized (by +cpio_set_c_name) to avoid undefined behavior when reading +file_hdr.c_namesize (previously happened for tar archives). + +References: +http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-cpio@gnu.org/msg00545.html + +* src/copyin.c (query_rename): Drop the hack, as we now work with +dynamically allocated buffer. Use cpio_set_c_name. +(create_defered_links_to_skipped): Use cpio_set_c_name rather than +manual assignment. +(read_name_from_file): New function to avoid C&P. +(read_in_old_ascii, read_in_new_ascii, read_in_binary): Use +read_name_from_file. +(process_copy_in): Initialize file_hdr.c_namesize. +* src/copyout.c (process_copy_out): Use cpio_set_c_name. +* src/cpiohdr.h (cpio_set_c_name): New prototype. +* src/tar.c (read_in_tar_header): Use cpio_set_c_name. +* src/util.c (cpio_set_c_name): New function to set +file_hdr->c_name and c_namesize from arbitrary string. +(cpio_safer_name_suffix): Some docs fixes. +* tests/inout.at: Also test copy-in, and try various formats. + +CVE: CVE-2016-2037 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/cpio.git/commit/?id=d36ec5f4e93130efb24fb9678aafd88e8070095b] + +Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy +--- + src/copyin.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------------- + src/copyout.c | 13 +++++------ + src/cpiohdr.h | 1 + + src/tar.c | 10 +++++---- + src/util.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + tests/inout.at | 19 ++++++++++++++-- + 6 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/copyin.c b/src/copyin.c +index cde911e..972f8a6 100644 +--- a/src/copyin.c ++++ b/src/copyin.c +@@ -76,28 +76,7 @@ query_rename(struct cpio_file_stat* file_hdr, FILE *tty_in, FILE *tty_out, + return -1; + } + else +- /* Debian hack: file_hrd.c_name is sometimes set to +- point to static memory by code in tar.c. This +- causes a segfault. This has been fixed and an +- additional check to ensure that the file name +- is not too long has been added. (Reported by +- Horst Knobloch.) This bug has been reported to +- "bug-gnu-utils@prep.ai.mit.edu". (99/1/6) -BEM */ +- { +- if (archive_format != arf_tar && archive_format != arf_ustar) +- { +- free (file_hdr->c_name); +- file_hdr->c_name = xstrdup (new_name.ds_string); +- } +- else +- { +- if (is_tar_filename_too_long (new_name.ds_string)) +- error (0, 0, _("%s: file name too long"), +- new_name.ds_string); +- else +- strcpy (file_hdr->c_name, new_name.ds_string); +- } +- } ++ cpio_set_c_name (file_hdr, new_name.ds_string); + return 0; + } + +@@ -344,8 +323,7 @@ create_defered_links_to_skipped (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, + d_prev->next = d->next; + else + deferments = d->next; +- free (file_hdr->c_name); +- file_hdr->c_name = xstrdup(d->header.c_name); ++ cpio_set_c_name (file_hdr, d->header.c_name); + free_deferment (d); + copyin_regular_file(file_hdr, in_file_des); + return 0; +@@ -1064,6 +1042,22 @@ read_in_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des) + } + } + ++static void ++read_name_from_file (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int fd, uintmax_t len) ++{ ++ static char *tmp_filename; ++ static size_t buflen; ++ ++ if (buflen < len) ++ { ++ buflen = len; ++ tmp_filename = xrealloc (tmp_filename, buflen); ++ } ++ ++ tape_buffered_read (tmp_filename, fd, len); ++ cpio_set_c_name (file_hdr, tmp_filename); ++} ++ + /* Fill in FILE_HDR by reading an old-format ASCII format cpio header from + file descriptor IN_DES, except for the magic number, which is + already filled in. */ +@@ -1090,14 +1084,8 @@ read_in_old_ascii (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des) + file_hdr->c_rdev_min = minor (dev); + + file_hdr->c_mtime = FROM_OCTAL (ascii_header.c_mtime); +- file_hdr->c_namesize = FROM_OCTAL (ascii_header.c_namesize); + file_hdr->c_filesize = FROM_OCTAL (ascii_header.c_filesize); +- +- /* Read file name from input. */ +- if (file_hdr->c_name != NULL) +- free (file_hdr->c_name); +- file_hdr->c_name = (char *) xmalloc (file_hdr->c_namesize + 1); +- tape_buffered_read (file_hdr->c_name, in_des, (long) file_hdr->c_namesize); ++ read_name_from_file (file_hdr, in_des, FROM_OCTAL (ascii_header.c_namesize)); + + /* HP/UX cpio creates archives that look just like ordinary archives, + but for devices it sets major = 0, minor = 1, and puts the +@@ -1152,14 +1140,8 @@ read_in_new_ascii (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des) + file_hdr->c_dev_min = FROM_HEX (ascii_header.c_dev_min); + file_hdr->c_rdev_maj = FROM_HEX (ascii_header.c_rdev_maj); + file_hdr->c_rdev_min = FROM_HEX (ascii_header.c_rdev_min); +- file_hdr->c_namesize = FROM_HEX (ascii_header.c_namesize); + file_hdr->c_chksum = FROM_HEX (ascii_header.c_chksum); +- +- /* Read file name from input. */ +- if (file_hdr->c_name != NULL) +- free (file_hdr->c_name); +- file_hdr->c_name = (char *) xmalloc (file_hdr->c_namesize); +- tape_buffered_read (file_hdr->c_name, in_des, (long) file_hdr->c_namesize); ++ read_name_from_file (file_hdr, in_des, FROM_HEX (ascii_header.c_namesize)); + + /* In SVR4 ASCII format, the amount of space allocated for the header + is rounded up to the next long-word, so we might need to drop +@@ -1207,16 +1189,9 @@ read_in_binary (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, + file_hdr->c_rdev_min = minor (short_hdr->c_rdev); + file_hdr->c_mtime = (unsigned long) short_hdr->c_mtimes[0] << 16 + | short_hdr->c_mtimes[1]; +- +- file_hdr->c_namesize = short_hdr->c_namesize; + file_hdr->c_filesize = (unsigned long) short_hdr->c_filesizes[0] << 16 + | short_hdr->c_filesizes[1]; +- +- /* Read file name from input. */ +- if (file_hdr->c_name != NULL) +- free (file_hdr->c_name); +- file_hdr->c_name = (char *) xmalloc (file_hdr->c_namesize); +- tape_buffered_read (file_hdr->c_name, in_des, (long) file_hdr->c_namesize); ++ read_name_from_file (file_hdr, in_des, short_hdr->c_namesize); + + /* In binary mode, the amount of space allocated in the header for + the filename is `c_namesize' rounded up to the next short-word, +@@ -1297,6 +1272,7 @@ process_copy_in () + read_pattern_file (); + } + file_hdr.c_name = NULL; ++ file_hdr.c_namesize = 0; + + if (rename_batch_file) + { +diff --git a/src/copyout.c b/src/copyout.c +index 1f0987a..bb39559 100644 +--- a/src/copyout.c ++++ b/src/copyout.c +@@ -660,8 +660,7 @@ process_copy_out () + cpio_safer_name_suffix (input_name.ds_string, false, + !no_abs_paths_flag, true); + #ifndef HPUX_CDF +- file_hdr.c_name = input_name.ds_string; +- file_hdr.c_namesize = strlen (input_name.ds_string) + 1; ++ cpio_set_c_name (&file_hdr, input_name.ds_string); + #else + if ( (archive_format != arf_tar) && (archive_format != arf_ustar) ) + { +@@ -670,16 +669,15 @@ process_copy_out () + properly recreate the directory as hidden (in case the + files of a directory go into the archive before the + directory itself (e.g from "find ... -depth ... | cpio")). */ +- file_hdr.c_name = add_cdf_double_slashes (input_name.ds_string); +- file_hdr.c_namesize = strlen (file_hdr.c_name) + 1; ++ cpio_set_c_name (&file_hdr, ++ add_cdf_double_slashes (input_name.ds_string)); + } + else + { + /* We don't mark CDF's in tar files. We assume the "hidden" + directory will always go into the archive before any of + its files. */ +- file_hdr.c_name = input_name.ds_string; +- file_hdr.c_namesize = strlen (input_name.ds_string) + 1; ++ cpio_set_c_name (&file_hdr, input_name.ds_string); + } + #endif + +@@ -866,8 +864,7 @@ process_copy_out () + file_hdr.c_chksum = 0; + + file_hdr.c_filesize = 0; +- file_hdr.c_namesize = 11; +- file_hdr.c_name = CPIO_TRAILER_NAME; ++ cpio_set_c_name (&file_hdr, CPIO_TRAILER_NAME); + if (archive_format != arf_tar && archive_format != arf_ustar) + write_out_header (&file_hdr, out_file_des); + else +diff --git a/src/cpiohdr.h b/src/cpiohdr.h +index b29e6fb..f4c63be 100644 +--- a/src/cpiohdr.h ++++ b/src/cpiohdr.h +@@ -129,5 +129,6 @@ struct cpio_file_stat /* Internal representation of a CPIO header */ + char *c_tar_linkname; + }; + ++void cpio_set_c_name(struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, char *name); + + #endif /* cpiohdr.h */ +diff --git a/src/tar.c b/src/tar.c +index a2ce171..e41f89d 100644 +--- a/src/tar.c ++++ b/src/tar.c +@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ read_in_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des) + if (null_block ((long *) &tar_rec, TARRECORDSIZE)) + #endif + { +- file_hdr->c_name = CPIO_TRAILER_NAME; ++ cpio_set_c_name (file_hdr, CPIO_TRAILER_NAME); + return; + } + #if 0 +@@ -316,9 +316,11 @@ read_in_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des) + } + + if (archive_format != arf_ustar) +- file_hdr->c_name = stash_tar_filename (NULL, tar_hdr->name); ++ cpio_set_c_name (file_hdr, stash_tar_filename (NULL, tar_hdr->name)); + else +- file_hdr->c_name = stash_tar_filename (tar_hdr->prefix, tar_hdr->name); ++ cpio_set_c_name (file_hdr, stash_tar_filename (tar_hdr->prefix, ++ tar_hdr->name)); ++ + file_hdr->c_nlink = 1; + file_hdr->c_mode = FROM_OCTAL (tar_hdr->mode); + file_hdr->c_mode = file_hdr->c_mode & 07777; +@@ -398,7 +400,7 @@ read_in_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des) + case AREGTYPE: + /* Old tar format; if the last char in filename is '/' then it is + a directory, otherwise it's a regular file. */ +- if (file_hdr->c_name[strlen (file_hdr->c_name) - 1] == '/') ++ if (file_hdr->c_name[file_hdr->c_namesize - 1] == '/') + file_hdr->c_mode |= CP_IFDIR; + else + file_hdr->c_mode |= CP_IFREG; +diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c +index 6ff6032..4f3c073 100644 +--- a/src/util.c ++++ b/src/util.c +@@ -1410,8 +1410,34 @@ set_file_times (int fd, + utime_error (name); + } + ++ ++void ++cpio_set_c_name (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, char *name) ++{ ++ static size_t buflen = 0; ++ size_t len = strlen (name) + 1; ++ ++ if (buflen == 0) ++ { ++ buflen = len; ++ if (buflen < 32) ++ buflen = 32; ++ file_hdr->c_name = xmalloc (buflen); ++ } ++ else if (buflen < len) ++ { ++ buflen = len; ++ file_hdr->c_name = xrealloc (file_hdr->c_name, buflen); ++ } ++ ++ file_hdr->c_namesize = len; ++ memmove (file_hdr->c_name, name, len); ++} ++ + /* Do we have to ignore absolute paths, and if so, does the filename +- have an absolute path? */ ++ have an absolute path? Before calling this function make sure that the ++ allocated NAME buffer has capacity at least 2 bytes. */ ++ + void + cpio_safer_name_suffix (char *name, bool link_target, bool absolute_names, + bool strip_leading_dots) +@@ -1426,6 +1452,10 @@ cpio_safer_name_suffix (char *name, bool link_target, bool absolute_names, + ++p; + } + if (p != name) ++ /* The 'p' string is shortened version of 'name' with one exception; when ++ the 'name' points to an empty string (buffer where name[0] == '\0') the ++ 'p' then points to static string ".". So caller needs to ensure there ++ are at least two bytes available in 'name' buffer so memmove succeeds. */ + memmove (name, p, (size_t)(strlen (p) + 1)); + } + +diff --git a/tests/inout.at b/tests/inout.at +index 60c3716..730cbd2 100644 +--- a/tests/inout.at ++++ b/tests/inout.at +@@ -35,7 +35,22 @@ while read NAME LENGTH + do + genfile --length $LENGTH > $NAME + echo $NAME +-done < filelist | +- cpio --quiet -o > archive]) ++done < filelist > filelist_raw ++ ++for format in bin odc newc crc tar ustar hpbin hpodc ++do ++ cpio --format=$format --quiet -o < filelist_raw > archive.$format ++ rm -rf output ++ mkdir output && cd output ++ cpio -i --quiet < ../archive.$format ++ ++ while read file ++ do ++ test -f $file || echo "$file not found" ++ done < ../filelist_raw ++ ++ cd .. ++done ++]) + + AT_CLEANUP +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb index 19ad69b037..69d36983e3 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=f27defe1e96c2e1ecd4e0c9be8967949" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/cpio/cpio-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Unset-need_charset_alias-when-building-for-musl.patch \ file://0001-Fix-CVE-2015-1197.patch \ + file://0001-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "fc207561a86b63862eea4b8300313e86" -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf