From b3bf5ccd83f501f217713bb7c936a1e8817b92ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Armin Kuster Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 16:55:16 -0700 Subject: qemu: Security fix for CVE-2020-29443 Source: Qemu.org MR: 109315 Type: Security Fix Disposition: Backport from https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=813212288970c39b1800f63e83ac6e96588095c6 ChangeID: c0296e285169cc937cc9758c9d84ac690297ee54 Description: (From OE-Core rev: 1765005f73303d9857f9fde93efb1cc8534964f1) Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools') diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc index 76bfb4fcf9..bd1a83955f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-25624_1.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25624_2.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25625.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-29443.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1528d5c2fd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 813212288970c39b1800f63e83ac6e96588095c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 13:09:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] ide: atapi: assert that the buffer pointer is in range + +A case was reported where s->io_buffer_index can be out of range. +The report skimped on the details but it seems to be triggered +by s->lba == -1 on the READ/READ CD paths (e.g. by sending an +ATAPI command with LBA = 0xFFFFFFFF). For now paper over it +with assertions. The first one ensures that there is no overflow +when incrementing s->io_buffer_index, the second checks for the +buffer overrun. + +Note that the buffer overrun is only a read, so I am not sure +if the assertion failure is actually less harmful than the overrun. + +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +Message-id: 20201201120926.56559-1-pbonzini@redhat.com +Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf +Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-29443 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + hw/ide/atapi.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hw/ide/atapi.c b/hw/ide/atapi.c +index 14a2b0bb2f..e79157863f 100644 +--- a/hw/ide/atapi.c ++++ b/hw/ide/atapi.c +@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ void ide_atapi_cmd_reply_end(IDEState *s) + s->packet_transfer_size -= size; + s->elementary_transfer_size -= size; + s->io_buffer_index += size; ++ assert(size <= s->io_buffer_total_len); ++ assert(s->io_buffer_index <= s->io_buffer_total_len); + + /* Some adapters process PIO data right away. In that case, we need + * to avoid mutual recursion between ide_transfer_start +-- +2.25.1 + -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf